Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

222. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State and the International Communication Agency¹

Moscow, February 28, 1980, 1814Z

3295. Subject: A Revised Brezhnev Doctrine in the Wake of Afghanistan? One Possible Approach. Ref: USICA 7395.²

1. (C—Entire text)

2. Summary. Actions of the magnitude of the Afghan invasion may perhaps be justified to the world at large in terms of Realpolitik or international law. The Soviets are busily attempting that, with a steady propaganda barrage aimed at proving external aggression, duty-to-treaty obligations, and threats to the USSR’s own security. But for the Party faithful, domestically and in the Communist Parties abroad, more important is the need to understand how the invasion comports with Marxist-Leninist ideology. Despite this obvious need, we find, however, that Soviet leaders—perhaps because of Moscow’s awareness of the anxieties generated abroad by the Brezhnev Doctrine—have so far made only a few stabs at rationalizing their action in ideological terms. No general theory has yet been articulated. Prompted by reftel, which suggests the existence of an “Afghan corollary” to the Brezhnev Doctrine, we have reexamined the post-Afghanistan Soviet leadership statements as well as current and earlier theoretical journals. Thus far, the ideological linkage between the Brezhnev Doctrine—which applies to “socialist states”—and the Afghan invasion has not yet been made, though one prominent ideologist does hint in a pre-invasion article at the need to act when the gains in countries with a “socialist orientation”, such as Afghanistan, are in jeopardy. If Washington analysts agree with our analysis of the ideologist’s article, it may be worth flagging to interested scholars or the media for their consideration and possible exploitation. End summary.

3. Since the invasion of Afghanistan, there has been speculation about the emergence of a revised or extended Brezhnev Doctrine to explain the Soviet action (e.g., USICA 7395). The speculation is based on the conclusion that the Brezhnev Doctrine, as imputed to the Soviets following the Czechoslovak invasion, falls short of providing a plausible ideological explanation for the latest Soviet invasion, and therefore one needs (leaving aside for the moment why the “need” arises) a revised formulation of the original doctrine or an “Afghan corollary” to it.

4. In what way does the Brezhnev Doctrine fall short of explaining, in Marxist-Leninist terms, the invasion of Afghanistan? Following the August 1968 invasion, students of Soviet ideology relied on various official statements—but especially one by Brezhnev at the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party on November 12, 1968—to make the case that a new ideological doctrine had been fashioned. Brezhnev stated at the Congress that:

When internal and external forces, hostile to socialism, seek to reverse the development of any socialist country whatsoever in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism arises in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—this already becomes not only a problem of the people of the country concerned, but also a common problem and the concern of all socialist countries.

Because Czechoslovakia was a Warsaw Pact country, “any socialist country” as used by Brezhnev was mainly viewed at the time as encompassing the countries of Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, rather than those elsewhere such as North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba.

5. The key point of the Brezhnev Doctrine in terms of its present-day [garble—relevance?] to Afghanistan is the reference to “socialist country”. No Soviet official has ever argued that Afghanistan has been a “socialist country” (or, for that matter, ever experienced “a capitalist order”), or is presently calling on the “socialist commonwealth”, as was done in the case of Czechoslovakia, to react to Afghanistan. Before the April 1978 revolution which overthrew Daoud, Afghanistan was seen as essentially feudal, and after the revolution as embarking on the path of “socialist orientation”. Soviet ideologists make a sharp distinction between “socialist countries” and those bearing the label of “socialist orientation”: The Deputy Chief of the Central Committee’s International Department, Ul’yanovskiy, writing in the authoritative CPSU theoretical journal Kommunist last July, defined the latter group of countries as “those, not yet being socialist, (but) which reject capitalism as a system, carry out fundamental social changes facilitating and hastening their possible transition to socialism.” Among the Third World countries assigned by the Soviets to this category besides Afghanistan (which Ul’yanovskiy last July noted had “recently joined them”) are Algeria, Benin, Burma, Guinea, PDRY, Congo (Brazzaville), Syria, Tanzania, Angola, Madagascar, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Jamaica. Candidate Politburo member Demichev, in discussing the international situation in his February 1 election speech, alluded to both kinds of Soviet allies, stating that “the fraternal countries of socialism, (and) the developing countries which have adopted a socialist orientation, are proceeding (forward) shoulder to shoulder along with us.”

