50. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]
AFGHANISTAN: Prospects for the Insurgents
The widespread insurgencies in Afghanistan continue to erode the loyalty of the armed forces—the main prop for President Taraki’s regime. Tribal rebels lack the strength and organization to confront the Soviet-supported Army outside their home areas, however, and by themselves have little prospect of overthrowing the government. Unrest in the cities and more settled areas may pose a more difficult problem for the regime. ([classification marking not declassified])
Muslim tribesmen along the Pakistani border took up arms almost immediately after the military coup a year ago that brought the Marxists to power in Kabul. Since then, many additional tribal groups, motivated mainly by religious sentiments, have instigated rebellions in their native areas. A government crackdown last winter against Muslim clergymen critical of the regime gave new impetus to the unrest. ([classification marking not declassified])
The insurgencies seem to be gaining momentum, and the government’s authority is now being contested to some degree in nearly every province. Along much of the eastern border with Pakistan, government control is limited to major towns and main roads. Rebel sources report that two towns in this region—Chiga Serai and Asmar—are surrounded and will soon fall. Farther west, rebels this week seized control of Arjestan and killed the district governor. Fighting continues near Mazar-i-Sharif in the north-central region and also in the northwest, where rebels control one large area along the Soviet border. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The Afghan Government has been forced to redeploy most of its available troops from the capital toward the Pakistani border. More than two-thirds of the Army’s infantry regiments are in the east, leaving few units available for deploying elsewhere. [2 lines, classification marking, and handling restriction not declassified]
[Page 149]Uncoordinated Rebellions
There is little cooperation among the various rebel groups operating in Afghanistan’s tribal areas. Along the Pakistani border, however, there has been limited cooperation between neighboring tribes, [2 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]
Coordination is better among the exile groups in Pakistan, but despite an announcement on 11 March that the three most important factions would cooperate, there has been little indication that they are actually working together. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The tribal rebels alone have little immediate prospect of overthrowing the Taraki government. The tribes can hold their own in the mountains and may even win minor victories against the government, but they have little chance of capturing a major city or waging a successful campaign outside the tribal areas. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The government was confronted with a different and more threatening challenge in western Afghanistan last month when mobs, aided by personnel from the local military garrison, took over parts of Herat, the country’s third largest city. After several days, reinforced government troops regained control of the city, but not the surrounding areas. This appears to have been a largely spontaneous uprising not directly related to the tribal insurgencies. ([classification marking not declassified])
In the cities and those rural areas where the government has traditionally maintained control, the people have fewer arms and are more poorly organized than the tribesmen. Popular unrest could again erupt into rioting as it did in Herat, but sustained resistance will depend on the refusal of government troops to oppose the rebels. A few organizations—such as the Muslim Brotherhood—may still be able to stage isolated terrorist acts in the cities. ([classification marking not declassified])
Foreign Support
Foreign backing for the insurgents is limited. Exile groups in Pakistan claim—and probably have received—some support from Saudi Arabia. They also assert that China has offered them arms. This cannot be confirmed. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Pakistan has permitted Afghan exiles, Pakistani religious organizations, and tribesmen to funnel some help to the Afghan tribes. There is little Islamabad could do to prevent Pakistani tribesmen from assisting their Afghan neighbors across the very porous border, and it is not inclined to try. The evidence, however, suggests no significant Pakistani military support for the rebels. Occasionally, when exile groups have been too open in their activities, the government has [Page 150] asked them to stop.2 ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Soviet backing for the regime has been a major deterrent to Pakistani support for the insurgents. Even clandestine help to the rebels has been limited by fear of Soviet retaliation and of provoking much greater and more open Soviet military support for Kabul. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The new regime in Iran is strongly sympathetic to Afghanistan’s dissident Muslim tribesmen but its problems at home prevent it from furnishing significant material help. Iran’s main contribution has been moral encouragement to the insurgents. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The Afghan Military
Tribal loyalties, religion, heavy casualties, suspicion of Soviet motives, and the slim prospects for an early end to insurgency have already seriously damaged morale in the Afghan Army. Purges of suspected disloyal officers have placed inexperienced men in key positions, and desertions occur daily. Some Afghan units reportedly have fled or surrendered after only token resistance. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
The government is taking steps to limit the impact of these losses. The Army is retaining soldiers beyond their obligatory terms of service and may have begun recalling individuals released from active duty. The Army also is using tribal irregulars to fight other tribes opposing the government. Kabul is undertaking a longer term program to improve command and control in the eastern provinces and to expand the Army as a whole. None of these measures, however, will have any immediate impact on the military’s ability to cope with the insurgency. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
[Page 151]The pressure on the military could eventually become so severe that officers who now appear loyal would advocate the overthrow of the Marxist regime. Both Kabul and Moscow are attempting to meet this danger. Further purges, more Soviet advisers and arms, strengthening the Army, and gestures such as the recent appointment of a popular officer as Defense Minister may help. At the same time, these remedies could intensify the problems in the military by increasing distrust of Soviet intentions, forcing the government to rely even more on inexperienced officers, and further revealing the government’s weakness. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
Soviet Support
Even before Taraki came to power last year, the USSR was Afghanistan’s major source of economic aid and almost the sole source of military assistance. Since then, the Soviet role has grown significantly. [3 lines, classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified]
Greater Soviet involvement is likely. Soviet assistance is needed to improve the military logistic system and increase mobility of its forces. Soviet personnel could also become more involved in the fighting in the hinterlands without seriously risking an adverse foreign reaction to their role. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])
The Soviets currently are taking pains to conceal the extent of their involvement, and it is unclear how far they are prepared to go to save the present government. The current visit to Afghanistan by the USSR’s ranking political-military general suggests that Moscow wants a close reading of the reliability and capability of Afghan armed forces before deciding on its next steps.3 ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by [text not declassified].↩
- In telegram 2772 from Kabul, April 9, the Embassy reported that on the previous day Radio Afghanistan alleged that “a large number of Pakistani soldiers in Afghan dress” had attacked camps in the border province of Paktia. The Embassy further noted that the charge, delivered during a high-level Soviet military visit to Kabul, suggested both Soviet endorsement and a “considerable escalation of the propaganda war” that Afghanistan was waging against its neighbors. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790163–0227) A memorandum prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 3, noted that Pakistan’s decision to aid “tribal rebels” would likely raise border tensions and could possibly lead to increased involvement in Afghanistan by third countries. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Pre-Invasion Reporting) A field report prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 23, forwarded information from [text not declassified] claiming that Pakistan commenced a covert aid program on May 18 to support Afghan rebels through material and financial means. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (May 79–Jun 79))↩
- A reference to General Alexei A. Yepeshev, Soviet First Deputy Minister of Defense and President of Political Affairs.↩