147. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
[Omitted here are the report cover, a security information page, and a cover page.]
The USSR in Afghanistan: An Interim Appraisal ([classification marking not declassified])
Key Judgments
The growing insurgency that threatened to topple a pro-Soviet Marxist regime and create further instability on Soviet borders was the major factor behind Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan and elimination of Amin. The Soviets thought the Amin regime was incapable of arresting the disintegration and calculated that Soviet troops were necessary both to change the Afghan leadership and to ensure that the new regime held onto power.
The fall of a pro-Soviet government in Afghanistan would have dealt a major blow to Soviet prestige, slowing the momentum behind the broad extension of Soviet influence in the Third World. Moscow probably also thought that dramatic, forceful action would enhance its role as a major regional actor in the Middle East and South Asia and that a Soviet military presence in Afghanistan would place pressure on Iran and Pakistan to accommodate.
From Moscow’s perspective, the time probably seemed propitious for the invasion. US-Soviet relations were already at an ebb, and Moscow probably discounted adverse political effects on its international position.
Once they decided to remove Amin, the Soviets acted decisively to ensure that the new regime would retain control in the face of opposition from dissident Afghan military and insurgent elements. On 27 December, Soviet airborne troops moved quickly to seize control of Kabul. Simultaneously, Moscow moved two Ground Forces divisions into Afghanistan to seize key cities and communication routes.
[Page 424]So far, there is no reliable evidence that the Soviet forces now in Afghanistan have launched a large-scale offensive against the insurgents. The USSR may first want to see if the new regime can command the loyalty of the Afghan Army.
The 50,000 or so Soviet troops now there are considerably below the number that would be needed to conduct countrywide anti-insurgent operations. Moscow would need a force upwards of three times that number and would have to tailor it to the difficult Afghan environment.
The insurgents are likely to conduct continual harassment of the Soviets, but in view of overwhelming Soviet military superiority, they will not stand and fight against large units. The insurgents are not well organized, equipped or led, but they know the country and have a long history of resistance to foreign domination.
There is little prospect that the Babrak Karmal regime can end the insurgency on its own. Faced with continual guerrilla harassment, the Soviets will be under pressure to engage in aggressive military operations and to commit more troops. It is unlikely that Moscow will be dissuaded from this by the prospect of even more damage to its international position.
The Soviets probably can eventually suppress the insurgency with more troops and ruthless military action. But political costs to the USSR are likely to mount as Soviet forces engage in prolonged combat operations in an Islamic, Third World country.
[Omitted here is the body of the assessment.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 6, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. A statement on the cover page reads: “This assessment was written by [less than 1 line not declassified] based on contributions from members of the NFAC USSR-Afghan Task Force, and the Office of Strategic Research. It has been coordinated with the Office of Political Analysis, the Office of Strategic Research, and with the National Intelligence Officers for the USSR and for the Middle East.”↩