Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

193. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the White House¹

Santo Domingo, January 23, 1979, 1446Z

321. To: The White House. From: Robert Pastor, Santo Domingo 321 Section 1 of 2. To: The White House, For Zbigniew Brzezinski and David Aaron.

The time for decision has arrived. We delay only at the risk of seeing all our efforts in Nicaragua come to naught.

After Somoza responded to the mediators’ December 20th proposal by saying that he could not accept an international plebiscite authority running an election in Nicaragua, the FAO and the three mediators all felt that we had come to the end of the line. They said it was time to show Somoza that we were serious when we had told him that rejection of the plebiscite proposal would adversely affect our relations. The President, of course, felt that Somoza’s objection had merit, and so we went the extra mile to persuade the other two mediators to accept a revised counter proposal. Because we knew it would be difficult for the FAO to accept a new proposal when they had risked significant internal division to accept the earlier one, we decided that we would tell them and Somoza that this was our bottom line. We did not intend to let Somoza diddle on any of the other plebiscite details, if he insisted on asking for more, we intended to tell him that we would withdraw the Milgroup and Peace Corps, and significantly reduce the size of our A.I.D. Mission and our Embassy.

As those who have been most skeptical of Somoza accurately predicted, he did respond by asking for more. We cannot go around the maypole again. The time has come to inform Somoza that we will take these steps outlined above. The critical question is how do we take these steps in a way which is most likely to encourage Somoza to accept the plebiscite or a change in government, or in a way which will leave him isolated. We also want to make the decision in a way which conforms to our previous pledges to our friends in and outside Nicaragua. I’m afraid State’s options paper is not helpful in considering this decision.² Option B is totally unrealistic, it presumes that we are capable of reneging on our pledges, and it violates the basic assumption which has guided our policy from the beginning: in the long-term, Somoza cannot win, the longer he hangs on, the more likely we will see a radical solution. Moreover, identifying with Somoza at this time will hurt us much more in Nicaragua and the world than it will help him. Thus, Option B is a recipe for disaster; not only will we look stupid in trying to return to “business as usual”, but it will probably accelerate the radicalization of Nicaragua by making it unambiguously clear to the majority of Nicaraguans who want to see Somoza leave that the Sandinistas are the only alternative.

It is also unrealistic to think that we can “strike a deal” with Somoza. The exercise we have just been through on the plebiscite demostrates that he is willing to do almost anything just as long as the changes do not touch him directly. But as we have also learned: the issue is not what reforms Somoza can take; the issue is Somoza. On that issue, we can’t deal, and he won’t.

Let me recommend the following scenario for PRC consideration:

(1) First, we need to follow the mediation effort to its conclusion. The mediators should draft their report to the O.A.S. In that report, they need to place the responsibility for the breakdown in the mediation effort clearly on Somoza’s shoulders.

(2) After the mediators have completed a draft and before they formally submit a report, Amb. Solaun should describe it in general terms to Somoza and inform him that we intend to withdraw the Milgroup and Peace Corps, and significantly reduce our A.I.D. Mission and Embassy staff.

(3) When the O.A.S. meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM) convenes to hear this report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAHRC), we should explain in some detail that we had worked sincerely to mediate the crisis in Nicaragua, but that Somoza had evidently viewed it as a way to divert attention from the real crisis facing his country rather than try to address it. The FAO had also extended and exposed itself to try to negotiate a peaceful, democratic solution. It is therefore more with sorrow than anger that we have concluded that Somoza has been insincere and that the mediation has been suspended.

Based on these conclusions and taking into account the very serious report of the IAHRC, we have decided to reduce the USG presence in Nicaragua. We are aware that this presence—including the Milgroup, AID, Peace Corps, and the large Embassy—has in the past been used as an indication of our support for Somoza, and we don’t want anyone to misinterpret our position anymore. The International Mediation Group fashioned a proposal which we believe could resolve the crisis. The opposition accepted it but Somoza didn’t. We therefore cannot continue to have the same relationship with him in the future that we have had in the past. At this point, we should withdraw our MilGroup and take the other steps. It would have a positive effect on the O.A.S. debate.

