171. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff1
6740. Department for Assistant Secretary Vaky and Deputy Secretary Christopher from Bowdler—SecDef for McGiffert from McAuliffe—JCS for General Jones from McAuliffe—This is a joint Bowdler-McAuliffe Message. Subj: Nicaragua Mediation No. 266: McAuliffe/Bowdler Talk with Somoza.
1. (S-Entire text)
2. General McAuliffe and Ambassador Bowdler met with President Somoza at 10:30 am December 21 at “Laccurva”, his home sitting on the hill above “the bunker.” No one else was present. The meeting lasted about an hour and twenty minutes.
3. Using the talking points contained in State 3199552 Bowdler first reviewed our concern over the position taken by the PLN negotiators. Bowdler told him we failed to understand why they had adopted this attitude. We do not consider valid their argument about the FAO’s unwillingness to enter his government in the event of victory in the plebiscite. There are no historical precedents where an incumbent government compelled a reluctant opposition group to agree to a coalition government before a significant event like the plebiscite. This position would not find any international support. Bowdler asked him whether a victory under international supervision and a pledge by the FAO to remain as a peaceful, constructive opposition—as it had agreed to do—was not an adequate outcome for him and the PLN? He did not attempt an answer. Instead he shifted the conversation to specific aspects of the proposal arguing that these were interventionist, damaging to national dignity or “unequivalent” as between what was asked of the FAO and the PLN.
4. This led to a plowing of many of the same furrows covered in Bowdler’s two previous talks with Somoza, such as: Somoza as the central issue to the political crisis, lack of public confidence in the formulas advanced by the PLN for a plebiscite and constituent assembly, partial vs. total constitutional revision, role of the PLN and Guardia National in working out the political solution, etc. He asked Bowdler [Page 440] the first two of the three questions raised by Pallais and Bowdler repeated the answers. He did not raise the third. The only hint he gave about the PLN reply to the NG proposal was that a detailed response would be prepared covering various aspects that the PLN could not accept, such as the internationally controlled elections and “radical” changes in government structure. It was clear that he was not thinking in terms of what the NG had requested, i.e., a clear cut answer of whether the PLN found the proposal acceptable in principle or not. (Subsequent to our talk with Somoza, Quintana called Jimenez to say that the PLN was drafting a counterproposal that would be ready “early in January.” Quintana asked whether the NG would come back to receive it. Jimenez told him that the NG would return if there were a disposition to accept the NG proposal and work out the details. Otherwise Quintana could send the counterproposal to the NG members through their Embassies. The NG planned to convene in Santo Domingo December 27 or 28 to draft its report to the MFM.)
5. After this exchange General McAuliffe entered the conversation, making the following points:
—His presence there was evidence of the concern of the JCS and DOD;
—The US military want peace and stability in Nicaragua and in Central America; instability and violence provide opportunities that Cuba and other inimical elements can exploit. (Somoza referred to the region as America’s “underbelly.”)
—We have had a long and effective military relationship with the Guardia Nacional and in particular with Somoza.
—However, the situation has changed, and we now foresee no durable peace in Nicaragua so long as Somoza remains;
—It is important that the GN continue to function to ensure tranquility in the country and to preclude opportunistic power-plays during the transition; however, it should be restructured to separate the police from military functions.
—The present mediation effort and proposed plebiscite offer the best means of ensuring a peaceful and fair solution and should be kept on track; further compromises on his part would be needed to do so.
6. President Somoza at this point undertook an extensive review of the position he has taken and the compromises he had made at the request of the United States since he first assumed positions of responsibility in the country. He repeated virtually all the arguments previously made to Ambassador Bowdler and to Ambassador Jorden. He acknowledged that the major issue was “Somoza” and that the current mediation team proposal was a clever way to remove the Somozas. He protested the unfairness of the positions taken by the [Page 441] mediation team and backed by the opposition. He reiterated that the plebiscite was not in accordance with the Nicaraguan tradition, nor as fair as the American election process. (It was clear from his comments to Bowdler and McAuliffe that he found the international supervision and control of the plebiscite especially troublesome.) He said that he appreciated the concern of the JCS for the seriousness of the situation, and that he, too, was deadly serious. On the GN, he indicated that he had considered (or was considering—this was waffled) removing the two Somozas, by retiring Jose and having Tachito take up another profession. In brief, he took pains with General McAuliffe to defend his position.
7. Assessment: President Somoza turned the demarche around to a vigorous defense of his position and of the actions taken by his PLN negotiators. He obviously saw the meeting as a means of conveying his views to the U.S. military. He appeared confident that he has the upper hand, and controlled the situation. He does not appear convinced that the United States fully opposes him, although he acknowledges that some sectors do. He is embarked on a course of delaying the negotiating process until it fails, but will take pains to try to shift responsibility to the FAO and the NG or at least fudge the issue.
8. Recommendation: It was clear to us that we are not going to have any significant impact on Somoza until he understands that his failure to accept the NG proposal will result in concrete action by the USG against him. We do not believe the gradual, piecemeal approach will work. Consequently we recommend:
A) That Somoza be told by Saturday, December 23 (so that it may influence formulation of the GON response) that unless the present mediation team proposal is accepted at least in principle and the PLN negotiators instructed to cooperate in rapidly negotiating a final document with the FAO, the United States will take immediate action to withdraw from the country the U.S. military group, the AID Mission, ICA, and Peace Corps and the US Ambassador.
B) That, within the USG, provision be made so that, when a new government is formed in Nicaragua in the future the MilGp and other elements mentioned in (A) can be restored.
9. Ambassador Solaun has seen this message and concurs in the recommendation.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780187–2287. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, San José, Panama City, and USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.↩
- See Document 168.↩