Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala¹

Washington, February 3, 1979, 2327Z

30207. Subject: Message to Foreign Minister Castillo on Nicaraguan Mediation. Ref: Guatemala 0779.²

1. (C-Entire text)

2. Please deliver ASAP following personal message from Secretary Vance to Foreign Minister Castillo:

Begin text. I am writing you about a matter which is of serious concern to both of us: Nicaragua. I have followed events there closely over the past year and share your preoccupation that the violence which has occurred in that country, and is still taking place, endangers the peace and stability of the Central American area.

Indeed, it was because of this concern that the United States supported the effort in which our representatives, together with the Dominican Foreign Minister, participated in an attempt to bring the various Nicaraguan elements together in a negotiated solution.

I regret that this effort did not achieve the success we both had hoped. Nevertheless it did manage to bring about a restoration of constitutional guarantees, a general amnesty and the lifting of the state of siege and censorship which has at least helped to ameliorate the tensions which built up during the course of the past year.

—Both our countries can be proud of the fine contribution our two representatives made to this effort, and I hope that we can continue to be unified in our approach to this problem. As you know, Mr. Minister, a letter has been prepared by all three mediators to be presented to the PLN which concludes regretfully that the mediation effort has not been successful in attaining its principal goal of assisting the Nicaraguan people to find a durable and democratic solution to their current political crisis. The mediators conclude, and I agree with their conclusion, that the mediation effort should therefore be recessed. I hope that this letter can be delivered as promptly as possible. I was therefore particularly distressed to learn that you have instructed your Ambassador not to sign that letter. I hope sincerely, Mr. Minister, that you will reconsider this step and agree to having all three representatives sign that letter. It is of the greatest importance, I believe, that this letter go forward to terminate this phase of mediation in reply to the PLN. May I therefore urge you to take that step.

I am also convinced, Mr. Minister, that the record of these negotiations is one of which we can be proud and which should be told. As you know, the three negotiators have also prepared a report recounting their efforts. This is intended simply as an historical record and not as a judgment or for purposes of debate.

I understand that you have reservations about such a report and have decided not to participate in it. I earnestly hope, Mr. Minister, that you will reconsider this decision as well. I sincerely believe we have an obligation to inform the meeting of Foreign Ministers which was convened last September to consider the Nicaraguan crisis on the results of the conciliation efforts, mindful of the fact that the meeting gave specific encouragement to this initiative of our governments in paragraph 5 of its resolution of September 23.³ It is also important for the other member governments of the OAS to know how the effort was conducted and with what result. Finally, the public in our respective countries and throughout the hemisphere should be informed of the scope of the effort. Public understanding will contribute to the search for a solution rather than impede it.

It would be most unfortunate if after so close a cooperation between our three governments on this constructive enterprise, we were not able to act with equal cohesiveness in this final stage of our mediation effort. We should also, I would hope, act with equal unity in telling our regional organization and the world how well we worked in our search for a peaceful solution to the Nicaraguan crisis. It is in this spirit, Mr. Minister, that I urge most earnestly that you authorize your representative to join with his two colleagues in signing the letter to the PLN to close this procedural chapter. I hope also that you will reconsider your decision not to participate in a joint report to the OAS. Such steps on your part would continue the innovative statesmanlike and constructive role which your government has played in these matters and in Foreign Affairs generally under your leadership.

Respectfully yours, Cyrus Vance. End text.⁴

3. For Guatemala: Castillo’s assertion that we cannot meet with Secretary February 12 because he will be in Venezuela for the inauguration is obviously in error. Venezuelan inauguration is March rpt March 12.⁵

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22 Human Rights—Nicaragua X. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Managua and Santo Domingo. Drafted by Vaky, cleared in S/S–O; approved by Christopher.
2. Telegram 779 from Guatemala City, February 3, reported that Obiols was about to be withdrawn from the Negotiating Group and that the Guatemalan Government would not approve the Negotiating Group’s proposed reply to the PLN’s note of January 17. Castillo noted that Lucas had declined to meet with Bowdler because “he didn’t want to be insulted. i.e. high-pressured by the U.S. in an area where his mind was made up.” Further, Castillo said that Guatemala would “not repeat not submit independent report either.” If the United States “wished to submit a joint report, that was their business” and Guatemala “would probably be obliged to speak against it.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 2/79) Telegram 19476 to Guatemala City and Santo Domingo, January 24, transmitted the draft Negotiating Group reply to the PLN note of January 17 for review by Obiols and Jimenez in Santo Domingo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790036–0433) According to Bowdler’s February 6 memorandum of telephone conversation, Jimenez “indicated that he would be prepared to go ahead even though the Guatemalans had raised objections” to the Negotiating Group’s reply. (Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Nicaragua/El Salvador Working Files, Lot 81D64, Nicaragua—Misc. Memoranda, February 1–March 16, 1979)
3. See footnote 4, Document 107.
4. In telegram 30933 to Guatemala City, February 6, the Department stated: “In view of the fact that Guatemala is in the process of officially withdrawing Obiols from the Negotiating Group and that it apparently will not participate in signing the letter to reply to the PLN’s January 18 response to the Negotiating Group, we have decided to ask Jimenez to authorize a reply to Foreign Minister Quintana, acknowledging the receipt of its response and stating that the Negotiating Group has recessed its activities.” An unknown hand wrote: “Castillo concurred, Feb 6,” in the margin. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 35, Nicaragua: 2/79) In a February 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Pastor noted that Guatemala had formally ended its participation in the mediation effort on February 6. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 67, Nicaragua: 10/78–7/79)
5. In telegram 1206 from Guatemala City, February 22, the Embassy reported that Lucas had decided that “no purpose would be served by responding” to Vance’s February 3 message to Castillo and that Castillo and Lucas had decided not to accept the offer to meet with Vance on February 12 “because they had concluded that Department officials would not really listen to the Guatemalan view that the mediation group (which was supposed to be a ‛friendly commission’) had in fact intervened in Nicaragua.” Castillo “reiterated that the US had intervened in Nicaragua when it put the Somozas in power. That intervention had polarized the country. The right-wingers who Somoza had made rich now only opposed Somoza because the US had intervened again.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790083–0012)