Office of the Historian

197. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Vance1

Washington, February 12, 1979

Central America and Nicaragua

I had occasion to discuss the Nicaraguan situation at length with Guatemalan President Lucas and Foreign Minister Castillo Valdez February 9–10 during the Central American Trade Conference in New Orleans. Copy of a cable detailing those conversations (there were three separate ones) is attached.2

What those talks revealed were:

—Lucas is afraid that if Somoza is forced out or leaves early it will create a vacuum which Castristas would fill; he does not believe there is any other alternative to Somoza; and he dismisses the moderate middle as incapable of governing.

—Lucas therefore opposes any pressure on Somoza to step down or negotiate a transition. He thinks Somoza should finish out his term, but should leave after that and not try to perpetuate the dynasty.

—Perhaps as a rationalization of his fear of change, and perhaps partly because he has been convinced, Lucas has clearly bought Somoza’s version of the situation. His description of the situation sounded exactly like that Somoza used to lay out for Bill Bowdler.

—Lucas will try to rally his Honduran and Salvadoran colleagues to support a status quo arrangement. He would like the U.S. to support that, or at least passively acquiesce. He would like us to stop creating pressure on Somoza.

—Castillo wants to come to Washington to see the President and you to seek that position.

What in effect is happening is that Somoza is succeeding in rallying his Central American colleagues (less Costa Rica of course) behind him and enlisting their aid in deflecting international—and especially U.S.—pressure on him. What this means in turn is:

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—Serious ideological division between Costa Rica and the other Central American nations.

—A serious potential risk that we will see a polarization in the whole region, not just Nicaragua. If the regimes band together, the guerrilla groups may do likewise. We may thus see transnational interactions on both ends of the spectrum, which will make the whole region a tinder box and a temptation to Castro.

We will be considering ways to prevent serious polarization, to bolster the middle in all these countries, and to foster support for evolutionary change.

  1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, February 1–March 16, 1979. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Vaky. Copies were sent to Newsom, Christopher, and Bowdler. Tarnoff initialed the memorandum.↩
  2. Attached but not printed is telegram 36811 to Guatemala City, February 12, entitled “Conversation with President Lucas on Nicaragua.”↩