167. Telegram From the Embassy in Nicaragua to the Department of State1
6650. For Deputy Secretary Christopher and Assistant Secretary Vaky from Bowdler—Caracas, Panama and San Jose Ambassador only—Southcom for Gen. McAuliffe. Subj: Nicaragua Mediation No. 256: New Demarche to Somoza. Ref: A) Managua 6631,2 B) Managua 6632, C) Managua 6649.3
1. (S-Entire text)
2. In view of the negative attitude and obstructive tactics displayed by the PLN delegates since the substantive talks began last Saturday4 (reftels), I think the time has come to apply new pressure on Somoza. As a starter I believe we should ask General McAuliffe to come here tomorrow to convey with me our deep concern over the PLN intransigence and the consequences of failure of the mediation. For this message to have teeth we should remove two of the MilGp members right away and the remainder immediately thereafter if Somoza fails to negotiate an acceptable formula for the plebiscite and follow-on action based on the outcome. Curtailment of aid and other measures should be brought to the ready for implementation.
3. I recommend that the message to be conveyed to Somoza follow these points:
A) After two and a half months of intensive negotiations the mediation effort is on the brink of failure. This failure is largely due to the intransigence of the PLN negotiators.
B) After the cooperation received from you over this period in improving the political climate in Nicaragua so that these talks could prosper, our government fails to understand why the Nicaraguan Government negotiators have now become the principal obstacle to reaching agreement on a plebiscite.
C) The unwillingness of the FAO to enter a government under your direction in the event you win the plebiscite is not a valid argument for refusing to negotiate a plebiscite package. There are historical and [Page 433] tactical reasons that make this understandable. Furthermore, your victory in a plebiscite held under international supervision and control, plus a FAO pledge to remain as a peaceful, constructive opposition—as it has agreed to do, constitutes a more than adequate outcome in the plebiscite contest.
D) If these talks break down over the issue raised by your negotiators, responsibility in the minds of the Nicaraguan people and world opinion is going to be placed on you. Under these circumstances you are going to find yourself further isolated.
E) Indeed, after the intense and sincere effort to find a peaceful, negotiated formula for resolving the political crisis in Nicaragua, failure to reach a solution for the reasons adduced by the PLN negotiators will have a seriously adverse effect on US-Nicaraguan relations.
F) Unless the negotiating effort is allowed to come to a rapid and successful conclusion—and our conversations with the FAO indicate a willingness to arrive at a settlement which is reasonable and fair to both sides—the U.S. Government will be forced to take immediate steps to disassociate itself from your government.5
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780187–2290. Secret; Flash; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Caracas, Panama City, and San José. Sent for information to USSOUTHCOM Quarry Heights.↩
- See Document 166.↩
- For telegram 6632 from Managua, December 18, and telegram 6649 from Managua, December 19, see Document 166.↩
- December 16.↩
- Oxman sent a copy of the telegram to Christopher under a December 19 memorandum in which he summarized Bowdler’s three requests: using McAuliffe in a joint démarche to Somoza, pulling out two MilGroup members, and using the talking points contained in paragraph three of the telegram. Oxman continued: “I think #1 makes sense. Vaky agrees. Pastor thinks it’s premature. As for #2, we may want to conserve this leverage. Vaky is getting DOD’s reaction to it. He thinks, and Pastor agrees strongly, that it is not clear we need to take this step right now.” Finally, regarding the third option proposed by Bowdler, Oxman suggested a “slight softening of the last talking point (I have suggested a possible reformulation). Pete agrees that it needs softening.” Oxman’s handwritten reformulation appears on the copy of the telegram. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, Box 22, Human Rights—Nicaragua IX)↩