6. If Afghanistan does not fit neatly into the Brezhnev Doctrine as it is usually understood, then is there some doctrine-in-the-making in which it does fit, as some Western observers are speculating? Are there statements by Soviet leaders or ideologists since the Afghanistan invasion which put the Soviet action in a Marxist-Leninist framework of more general applicability? Obviously, here arises a dilemma for the Soviets. Domestically, and for Communist parties abroad, there exists a need to provide some transcending ideological rationalization for the Soviet action in Afghanistan, just as Brezhnev felt compelled to provide some rationalization at the PZPR Congress in November 1968 following the Czech invasion. Since the entire Soviet system derives its legitimacy from Marxism-Leninism, the millions of Party faithful who serve as props for that system have to be served up some such interpretation of events such as Afghanistan. The danger in the absence of such an interpretation is further ideological erosion.

7. At the same time, the very interpretation which the leadership provides can only further heighten anxieties abroad, raising a dilemma. Just as the Brezhnev Doctrine reinforced skepticism about Soviet intentions in “socialist countries” such as Romania and Yugoslavia, so will any overarching interpretation for Soviet military aid in circumstances such as Afghanistan raise concern among actual or potential countries assigned by Moscow to the “socialist orientation” category, i.e., all countries of the Third World as the Soviets see it. Although Brezhnev, speaking in Belgrade in 1971, denied the existence of any “so-called new doctrine of limited sovereignty,” the label “Brezhnev Doctrine” has continued to stick, and do damage to the Soviet image abroad.

8. Perhaps in part because of the history of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Soviet leaders have so far played down ideological explanations for their rendering aid to Afghanistan. The heavy emphasis has rather been on meeting an Afghan request, in compliance with treaty obligations, and on rights reaffirmed by the UN Charter, with occasional reference to the need to protect Soviet state interests, by liquidating a situation which could have resulted, in Moscow’s view, in hostile bases along the southern border. Soviet leaders and ideologists have made a few random “stabs” at rationalizing their action in terms of stock Marxist-Leninist formulas but nothing approaching a general theory has yet been articulated. Among such attempts, which have sometimes misled a few outside observers to conclude a “new doctrine” is being offered, are:

—“Proletarian internationalism”: Two Central Committee apparatchiks (Kobysh in Literaturnaya Gazeta, January 23, and Portugalov in TASS, February 6) first used the hoary favorite, “proletarian internationalism”, in addressing the Afghan question. However, with the exception of KGB Chief Andropov, the Soviet leaders themselves have avoided resort to this rationalization in the specific context of military aid to Afghanistan. (Andropov said that the Soviet aid was a “high act of faithfulness to the principle of proletarian internationalism . . .”) We assume Brezhnev and others have steered clear of “proletarian internationalism” for the reason that Afghanistan obviously lacks a proletariat of any significance for which such aid could be justified.

—“International duty” or “international solidarity”: Soviet leaders, including Defense Minister Ustinov, have generally settled for one of these hackneyed formulas to justify their military assistance on Marxist-Leninist grounds. Both recur in the unsigned Novoye Vremya article which prompted David Binder to speculate in the New York Times that an “extended Brezhnev Doctrine” was in the making.³ Our problem with the Novoye Vremya article, however, apart from the “unofficial” character of the journal as a Soviet source, is that it provides too sweeping language for any new doctrine . . . a succession of slogans such as “international solidarity” rather than workable criteria. Both of these slogans did appear in the Brezhnev-Marchais statement issued in Moscow January 10 which International Department head Ponomaryev has strongly recommended to Party members for an understanding of Afghanistan.⁴ Both formulas also are to be found in profusion in the Soviet press immediately following the Czechoslovak invasion, beginning with the August 22, 1968 unsigned statement in Pravda entitled “The Highest International Duty.”