(4) At the same time, we remain as concerned about the human rights situation in Nicaragua as ever, and we should be in front of the OAS debate to try to get a resolution deploring the human rights situation there and making it clear to Somoza that the OAS will find any decision on his part to kill or imprison opposition leaders as unacceptable.

(5) Amb. Solaun should not only maintain his contacts with FAO, COSEP and Church leaders, he should increase them—for two reasons: (1) to keep them from shifting their allegiance to the extreme left—a process which has already begun, and (2) to try to save them from Somoza. We have a certain responsibility to the democratic middle, which exposed itself during the mediation effort, and Somoza is likely to be more careful if we place them under our wing.

These are the steps which I hope the PRC will agree on. If we fail to take these steps, we will leave the moderate opposition in Nicaragua exposed; our credibility in Nicaragua and in the hemisphere destroyed, and we will invite a downward spiral of radicalization in Nicaragua.

There is one additional step, which I hope you will consider at this time, and that is to respond positively to the request by Edan Pastora³ for a low-level, discrete, and to the extent possible, secret contact with the Terciario wing of the Sandinistas. This should be done only if critical members of the FAO approve of the idea. Such a conduit could serve several purposes: (1) it could encourage division within the Sandinistas just at the time when their unity and strength has begun to attract elements from the middle. (2) If the Sandinistas ever overthrow Somoza, it would be good to have had these contacts before, not only because it can be a source of valuable information on their activities and organization, but because we will be in a better position to respond to questions from the public about why we know so little about such a potent political force (the same questions we are hearing about Iran). (3) It is not clear whether we can have much influence on the Sandinistas, but certainly we will have more influence if we contact them than if we don’t. Also to the extent that we contact them, they would have less reason to turn to the Cubans. (The Panamanians and Venezuelans played that role for a while, but apparently they took our statements of concern seriously and have, according to recent intelligence reports, reduced their contacts. The Cubans have apparently picked up the slack.) (4) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Somoza is likely to learn of those contacts, and when he does, he will for the first time realize that we do not intend to come to his support if the alternative is a Sandinista take-over. This may prove even more persuasive than the other steps to reduce our presence.

I have talked to Vaky about the idea of contacting the Sandinistas, and he strongly disagrees for four reasons: (1) It would confuse and undercut the FAO; (2) The evidence that Pastora is a strong or decisive leader is unclear; (3) We will invite Pastora to ask us for things which we can’t deliver (i.e., support and blessing); and (4) It could be misinterpreted in the U.S. I obviously do not find his arguments persuasive.

To the situation room; please pass to Richard Brown.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/24–31/79. Secret. Sent via Privacy Channels. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Pastor was in Santo Domingo to participate in the Caribbean Chiefs of Mission and AID Directors’ meeting January 22–24. (Telegram 18139 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, January 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790033–1122)
2. On January 22, in advance of a scheduled January 26 PRC meeting, Perry sent Brzezinski a paper entitled “Future Policy Toward Nicaragua.” The paper offered two policy options: “Option A. Distance ourselves and adopt a correct but not supportive relationship to Somoza, through a combination of unilateral and multilateral actions as described below, and thereby serve to encourage a broadly based centrist opposition group to maintain cohesion and independence;” and “Option B. Suspend mediation efforts and return to business-as-usual with the Somoza Government.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/24–31/79) Tarnoff sent a revised version of the policy paper, drafted by Bowdler, to Brzezinski on January 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua IX) For additional information on the PRC meeting, see Document 194.
3. Robelo met with Vaky, Bowdler, and Barneby on January 4. In telegram 2596 to Managua, January 5, the Department noted that during that January 4 meeting Robelo had “said he had talked to Eden Pastora two days ago by phone, and latter had asked Robelo to inquire if U.S. officials would be willing to receive him.” The Department also noted that Vaky had replied to Robelo that “in present circumstances, and particularly in view of U.S. role as mediator, any such meetings would be inadvisable at this juncture.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790006–0031)