Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

194. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 26, 1979

SUBJECT

• PRC on Nicaragua

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes the PRC meeting and requests your approval of the Conclusions.

Your recommendations were adopted unanimously by the PRC, but after you left, there was discussion on one issue which ran contrary to a point you had made privately to me. The PRC concluded that decisions to continue the suspension of the two AID loans which were signed but not implemented, and a decision not to have any new AID loans would permit a slight reduction in AID personnel in Managua. Apparently there were special AID personnel sent to Managua to administer the two loans which are currently suspended. I assume that is still consistent with the general point you made about not taking a punitive step in the economic assistance area. (S)

John Murphy has written the President a letter (Tab B)² which argues Somoza’s position on the outstanding issues of the plebiscite. State has prepared a draft response (Tab C)³ which addresses each of Murphy’s points. In addition, at Tab D, I have prepared a brief summary of the outstanding issues, Somoza’s (and Murphy’s) views, and the US view.⁴ I recommend that you not forward Tabs B, C, or D to the President. I believe that Secretary Vance should respond to Murphy’s letter, but I wanted to check with you on that point.⁵ (S)

I also recommend that you read the intelligence report at Tab E.⁶ It strikes me as very reliable, and confirms the premises which underlie the PRC’s recent decision. You may want to give that to the President. We have also just received a cable summarizing the conversation between Vaky and Panama President Royo (Tab F).⁷ Royo makes the point that if the US stopped extending aid or supporting Somoza, “that would create the necessary pressure” to ease Somoza out, and prevent the Communists from taking power. (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the memo at Tab I and forward it with the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A to the President.⁸

That you approve my contacting the State Department to suggest that Secretary Vance should respond to Murphy’s letter.⁹

Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹⁰

Washington, January 30, 1979

SUBJECT

• PRC on Nicaragua (S)

Christopher chaired a PRC meeting to decide on the next steps for U.S. policy in Nicaragua. There was a complete consensus—including Harold Brown and General David Jones—that the time had come for us to take a number of steps which would indicate that the U.S. would no longer be one of the pillars of support for General Somoza. As you will recall, our Ambassador told Somoza that if he rejected the mediators’ revised proposal, this would adversely affect our relations. Since then, Somoza has rejected the proposal, and our credibility with the moderate opposition in Nicaragua and with President Perez is at stake. (S)

The PRC therefore unanimously and strongly recommend that you approve the U.S. taking the following steps: termination of our military assistance and withdrawal of Milgroup; reduce non-essential official personnel in our Embassy in Managua; keep in suspense the two AID loans signed (but never implemented) last August; and disburse the remainder of the AID loans which have been partially implemented. In addition, for security reasons, we recommend withdrawing all Peace Corps personnel. We also intend to take diplomatic steps in the OAS and with other nations in the region to minimize the violence and increase the pressure on Somoza. (S)

The specific steps are identified in the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A. If you approve, we will announce and explain these steps in a public statement at an appropriate time next week. We will also brief Congressional leaders. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A, and the steps identified in #4.

Tab A

Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹¹

Washington, January 26, 1979, 3:40–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy to Nicaragua

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Ambassador William Bowdler, U.S. Mediator to Nicaragua
  • Mr. John Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs

• Defense

  • Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
  • Mr. David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

• JCS

  • General David Jones, Chairman, JCS
  • Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith, Assistant to the Chairman

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI
  • [name not declassified] Office of Regional and Political Analysis Analyst

• AID

  • Administrator John J. Gilligan
  • Mr. Edward W. Coy, Acting Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean

• NSC

  • Ambassador Henry Owen
  • Mr. Robert Pastor

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • David Aaron

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Purpose of Mediation Effort. There was agreement that we had reached a critical decision point. The moderate opposition (FAO) has grudgingly accepted the mediators’ revised proposal, but Somoza has not. Bowdler believes that we cannot break the impasse without making concessions which the FAO and the other two mediators could not accept. The mediators intend to submit a report to the O.A.S. which indicates they have not through mediation been successful in finding a solution to the crisis in Nicaragua. (S)

2. In Nicaragua. In the short term, Somoza has consolidated his position by significantly strengthening the National Guard. The Sandinistas appear intimidated and have changed their tactics, focusing on a longer term operation. With the Group of Twelve, they have set up a National Patriotic Front and have begun to attract elements of the FAO. The PRC agreed that polarization will increase over time, and that eventually Somoza will be vulnerable to a radical solution. (S)

3. Political Considerations. Rep. Charlie Wilson (D-Texas), who strongly supports Somoza, has threatened “to cut the heart out of the AID program” if we terminate reconstruction assistance for Nicaragua. He said he cares less about the question of withdrawing the Milgroup. (S)

4. U.S. Policy. The PRC unanimously agreed that we need to take the following politically symbolic steps now to show Somoza and the FAO that we were serious when we said that failure to agree to the mediators’ proposal would negatively affect our relations: terminate all military assistance and withdraw the Milgroup; withdraw all Peace Corps for security reasons; reduce non-essential official personnel; in a reconvened 17th meeting of O.A.S. Foreign Ministers, consider the report on Nicaragua of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the report of the Mediation Group and obtain as strong a censure of the Somoza regime as possible; continue to strongly urge governments likely to sell arms to Somoza or to provide weapons to the Sandinistas not to do so in order to limit escalation of the violence in Nicaragua; keep in suspense the two AID loans signed (but never implemented) last August; disburse the remainder of the AID loans which have been partially implemented; and don’t go ahead with any new aid at this time. These steps should be taken to signal our displeasure with Somoza’s intransigence and to get some distance between us without losing the possibility of influencing him in the future. While the decision to go ahead with the AID money in the pipeline will probably provoke criticism from the opposition, the PRC felt this would be balanced by the other steps and by a statement, which we should issue, pointing out the humanitarian aspects of the earthquake reconstruction aid (which Wilson is so concerned about). In the statement which is issued to explain these decisions, there will be a condemnation of violence and any attempt to begin such violence.¹² We would also remain ready to talk with Somoza if he is prepared to reconsider the mediators’ proposal. (S)

5. Next Steps. The PRC agreed to consider in a few weeks the suspension of on-going loans plus additional steps in a possible second phase effort to resolve the crisis.