9. Although Soviet statements since the Afghanistan invasion therefore provide little substance for a revised Brezhnev Doctrine, the fact that Afghanistan falls into a common stage of development on the Marxist-Leninist road to Communism, along which many other countries are depicted (by the Soviets) as traveling, provides Western analysts with some basis to construct a revised doctrine. It seems to us what is missing from Soviet statements since Afghanistan which would lend itself to such an effort is a description of the circumstances triggering a Soviet decision to render its “aid” to countries of “socialist orientation”. The Brezhnev Doctrine, as cited in paragraph 4, describes the “trigger” in the case of “socialist countries” as the emergence of “internal and external forces, hostile to socialism, seek(ing) to reverse the development of any socialist country . . .” But what circumstances are germane in triggering Soviet assistance to a country of socialist orientation?

10. The deputy head of the Central Committee’s International Department Ul’yanovskiy, writing in the earlier cited Kommunist of last July, identifies circumstances which we believe could serve as the basis for a doctrine of general applicability to this category of country. Ul’yanovskiy states that a “socialist orientation” can be sustained “so long as vigilance to imperialism’s schemes is maintained, so long as rebuffs are given to insidious and dangerous neocolonialism.” “Any manifestation,” Ul’yanovskiy continues, “of a lack of confidence, but even more, of hostility to the world of socialism, any manifestation of a tendency to conciliation in relation to imperialist policy, to neocolonialists—‘beware of these latter day bearers of gifts’—usually serves as a signal of a retreat from the principles of socialist orientation.”

11. Ul’yanovskiy’s statement does not include an explicit warning of the consequences when a “signal” is received by Moscow of a “retreat” from a “socialist orientation”. In terms of the translation of theory into practice, the threshold triggering and defining Soviet action obviously is seen to vary from case to case (depending on geopolitical factors, international environment, etc.), even for an ideologist such as Ul’yanovskiy; thus no Soviet “aid” at all was rendered to Somalia although it is cited in the article as a country of “socialist orientation” in retreat. (Besides, Soviet ideologists are not supposed to issue warnings.) But the net result of Ul’yanovskiy’s description of what comprises a “retreat”, when considered in light of the action the Soviets took against the Amin government, is to suggest a doctrine akin to the Brezhnev Doctrine—but addressed to this category of countries rather than “socialist countries”. For the countries of the Third World, assigned now or in the future by Moscow’s ideologists to the “socialist orientation” category, Ul’yanovskiy’s language adds up to a fairly credible warning—and made more credible as Moscow’s capability to project force into the Third World improves.

12. While our purpose has been to focus above on an ideological justification for Soviet intervention in Third World countries, the fact is that—as mentioned previously—in the case of Afghanistan the Soviets have thus far emphasized primarily “legal-political” justifications, especially the 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It may well be that the Soviets in fact will only feel comfortable engaging in a significant military intervention in a sovereign state in circumstances providing both an ideological explanation for domestic consumption within socialist countries, and a “legal-political” justification for the world at large. This would follow the Czechoslovak pattern where the Soviets had their “legal-political” pretext, given Czechoslovak membership in the Warsaw Pact, and developed their ideological justification in the form of the Brezhnev Doctrine only after the fact of the invasion. In any event, the ideological justifications discussed in the preceding paragraphs in no way contradict Soviet “legal-political” explanations for the Afghan invasion, but are rather hypothesized as a complement to them. All factors considered, there is the suggestion that the states most endangered by the precedent of Afghanistan are those countries which are both “of socialist orientation” and have in addition legal-political ties to Moscow such as treaties of friendship and cooperation.

13. We suggest the above as one possible approach to identifying a Brezhnev-type doctrine in the thicket of the largely non-ideological Soviet statements so far issued in justification of the Afghanistan invasion. Given Moscow’s awareness of anxieties in the Third World following its action, it may be some time before a comprehensive statement lending itself to the development of a new doctrine actually surfaces here. It may be worth Washington’s effort, therefore, in terms of our public diplomacy in the Third World in the next years, to flag the approach to interested scholars or the media for their consideration and possible exploitation.

Watson

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800108–1081. Confidential. Sent for information to Leningrad, Warsaw, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Munich, Prague, Sofia, and USNATO.
2. Not found.
3. The full reference to the article is: David Binder, “Brezhnev Doctrine Said To Be Extended,” New York Times, February 10, 1980, p. 10.
4. In telegram 1209 from Paris, January 11, the Embassy reported on a statement made by French Communist Party leader Georges Marchais, January 10. Marchais declared the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was justified in order to defeat the “imperialist threat” Afghanistan faced. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800019–0600)