Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

48. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, April 6, 1979, 11 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

• Covert Action and Sensitive Collection Issues (S)

PARTICIPANTS

• Vice President*

• State

  • David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

• Defense

  • Charles Duncan, Deputy Secretary

• JCS

  • Lt. Gen. William Smith, Assistant to Chairman

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director

• OMB

  • Randy Jayne, Associate Director, Nat’l Security & Int’l Affairs

• Justice

  • Attorney General Griffin Bell

• NSA

  • Robert Drake, Deputy Director

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chairman

• NSC

  • Paul B. Henze, Notetaker
  • Thomas Thornton**

* Present only for first ten minutes.

** Present only through discussion of Afghanistan/Pakistan.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Vice President’s views: The Vice President opened the meeting with a brief discussion of the situation in Afghanistan, underscoring the problems the Soviets are encountering there and the concerted effort they are making to obfuscate them and shift blame onto the United States. He stressed the need to defend our interests and commitments in this part of the world and expressed the hope that the group would be forward-leaning in its consideration of proposals for dealing with this problem. (S)

Afghanistan/Pakistan: The Vice President then departed and the meeting then turned to a detailed discussion of the problem of providing encouragement or aid for insurgency in Afghanistan. It was agreed that this could be done realistically only through and/or with the assistance of the Pakistanis and in the framework of other recent high-level policy decisions on Pakistan. After review of CIA’s proposals it was decided that CIA would have early exploratory talks with Pakistani intelligence officials about

• radio broadcasts to Afghanistan

• financial assistance for selected insurgent groups

• an effort to assess the insurgent movement from the viewpoint of providing training and material assistance.

It was agreed that a Presidential Finding will be required to cover such activity and, unless there is a negative response from the Pakistanis, such a Finding will be forwarded to the President and CIA will be authorized to proceed with the task of working out operations in these fields in cooperation with the Pakistanis.² If the Pakistani response to CIA’s exploratory talks is negative, the SCC will reconvene and review the issues anew. (TS)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Near-Verbatim record of SCC of April 6, 1979

VP: It seems to me that this Afghanistan issue provides a good opportunity for us here. We have the Russians deeply involved in the internal affairs of another country and they are obviously trying to mask it with counterattacks to put us on the defensive. They are supporting a highly unpopular government in Afghanistan; secondly, they are fighting the world of Islam. It is embarrassing to them. It would be nice for us to be seen on the other side. I have been encouraging us to make that point wherever we can. The State Department had made a good statement on it. Senator Pell did a statement on it. We have talked with Zablocki and others and they will be making statements. I think we ought to keep the heat on this. The Russians are jumpy as hell about this. I gather when we say we are not involved that that is accurate. Are the Egyptians and the Pakistanis involved?

FC: We have no evidence that they are; but they cannot control the border.

ZB: The Pakistanis are not involved except that the insurgency started in three areas across the frontier from Pakistan.

WS: They do not want to get too involved because they are afraid the Russians will step on them.

DN: [2 lines not declassified] he protested to the Russians that they were making irresponsible accusations.³

VP: The Russians are getting away with murder and we should not take it.

ZB: We have a few modest proposals for assisting the Afghans and the Pakistanis. We will be considering these items in the light of your helpful comments. We are sorry you have to leave now.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

ZB: In view of the Vice President’s comments—which are shared by the President—let us go first to the action proposals for Afghanistan. We have all read Stan’s paper—the proposals all involve either some assistance to the Pakistanis or direct financial aid to the insurgents (read summary of proposals). Let’s consider CIA’s options. We have already spent a lot of time discussing covert assistance to the Afghans. We are aware that a major insurgency is in progress. It is in our national interest that this insurgency continue even if it does not succeed. The question is whether any one of these steps would be helpful. We do not have a national policy that covert activity is to be abandoned. We have a national policy that covert activity should be undertaken when it is warranted.

ST: I want to make the point that covert actions will not turn the tide but they could help sustain insurgency there. Whether we are going to overturn the government or not should not be the main question. This program has to be accompanied by a strong policy of support for Pakistan. Unless the Pakistanis feel we are going to live up to the 1959 treaty, they are not going to cooperate with us. Radio broadcasts are totally dependent upon them. We could not do them without their support . . .

GB: Why can’t you just bring a ship up and do them from it?

