Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

51. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 26, 1979

SUBJECT

• Status of CIA Discussions with the Pakistanis Concerning Aid to the Afghan Dissidents (S)

1. At the 6 April 1979 meeting of the SCC, it was concluded that CIA should explore with the Government of Pakistan (GOP) provisions of U.S. financial and material aid to Afghan insurgents as well as the feasibility of radio broadcasts into Afghanistan.² The following is a status report on the CIA response to this tasking: (S)

a. Discussions with GOP. From the two discussions we had with Pakistan liaison, after an initial delay on their part, it is apparent that the matter of aid to the Afghan insurgents has become increasingly politicized. (See attachment for a detailed report on our liaison discussions to date.)³ This perception is based in part on comments by GOP liaison that Pakistan would not risk acting against Afghanistan without firm U.S. backing. Also, at the request of liaison, our discussions with them are now in a “pause” status while they review the situation. We suspect that General Zia is orchestrating this slowdown awaiting developments in his ongoing talks with Ambassador Hummel. If we have not heard from liaison by 26 April, we will take the initiative again and request a meeting. (S)

b. Unilateral Contact with Dissidents. You should be aware that Islamabad Station is in unilateral contact with a fairly prominent Afghan dissident leader, who, on 24 April requested $1,000,000 from us to purchase ammunition from unidentified sources in Pakistan. We advised him that we had no policy authority to grant his request.⁴ (S)

c. Radio Broadcasting. We continue to explore radio broadcast possibilities, although host country political sensitivities and lead time for acquiring broadcast equipment cast doubts on this option. We believe, however, that radio services such as [1½ lines not declassified] can be utilized indirectly by providing unique news stories to journalists and publications from which [less than 1 line not declassified] often obtains its program material. This effort is underway. (S)

d. Psychological Operations. We are readying a senior covert action officer to visit Islamabad and Kabul, to assess and, where appropriate, to initiate psychological operations against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The activities which this officer will discuss in the field include: distribution of anti-Soviet propaganda leaflets; production and distribution of cassette tapes; development of spokesmen to project the dissident message effectively; means of getting that message to the foreign press; and black operations (see f. below). (S)

e. Worldwide Propaganda. We have already tasked the worldwide covert action infrastructure on Afghanistan and are directing appropriate briefings and propaganda material to our assets. As of 25 April we have obtained media placements in 25 countries and have provided liaison and agent of influence assets with tailored briefings in 51 countries. Some examples of this effort include:

—Senior [less than 1 line not declassified] officials were briefed on 12 and 16 April.

—The President of [less than 1 line not declassified] was briefed by his intelligence service.

—The highest levels of the [less than 1 line not declassified] government have expressed intense interest in material we provided on the Afghan situation.⁵

—A briefing was prepared for the President and Prime Minister of [less than 1 line not declassified].

—The Prime Minister and Cabinet of [less than 1 line not declassified] were briefed by their intelligence service.

—Significant new media placements have appeared in [3 lines not declassified].

f. Black Ops. Part of our projected program involves dissemination of a strictly limited number of black documents designed to support and enhance the already ongoing gray propaganda program. The SCC meeting of 6 April, however, directed us to develop plans for interfering in Afghanistan, and the SCC meeting of 6 March had already endorsed “internal propaganda.”⁶ This activity has policy approval under the General Finding on “Soviet Interference in Other Countries’ Affairs.” The Department of Justice, however, has ruled that we had to obtain cleared guidelines on a black program from State, as black operations had not been covered specifically in the relevant “Perspectives.” Unfortunately, attempts to obtain such cleared guidelines have been rebuffed. State takes the position that black operations by themselves would have little impact. This argument fails to take into account our gray program, which black operations will complement and reinforce, as well as the propaganda warfare by leaflet and “night letter” already being waged by the dissidents. (We would expect that our black ops would be picked up and exploited fully by the dissidents.) State also argues that since the Soviets might assume the U.S. hand lay behind any fabricated documents, their dissemination would embarrass Secretary Vance in view of the “strong assurances the Secretary recently gave Ambassador Dobrynin, with NSC concurrence, to the effect that we have no intention of interfering in Afghanistan.”⁷

Stansfield Turner⁸

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret. Attached but not printed is Brzezinski’s handwritten note forwarding the memorandum to Aaron: “DA, Please get on top of this through a mini-SCC. We need action. E.g, give them money. Also black ops.” At the top of Brzezinski’s note, Henze wrote: “Turner will take up formally with ZB 1 May 79.” Neither a record of the May 1 meeting nor a record of a mini-SCC on the topic was found. The next SCC meeting that took up the Afghanistan issue was held June 26. See Document 53.
2. See Document 48.
3. Attached but not printed. The attached memorandum reported on two meetings the Chief of Station in Islamabad had with ISID Director Major General Mohammad Riaz Khan and ISID Deputy Director Brigadier General Kamal Rabbani. At the first meeting, Riaz proposed that the United States fund Pakistan’s procurement and distribution of medical supplies to Afghan rebels and provide non-U.S.-made small arms and ammunition to be distributed to the rebels. The supplies would go to Pathan tribesmen on the Pakistani side of the border who were supporting the rebels based on the Afghan side of the border. The second meeting effectively froze these propositions; in light of Soviet and Afghan charges of Pakistani involvement in the Afghan rebellion, ISID had become wary of commencing direct support. Additionally, Rabbani disclosed that the tribesmen “could not be disciplined to keep quiet about outside aid,” and that in any case, the Afghan Government had sufficiently penetrated the rebel groups so that it would learn the source of the aid.
4. Brzezinski drew a vertical line in the left margin and an arrow pointing to the last sentence of paragraph b.
5. In the left margin next to the first three bullet points, Henze wrote: “Indian and Islamic World?”
6. See footnote 5, Document 38.
7. See Document 49.
8. Turner signed “Stan Turner” above his typed signature.