146. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in NATO Capitals, the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Embassies in the Soviet Union, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan1
4074. Subject: U.S. Response to Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.
1. (C—Entire text)
2. The following is a catalog of the steps which have been decided upon affecting relations with the Soviet Union. Separate implementing instructions will be provided to Embassy Moscow and other posts as appropriate. This message provides a list which can be used in discussion with host governments of the range of actions decided upon so far. Some additional steps are still under review and may be decided upon at a later date. These measures are being taken in light of President’s statement that business as usual with the Soviet Union is impossible in light of their invasion of Afghanistan.2 In briefing host governments posts should be careful not to give the impression that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is primarily a disrupting event in U.S.-Soviet relations. Rather, it is a subject of deep concern for the entire international community as evidenced by the fact that 50 nations have signed a letter calling for Security Council action.3 Steps which the U.S. has decided on in its bilateral relations with the USSR are designed to reinforce multilateral action in the UN and in NATO and to complement steps which other nations are taking in their bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. If the international community is to succeed in its aims of seeking a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and preventing similar Soviet moves in the future against small independent nations, the Soviet leadership must be fully aware of the costs of action such as the invasion of Afghanistan in multilateral and bilateral terms. Equally important, the U.S. and its NATO Allies are continuing plans to improve defense capabilities so that they can provide a more effective deterrent to Soviet military moves throughout the world.
[Page 422]3. Following is a catalog of steps decided upon which are now being implemented.
[Omitted here is a list of actions; see Document 136.]
11. We will be consulting intensively with our allies in NATO and COCOM and with other concerned countries bilaterally in order to insure a strong and coordinated response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We are gratified with the response our consultations to date have produced and are confident that other countries will be announcing their own measures, including especially in the field of technology transfer, grain sales and credit policy in the near future.
12. For USNATO: You may draw upon the above in your SPC discussions on January 7 and following.4
13. For Ankara: You should make this cable available to Mr. Nimetz for use in his discussions with Turkish officials.5
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800011–0876. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Belgrade, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Riyadh, New Delhi, Islamabad, Jakarta, Beijing, Seoul, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Buenos Aires, Bangkok, Kabul, and Manila. Drafted by Barry; cleared in A/O, S/REM, NSC, and S; and approved by Christopher.↩
- In his January 4 address, Carter said that “neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 23)↩
- See footnote 6, Document 136.↩
- The portion of the Special Political Committee discussion relating to Afghanistan was reported in telegram 102 from USNATO, January 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800012–0939) The Mission reported on the North Atlantic Council meeting on Afghanistan in telegram 239 from USNATO, January 11. The telegram noted that the Council endorsed the work of the SPC and the Political Committee on Afghanistan-related matters, and quoted Secretary General Luns: “The Soviet Union must be left in no doubt about the extremely serious nature of its actions and about the possible consequences it will have to face.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800102–0140)↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece, Document 147.↩