ZB: We can do only the smallest amount of support for the guerrillas without cooperation with the Pakistanis. I am concerned if we try to get sites for [less than 1 line not declassified] we have to relate these actions to other things we do—it is almost bound to leak. We are going to have to give a degree of guarantee to the Pakistanis in any case. This issue is really a State Department issue—how far we are willing to go in giving the Pakistanis support for the cooperation they give us. Then there is the nuclear problem and a lot of other issues with them.⁴ I do not know how to sort it out. In a different context we have settled on a 4-pronged approach to Pakistan which is in the process of being implemented by the Department of State. One element of that involves reiteration of our commitment of the late 1950’s without permitting the Pakistanis to engage in hypothetical exercises as to what we might do under certain contingencies. We are trying insofar as possible to separate contentious issues from issues where we have a common interest—one of these being preservation of the countries to the south of the Soviet Union in this part of the world and expressing sympathy for the insurgency in Afghanistan. The question is whether any of these proposed activities would further our policy regarding Pakistan and whether it would have the effect of complicating the takeover of Afghanistan itself—not to speak, perhaps, of the ultimate objective which would be to reverse the takeover and keep the situation boiling the way that they (the Soviets) have kept it boiling for us in other parts of the world.

DN: I would like to raise a more general question. Right now there is an active insurgency going on in Afghanistan. All indications are that the Pakistanis want to maintain a posture that they are now [not] involved. If we go ahead with anything that requires a Presidential Finding and reporting to seven committees under Hughes-Ryan procedures, we are running a risk.⁵ The American role is likely to come out—knowledge of the American role could change the prospects as far as the Soviets are concerned. They could react differently. I want to raise this question, for we run the risk of upsetting the Soviets if we undertake these covert activities.

ZB: That risk is there and its implication is that we should not undertake covert activity at all.

GB: Then we would be out of business.

FC: There is considerable concern on the Hill about just that point now. Congress has raised it with us. They say they intend for us to engage in covert action and they feel that they need to do something about cutting down access to sensitive information to minimize the chances of leaks. In a recent SSCI meeting I was asked why we in CIA were not doing something in Afghanistan.

GB: I believe we should change the law only to report through the select committees on intelligence. I bet we can do that.

ZB: I was on a plane with Chuck Percy the other day—he told me that if we wish to do serious covert activities, the Senate will give us overwhelming support now. The way to get going is to pick a place and to try to do it.

GB: We have to put pressure on the intelligence committees to control the leaks.

FC: I think they are in a mood to do it. That does not meet our immediate problem, however. The law still requires us to brief seven committees.

DN: If what is going on is already causing real problems for the Soviets in Afghanistan, what additional benefit do we gain by getting involved in it ourselves? Especially if we run the risk of having what we are doing leaked and thus changing real perceptions in Moscow?

ZB: Another question that can be asked—if the insurgency is not doing well, why help it? But you then come up again with the conclusion that if you don’t do it, you lose an opportunity. You have an important point re Pakistan. My inclination would be to pick from this list those actions that we would only undertake with Pakistan if they are willing to cooperate. If they are not willing to cooperate, we do not do it. I would be inclined to go for the radio broadcasts. This is an important mechanism for influencing political conduct. This can only be done together with the Pakistanis. Then we could consider some financial aid and send in a survey team to examine on-site possibilities for other forms of support—all of these actions would require cooperation with the Pakistani intelligence services. If they come back and say no—then we have to reconsider.

DN: There is one other avenue—through the Saudis and through the emigre groups if the Saudis will provide funds.

ZB: Would you be willing to do that without telling the Pakistanis?

DN: No.

GB: My feeling after reading this was that we should do whatever we can without involving the Pakistanis so that they can say they know nothing about what is going on.

ZB: Is that possible?

ST: We feel that we could only do a little of this and then we would have to tell the Pakistanis.

ZB: This brings us back to David Newsom’s point—there may be a leak. If it is a leak about something we are doing without the knowledge of the Pakistanis, then we have a greater problem with them in case of a leak . . .

FC: They have already given us some indications they want to do something.

GB: Then I withdraw my observations.

ZB: What about the package I have suggested?

ST: It will take a survey before we can give financial aid to anybody.

DN: You have to do the survey before you can make a precise recommendation on financial support?

FC: We can engage the Pakistanis in discussion of financial support for dissident groups and then channel the support with their knowledge.

DN: When do we have to make the Presidential Finding?

FC: I strongly recommend that we make a Finding first.

ZB: What do you think, Griffin?

GB: You can talk to them without making a finding.

FC: But that would confront us with the problem of arousing expectations that we could not meet. We would feel a lot better having these discussions after having a Finding.

GB: If you do that, it may leak and then we don’t have the chance to do it.

ZB: Can we have a Finding by the President and then not do it?

