Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980; Volume XV; Central America, 1977–1980

172. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State¹

Managua, December 22, 1978, 1645Z

6748. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky from Bowdler—Caracas, Panama and San Jose for Ambassador—SouthCom for McAuliffe. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation No. 270: PLN Response to NG Proposal. Ref: Managua 6740.²

1. (S-Entire text)

2. By separate message (Managua 6747)³ I am sending the PLN response to the NG proposal which was delivered to FonMin Jimenez during the night.

3. As you will see, it ostensibly leaves the door open to further negotiations but raises so many objections to the NG proposal as to constitute as negative. Hence the objective which Gen McAuliffe and I described in reftel (i.e. give Somoza such a jolt prior to the PLN reply so as to bring about acceptance of the NG proposal) is OBE. The indication that the PLN will in due course present a counter proposal is designed to escape shouldering full responsibility for failure of the talks. The fact remains that Somoza has decided not repeat not to accept the kind of an independent plebiscite which is required and the only type which the FAO—and we—can accept.

4. I do not think that this development alters the need to proceed rapidly with the steps recommended in reftel. In the face of the events of last September, the human rights situation here (despite the improvements won by the NG), and the [garble] to the NG proposal, I do not see how we can return to business as usual with Somoza. Our credibility with the moderate democratic forces in Nicaragua whom we have encouraged—and exposed—is at stake. The same might be said for our human rights policy in the hemisphere.

5. If the balance of democratic governments vs military regimes in the hemisphere were more favorable, we might consider OAS action to condemn and diplomatically isolate Somoza as the regional body did with Trujillo; but the balance is different today. So I think we should take the lead unilaterally and invite likeminded states to do the same. The NG will be meeting next Wednesday December 27 in Santo Domingo to draft its report. Whether this report, together with the IAHRC report,⁴ will establish sufficient basis to persuade enough OAS member governments to condemn the Somoza regime and call for its diplomatic isolation, I am not in a position to judge. I would hope so. But in the face of this uncertainty, I think our cause in Nicaragua and the hemisphere would be served if we were to take, while the rejection of the mediation is still fresh to clearly draw a cause-and-effect relationship, the measures recommended in reftel in advance of any OAS conclave on Nicaragua.

Solaun

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2285. Secret; Flash; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.
2. See Document 171.
3. In telegram 6747 from Managua, December 22, the Embassy included a translation of the PLN response to the NG’s draft compromise plan noting seven objections: revisions to the voter registration system; voting by non-resident Nicaraguans; removal of all Somoza family members from the National Guard; oversight of the vote by an international authority; modification of the constitution following the outcome of the vote; the loss of authority for selecting symbols by the political organizations; and the reorganization of electoral districts. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/23–31/78)
4. See Document 144.