168. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Nicaragua and the Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command (McAuliffe)1
319955. Military Special Exclusive—Managua for Amb Bowdler. Subject: Nicaragua Mediation: New Demarche to Somoza. Ref: Managua 6650.2
1. (S-Entire text)
2. General McAuliffe is authorized to go to Managua to accompany Ambassador Bowdler in the demarche proposed reftel. He should communicate immediately with Ambassador Bowdler as to timing.
3. The question of removing some or all of U.S. Government personnel should be examined in the light of the demarche to Somoza.
4. Talking points in reftel are approved with the following amendments/additions:
—For talking point c, we suggest some added arguments as follows: The willingness of the FAO to enter a government under your direction in the event you win the plebiscite is not a valid argument for refusing to negotiate a plebiscite package. There are no historical precedents where the incumbent government compelled reluctant opposition party or group to agree to a coalition government before a significant event, like a vote of confidence. In France, Great Britain, Italy, even Colombia (where there have been pacts before an election), and other countries, the opposition has always been free to decide whether or not to join a coalition government. You cannot compel the FAO to join your government if they feel they could help Nicaragua better by being a constructive, moderate opposition party. Your position will not have any international support. In any case, . . . your victory in a plebiscite held under international supervision and control, plus a FAO pledge to remain as a peaceful, constructive opposition—as it has agreed to do, constitutes a more than adequate outcome in the plebiscite contest.
—For talking point F: unless the negotiating effort is allowed to come to a rapid and successful conclusion—and our conversations with the FAO indicate a willingness to arrive at a settlement which is [Page 435] reasonable and fair to both sides—you can expect relations between our two governments will be strongly affected.
5. We suggest the following point be added to reference: to ensure that a precipitous power vacuum does not occur, the USG supports the continuation of a restructured Guardia Nacional and National Police Force as the guarantors of domestic tranquility during the perilous transitional period. It is essential that this or a similar safeguard be available to preclude opportunistic power-plays or a general breakdown of authority.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor Files, Country Files, Box 34, Nicaragua: 12/1–20/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted and approved by Vaky; cleared by Pastor, Armacost, and Gen. William Smith. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526–0284)↩
- See Document 167.↩