223. Memorandum From Lincoln Bloomfield of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Afghan Neutralization—Some Broader Aspects (C)
The Carter Doctrine adds the general area of the Persian Gulf (which I strongly recommend we henceforth refer to as the “Gulf”) to Western Europe, Japan and the Eastern Mediterranean as among the vital interests to the United States. Unlike the other areas, the Gulf is unique in having been defined by both superpowers as of vital interest (see the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement of 1940).2 This makes it essential to elaborate new ground rules for superpower relations to replace those agreed to at the 1972 Moscow summit prohibiting advantage-seeking in peripheral areas, flagrantly violated by the Soviet Union in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. (U)
Afghanistan is of course more than that. It is a case of armed intervention, but in an area of vital interest to Moscow. (The closest U.S. analogy is the Dominican Republic in 1965.)3 But it is also a third world, “unaligned” country. Any viable ground rules applicable to Afghanistan should respond both to Soviet perceptions of interests, and to third world allergy to superpower military intervention. (C)
The essence of such a rule would be a prohibition not just of advantage-seeking but of outside armed military interference in third world conflicts or in the internal affairs of unaligned countries. Such [Page 611] a doctrine would have been explicitly violated by Cuban troops in Africa or Soviet troops in Afghanistan. (It also would have barred our intervention in the DR in 1965, France in Zaire and Morocco, etc.) (C)
Such a doctrine would leave untouched the established military dispositions of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in Western Europe and the Pacific, and would leave both free to deploy their fleets. (C)
“Guaranteed neutrality” for Afghanistan in exchange for complete withdrawal of Soviet combat forces would serve U.S. interests, but seems a non-starter as it offers nothing to Moscow except face-saving. But its potential value to the larger need for universally-applicable ground-rules requires that it be seriously analyzed. Two things are required: a greater inducement to Moscow to accede; and some imaginative instrumentalities, such as international observation, to make the guarantee effective. (C)
Afghanistan will undoubtedly revert to its historic xenophobic stance, which leads Americans to predict Soviet non-acceptance. But the matter acquires more substance when seen in a larger perspective, particularly in terms of Cuba. Afghanistan and Cuba are symmetrical in unique ways. (C)
A guarantee of neutrality was in effect given in 1962 when Moscow agreed not to make it a base for offensive weapons, in exchange for which we agreed not to invade Cuba. (U)
A comparable agreement should be considered for Afghanistan. In both cases the internal political orientation will probably remain anathema to the neighboring superpower. But a variety of tolerable coexistence becomes possible by virtue of neutralization, meaning: a) verified guarantees against pursuit of policies threatening to the neighbor; and b) absence of superpower military intervention (including China). (C)
In linking Cuba and Afghanistan, we do not want to generate a new crisis. The point is that President Kennedy’s 1962 agreement could be the obvious model for Afghanistan. U.S. self-imposed restraint after such an agreement becomes the implicit model for Soviet policy in withdrawing from Afghanistan. (C)
(An even broader global perspective is afforded by Palestinian autonomy. A well-developed and implemented doctrine prohibiting armed intervention will undoubtedly have to be an element in the essential neutralization of any Palestinian homeland. The latter case would be characteristic of the settlements which brought long-term peace to Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. The new rule would be very relevant.) (C)
A final element is an enhanced role for international peace observation. The habitual dismissal of this capability until it is desperately [Page 612] needed in crisis should be eschewed, and it should be made part of serious planning. (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 2/80. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Thornton, Owen, Pastor, and Brement.↩
- See Document 243.↩
- See Document 178 and footnote 2 thereto.↩