Tab D

Paper Prepared in the National Security Council¹³

Washington, undated

Issues Raised in the Letter from Cong. Murphy to the President

1. Registration of Voters

Somoza View—Registration must be conducted in advance of the plebiscite to prevent confusion and to insure the bona fides of all voters.

U.S. view—For the plebiscite to be fair, it is not necessary for voters to be pre-registered. Precedent exists (of other referenda and plebiscites held in other parts of the world) that indicates pre-registration of voters is not necessary. Furthermore, the mediators’ proposal provides the three-member polling station board (PLN–FAO–PIA) with sufficient authority to determine the bona fides of eligible voters. The mediators found that the FAO would not accept the pre-registration because as Nicaraguans who have lived under the Somoza regime for decades, they sincerely viewed the pre-registration condition as a means through which Somoza would intimidate prospective voters and manipulate the election results in his favor.¹⁴

2. Question Posed in the Plebiscite

Somoza View—The question should consist of two parts: Should Somoza complete his constitutional term, or should a national constituent assembly be convened.

U.S. View—The question should be a simple, straight-forward proposition: Should Somoza continue as President of Nicaragua. The Somoza question (a) is confusing, (b) leaves open the possibility that Somoza could manipulate and control the constituent assembly if somehow he were to fail in winning enough votes on the first half of the question, and (c) is not acceptable to the FAO who see it as yet another cynical step by Somoza to confuse the issue.¹⁵

3. Departure of the Somozas in Advance of the Plebiscite

Somoza View—Would not be reasonable or fair to expect the key figure of a plebiscite to absent himself before the vote. (Murphy has been misled to believe that the mediators want President Somoza to depart before the plebiscite; in fact, they suggested that Somoza’s son and half-brother, who are top officers of the National Guard, be assigned abroad prior to the plebiscite.)

U.S. View—In order to help create a climate of trust and confidence among the Nicaraguan general public that a plebiscite could be conducted fairly, the departure of these key family members is essential. Somoza, however, would be free to conduct a normal political campaign in the period prior to the plebiscite.¹⁶

4. Right of Nicaraguans Living Abroad to Vote in the Plebiscite

Somoza View—This has never been a practice in Nicaraguan history and would be impossible to administer.

U.S. View—Many Nicaraguans have fled their country because of the repressive policies of the Somoza regime. To permit them to vote would only be fair. They can easily be identified by presenting passports to the three member (PLN–FAO–PIA) board designated to operate a polling station in mutually agreed upon sites abroad. This right is a well-known and widely practiced right, and, in fact, is a legal right recognized and insured to citizens of the U.S. and other democratic countries who reside abroad. It is not specifically prohibited under the Nicaraguan constitution.¹⁷

5. Redistricting Voting Precincts

Somoza View—Runs counter to customary voting practices, would cause confusion and would result in a degree of disenfranchisement of the rural population especially.

U.S. View—In order to restore confidence in the voting process, which under the Somozas has been fraudulently manipulated and perverted, it is necessary to redraw the districts to remove the precincts and polling stations from the control of Somoza officials. The mediators discovered that in order to dispel the deep skepticism of the FAO that a fair and just plebiscite could be conducted, a break with the Somoza voting structures had to be devised. We have every reason to believe more persons would vote in rural and urban areas if they feel confident that their vote will be truly secret, will be counted, and that they will not be harassed or persecuted for having participated in the voting.¹⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/24–31/79. Secret. Sent for action. Aaron initialed the top of the page and wrote: “fix it.” An unknown hand wrote “done” at the top of the page. Tabs I, A, and D are printed below.
2. The letter, dated January 22, is attached but not printed.
3. The response, dated January 25, is attached but not printed.
4. An unknown hand, underlined “not.”
5. In a February 10 letter, Vance replied to Murphy, endorsing the efforts of the Negotiating Group to advance a plebiscite. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Lot 81D113, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua X)
6. Tab E, attached but not printed, is a January 26 Intelligence Information Cable, which discussed a meeting among members of the Sandinista National Liberation Front, the Broad Opposition Front, and the Group of 12.
7. Attached but not printed, is telegram 651 from Panama City, January 26, which described Royo’s January 25 meeting with Moss and Vaky.
8. An unknown hand approved this recommendation.
9. An unknown hand approved this recommendation.
10. Secret. Carter wrote: “Zbig. J.” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
11. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote in the margin on the first page: “OK, but see my notes on remaining issues. A plebiscite conducted along terms outlined may provide a fallback option as alternative to armed insurrection. J.C.” The President’s notes are found in Tab D.
12. In telegram 32714 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, February 8, the Department included the text of the press announcement explaining the U.S. actions regarding Nicaragua. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/24–31/79)
13. No classification marking.
14. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “Somoza’s willingness to register up to 2 weeks of election would be adequate.”
15. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “But to leave anarchy behind him is hard to accept.”
16. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “I agree with Somoza.”
17. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “OK if registered up to 2 weeks of election day.”
18. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “Somoza is willing to redistrict urban areas—It may be ridiculous to change rural districts. (It would be in Plains).”