FC: We have to inform the Congress in a timely manner.

GB: You don’t have to tell the Congress until you do it.

ST: You can have the SCC approve the finding and not have the President sign it.

FC: Our people in the field want to have some blessing before they talk about this sort of thing with the people they are dealing with.

GB: If the SCC authorizes you to negotiate that is enough—if they say that they don’t want to do that—how will we then unravel this thing that we have started?

FC: If the position of the SCC is clear that if we negotiate and the Pakistanis are interested, then we will get finding and go ahead, then we can do it.

ZB: Is that possible, Griffin?

GB: That is possible.

ZB: Let us say what we will be saying.

DN: I am willing to go along with the radio broadcasting and financial aid subject to agreement from the Pakistanis. I am only in favor of a survey without future commitments.

ST: I fear we may have confused this in the way we have presented it. Unless we find out what is really going on in Afghanistan and among these insurgents, any money we give to the Pakistanis could simply go down the drain.

ZB: For the minutes: the SCC will recommend to the President that he issue a finding involving these three items subject to Pakistani assent.

GB: And we do not have to report anything to the Congress until the President signs the Finding.

ST: I see one possible glitch. As my COS starts talking to the Pakistanis—he will be encouraging Pakistani support of the Afghan rebellion.

GB: There is nothing wrong with a little salesmanship.

FC: We have had a couple of rulings out of your department that didn’t recognize that.⁶

ST: You say he is trying to influence the Pakistanis to take a more forward position. This gets to be a very fine line . . .

DN: How would you describe the survey team and its proposals in your report to the Congress?

FC: “Survey team” is too formal a description. We might step up our collection in collaboration with the Pakistanis. We are not going to mass a group of people together to do this.

GB: I suggest you drop the word “Survey team” and say you are going to assess the situation.

ZB: That is highly desirable. We could be dealing with a bunch of frauds.

RJayne: I am worried that the Pakistanis may simply tell us to buzz off. If that is the case, we ought to amend the three items so that we can consider some other avenue of support.

ZB: Yes, but in that case we would have to reassess what we might try. I am not against covert action, but it has to have some relationship to foreign policy in general or it makes no sense.

RJayne: What if the Pakistanis say we do not want to have anything to do with these activities, but we will let you come and do whatever you want—go ahead.

ZB: That would be a different problem.

FC: What is likely to happen is that they will say we will explore this but we want to talk about the 1959 agreement you have with us.

ZB: That has some advantages. Let us sum up what we have decided. Let us say that the SCC has voted to approach the Pakistanis to determine whether they have a positive attitude toward radio broadcasts, U.S. financial assistance of a type yet to be specified as to size and means of conveyance and recipients and on the issue of assessing the nature of the Afghan insurgency . . . and subject to the absence of a negative response from the government of Pakistan, we will proceed with a Finding which will be laid before the President. If the Pakistani response is negative, we would meet again and take up these questions again . . .

DN: Under the instructions we have prepared for Art Hummel, we are authorizing him to say if it is raised by Zia that we will examine these questions—do we want him to initiate discussion under these circumstances?

ZB: What is your judgment?

DN: I am inclined to think that Zia would be aware that this other contact is going to be made and that a Finding coming out of these discussions will require further review in Washington.

ZB: Should Hummel initiate it if Zia asks?

DN: We will leave it on an if-asked basis.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–020, Minutes—SCC 1979. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Henze. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Attached but not printed is a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, April 9, which summarized the meeting. Brzezinski noted: “the Attorney General opined that a Presidential Finding and report to Congress was not required at this stage. It was understood, however, that if the Pakistanis respond positively, you will be asked to execute a Finding that would authorize CIA to implement the most feasible and otherwise desirable options.” Carter drew a line in the left margin beside the first sentence and wrote: “Better expression than SCC minutes,” and underlined “if the Pakistanis respond positively.” Also attached but not printed is Henze’s April 4 memorandum to Brzezinski; see footnote 1, Document 47.
2. An unknown hand underlined “unless there is a negative response,” and placed a question mark in the left margin next to the sentence.
3. Not found.
4. See footnote 4, Document 42.
5. A reference to procedures required by an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Also called the Hughes-Ryan Amendment after its co-authors Harold E. Hughes (D–Iowa) and Leo Ryan (D–California), the legislation obligated the President to find that a particular covert action was important to U.S. national security. The finding and “a description and scope of such operation” must be submitted “to the appropriate committees of the Congress” in “a timely fashion.” (P.L. 93–559, 88 Stat. 1795)
6. Not further identified.