Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

192. Memorandum From Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 18, 1979

SUBJECT

• President’s Lunch² with Representative John Murphy (C)

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President briefing him for his lunch with Representative John Murphy. As you know, this is a very critical conversation. Murphy will come in well-armed by Somoza to try to turn the President around. If he succeeds, we can kiss Nicaragua good-bye. Moreover, I feel Somoza will give his response to our proposal to Murphy before he gives it to us. That will obviously put the President at a significant disadvantage. Therefore, while I know that you like to keep the briefing paper to the President to one page, I think this luncheon permits an exception to the rule. Besides, I have sent only one of the five briefing papers that the State Department has sent for him.³ (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I and send it with the Tabs to the President.⁴

Tab I

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter⁵

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Your lunch with Rep. John Murphy January 19, 1979

From the foreign policy perspective, your meeting has three purposes: (1) to try to secure the cooperation of John Murphy in passing the Panama Canal implementing legislation by June; (2) to inform him that the proposal presented by the mediators for a Nicaraguan plebiscite on January 12 was our bottom line, and if Somoza does not accept it, or if he tries to draw out the negotiations by bickering over details, our relations with his government will be seriously and negatively affected; and (3) to make clear that you will not permit any linkage between the two issues. (C)

As an opponent of the Canal Treaties, Murphy would be difficult enough to win over even if there weren’t policy differences between us on Nicaragua. A classmate and very close friend of Somoza, Murphy is angry that your Administration has abandoned (what he views as) one of America’s best friends, Anastasio Somoza. I suggest you read the cable summarizing Murphy’s conversations in Panama for a flavor of his views on the two issues of Panama and Nicaragua. (see Tab A).⁶

Panama. Murphy introduced implementing legislation on Monday which causes us a number of problems. In particular, he wants to maintain continued Congressional authority by establishing an appropriated fund agency to run the Canal rather than an independent corporation as we prefer. Also, he wants to draw the American members of the Commission from private life, while we favor appointing USG officials so as to assure a coordinated US approach. We expect that our implementing legislation will be submitted next Monday.⁷ You should note our strong interest in cooperating closely with Murphy to pass a bill by June 1 and assure a peaceful and stable transition to a new Panama Canal administration. (C) (see Tab B).⁸

Nicaragua. It seems likely that he will try to exploit whatever leverage he thinks he has to try to reverse your policy on Nicaragua. You need to be very firm with him. He is so close to Somoza that if he leaves your lunch thinking that you might reconsider issues such as economic or military aid, he will telephone this information to Somoza immediately. And we have no doubt that Somoza would interpret any such information in a way that could undermine the mediation effort and everything we have been trying to do there.

On January 12, after Bowdler had persuaded the other two mediators to adopt our changes in their initial plebiscite proposal (i.e., accept Somoza’s proposal for a national plebiscite authority, although it would be closely monitored and supervised by international observers), the three mediators met with Somoza. Earlier, they had met with the opposition (FAO) which accepted the revised proposal, but refused to publicly commit themselves to it until Somoza accepted it. (C)

Somoza has promised to respond on January 19.⁹ As soon as we receive his response, I will brief you on it, but based on conversations with his Ambassador, we expect Somoza will respond with a “heavily qualified acceptance”, i.e. he will insist on pre-registration (he sees this as the last way to manipulate the process and intimidate voters) and on his plebiscite question, which is confusing and side-steps the major issue: whether Somoza should continue in office till 1981.

The mediation effort was established in order to preserve the democratic middle in Nicaragua, which was threatened by Somoza and the Sandinistas. We decided to support a plebiscite because it provides an opportunity for the Nicaraguan people to participate in a process which would peacefully and legitimately facilitate Somoza’s departure, if as seems clear, he enjoys practically no popular support. (C)

Somoza has recently told us that he has successfully split the middle, that he can defeat the Sandinistas, and that he can make it without us. We question all three points. First, we believe that the moderate opposition will probably fragment if the mediation collapses: many will join the National Front recently established by the Sandinistas; others will flee the country. Second, Somoza is unquestionably stronger than the Sandinistas now, but as the country becomes more polarized, he will find himself in as isolated a position as the Shah; only by then, the only alternative will be the Sandinistas. Finally, we think Somoza still fears U.S. disassociation from his regime. If the U.S. abandons Somoza, he really has nowhere else to turn for international support; even the southern core military regimes won’t touch him. (C)

I recommend that you approach Murphy firmly, though more in sorrow than in anger. The mediators have gone more than halfway with their compromise proposal. Unless Somoza accepts it soon, and a plebiscite which is credible to the Nicaraguan people is set in motion, we can not continue our historic relationship. The human rights abuses described in the report by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights¹⁰ were tragic and deplorable. We fear that if the mediation breaks down, these abuses will increase as will violence and political polarization. (C)

You may want to tell Murphy in quite specific terms that we have gone about as far as we can, and that you intend to withdraw the Milgroup, reduce the AID mission and our Embassy staff, and for security reasons, withdraw the Peace Corps, unless Somoza accepts the proposal. (Bowdler has not been that specific yet.)¹¹ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/17–23/79. Confidential. The memorandum was sent through Albright. Brzezinski did not initial the memorandum. Aaron wrote at the top of the first page “DA. good memo.” Inderfurth wrote the word “urgent,” underlined it, and initialed at the top of the page.
2. Inderfurth drew a line to the word “lunch” and wrote “tomorrow (Friday)” in the right-hand margin.
3. Reference is to an undated paper entitled, “Highlights of President Somoza’s January 18 Response to the Negotiating Group on a Plebiscite,” upon which Carter initialed the top of the first page. Susan Clough, Carter’s Personal Assistant and Secretary, wrote a covering note to the memorandum on January 19 stating: “Rick Inderfurth just brought this from Brzezinski’s office, and said you had requested it for your lunch. If it’s something you want to give during lunch, please keep. If it’s briefing material . . . I’ll put it on your desk.” Carter wrote at the bottom of the covering note: “No bill yet. Hum Rts—after uprising,” referring to his lunch meeting with Murphy. An unknown hand wrote at the bottom of the note: “Return to ZB.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/19–23/79)
4. Brzezinski did not approve or disapprove of the recommendation.
5. Confidential. The memorandum is unsigned.
6. Tab A, attached but not printed, is telegram 243 from Panama City, January 10, in which Moss reported to Vaky that Murphy visited Panama January 9–10 at the invitation of Royo. Moss wrote: “Murphy said that he advised Royo that Panama stay as far away from the Nicaraguan situation as possible and ‛uncouple itself’ from the events in Nicaragua; otherwise, the notion of Panamanian involvement could be disastrous for the passage of implementing legislation” for the Panama Canal Treaty. Moss also noted that Murphy had told him: “The United States should see the light, cease its policies of strangling the Somoza regime through cutoff of AID, military assistance, IMF funds, etc., and let Somoza get on with the business of running his country and restoring peace and stability.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 1/17–23/79)
7. January 22.
8. Not attached.
9. See Document 191 and footnote 3 thereto.
10. See Document 144.
11. On January 19, from noon to 1:05 p.m., Carter participated in a luncheon meeting with Murphy and Murphy’s wife Kathleen to discuss the Panama Canal implementation legislation, maritime policy, and the Nicaraguan situation. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of the luncheon meeting has been found.