Office of the Historian

198. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, February 13, 1979

SUBJECT

  • Nicaragua Update (S)

Last Thursday2 President Perez of Venezuela called our Ambassador to his residence and commented on our move to “distance ourselves” from the Somoza government, which had been announced earlier in the day.3 He urged that we confront the OAS soonest with the IAHRC report to obtain strong sanctions against Somoza.4 (C)

We are consulting with member countries of the OAS to determine the strength of support for a resolution to condemn the government of Nicaragua for its violations of human rights. Seventeen votes will be necessary to pass a resolution, and we count 13 (including ourselves) who will support a strongly worded resolution. The remaining four votes will have to come from Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Bolivia, Honduras, or Trinidad. The stronger the resolution, the more difficult [Page 521] the two-thirds vote. But a very mild resolution will be exploitable by Somoza and will serve his ends. We are hoping for the reconvening of the 17th MFM by February 19. (C)

Dominican Foreign Minister Jimenez agrees with our strategy in convening the MFM of the OAS to present orally and prefunctorily the mediation report and to seek a resolution on the IAHRC findings in Nicaragua. He stated, however, that visits to Colombia and Venezuela will make it impossible for him to be in Washington until the first week of March. (C)

We presented demarches to the governments of Cuba, Panama, Venezuela, and Costa Rica to express our concern over reports that they have provided arms and other support to the Sandinistas.5 Panama’s Torrijos admitted giving aid in the past but said that Perez, Campins (the Venezuelan President-elect), and he had agreed “not to become further involved unless Costa Rica needs help.” He believes that we should take stronger measures to sever ties with Somoza, and observed that the only way to deal with Somoza is by a coup. (C)

At a meeting of the leaders of the various FSLN factions in Panama two weeks ago, a message from Fidel Castro was delivered inviting them to Cuba. Torrijos, according to an intelligence report, refused permission for their departure from Panama to Cuba.6 If they choose to fly from some other country that would be all right, he said. (S)

From a generally reliable intelligence source we have learned the details of what transpired at the meeting between Guatemalan President Lucas and his Honduran counterpart in Tegucigalpa last week. Lucas enlisted Paz’ support in formulating a regional policy (among Guatemala, El Sal., Honduras) toward Nicaragua. In short, because of the collapse of the mediation, Lucas wanted to insure that Somoza stuck to his promise to step down in 1981 and give way to a “democratic and anti-communist” government. In return for Somoza’s commitment, they would provide him with at least moral support in his campaign to defeat the FSLN. He asked (and received Paz’ concurrence) that Honduras increase its patrols along the Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Nicaraguan borders to prevent the movement of men and arms. (C)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 2/79. Secret. A notation in an unknown hand at the top of the memorandum reads: “DA has seen.”↩
  2. February 8.↩
  3. See footnote 12, Document 194.↩
  4. In telegram 1256 from Caracas, February 9, Luers reported on his February 8 meeting with Perez. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790063–0539)↩
  5. In telegram 34470 to multiple posts, February 9, the Department requested that the recipients make a démarche to the host governments regarding the supplying of arms to the Sandinistas: “Such transnational help provides the basis for Somoza to continue making charges of intervention in Nicaraguan domestic affairs, thereby shifting the focus of attention away from his own responsibility for the critical situation in Nicaragua.” The telegram also included specific talking points tailored to both individual posts and groupings of posts. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790066–0647)↩
  6. Not found.↩