145. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State and the White House1
79. Dept pls repeat to New Delhi and others as desired. Dept Subject: (S) Afghanistan Reaction: President Zia’s 5 Jan. Discussion With Ambassador.
1. (S) Entire text; strictly protect foreign government information. This is an action message.
2. President Zia ul-Haq called me in to his residence at 1730 on 5 January for a chat; with him were Foreign Advisor Agha Shahi, Foreign Secretary Shahnawaz (both of whom I had seen earlier in the day), and MFA notetaker Farooq Rana. A/DCM Hagerty accompanied me.
3. Subject was Afghanistan, which Zia said he and his advisors had been discussing and would be examining further in next few days when Pak Ambs in Moscow and Kabul would be back in town for meetings. Events of 27 January [December], he said, constitute a fateful “moment in history as far as Pakistan is concerned.” And Pakistan faces “decision which direction to take.” He recapped other major decisions Pakistan had taken during last 32 years, touching on decision to sign 1954 agreement with us,2 to enter Baghdad Pact/CENTO, to join SEATO, then to leave those alliances, and to join with the Non-Aligned Movement. Most of these decisions related to Pakistan security considerations, and Pakistan took its decisions to suit its perception of what circumstances and its best security interests required.
4. Now, he said, Pakistan “stands at threshold of decision with only two options: it can either toe the Soviet line, or it can again line up with the Free World. And if the latter, the question is who will support Pakistan and in what magnitude?”
5. He said he “had been pleasantly surprised” by President Carter’s very timely telephone call.3 He said he had told Carter that Pakistan had come to feel that U.S. did not “care for this region . . . that you’d written us off.” He appreciated President Carter’s assessment that a [Page 418] “qualitative change” had taken place in the region with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and said he told Carter he would be discussing with Amb Hummel how to approach Pakistani requirements and how best to proceed from here in light of events in Afghanistan. Zia said he was especially encouraged by Carter assurance that he would do his best “to keep our differences away from this important issue.”
6. He then reviewed recent Afghan-Pakistan events, noting that short of involving itself physically, all concerned had said the USSR would go to any lengths to protect the existence of the regime that overthrew Daoud in April 1978. “But in the end, the Russians have become involved physically” in massive numbers, with three divisions in Afghanistan already and 5–7 divisions poised to enter. He had reports that Soviet troops have been seen no more than ten miles from Parachinar, on Pak-Afghan border; they already occupy Ghazni, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. “We will confront them, no doubt,” he said, “but we must know where we stand.”
7. He recapitulated his discussion with Soviet Amb last week in which Soviet Amb asked for “understanding” of Soviet position. “What understanding?” Zia says he asked; “You have committed aggression against my neighbor. You say the regime invited you in. Who invited you?” When Amb said Babrak, Zia replied that Babrak was not in power when troops descended on Kabul. Soviet Amb fudged, stressing Soviet friendliness for Pakistan and emphasizing gains which could accrue from cooperation between the two countries. Zia says he demurred, citing Pakistan principles and the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. “Will you get someone to call you into Pakistan too?” he asked.
8. Soviets have not issued “threats against us,” Zia said, but the line “is clear. If they can enter Afghanistan, they can enter Pakistan too.” He added his concerns about India to this mix as well, concerns based on presence of Indira Gandhi as either “king-maker or queen herself.”4 He noted Soviet relationship with India and Indian noises about possible arms for Pakistan from Pakistan friends. “India,” he said, “can forget that we will ever look east after what has happened in Afghanistan. It would be in India’s interest to share our concern about that.” But, he concluded, Pakistan must know where it stands with the U.S. Brzezinski statement says U.S. will stand by 1959 agreement, even to “defending Pakistan, if necessary.” President Carter’s statement of 4 January “gives impression that nuclear issue need not [Page 419] be an obstacle;” Pakistan needs to know precisely what America proposes to do to help Pakistan.5
9. I described for him in some detail the tough measures in Soviet-U.S. relations Pres Carter announced 4 January citing them as concrete evidences of seriousness with which USG views Soviet actions in Afghanistan. I described for him meetings which have been taking place in Washington and my expectation that I would shortly have the kind of information he sought. I also told him of our conversations, in Delhi and in Washington, with Indian officials in which we told them flatly we do not accept Indian views on the subject of arms for Pakistan.
10. Zia said he is looking forward to visit to Islamabad of Lord Carrington on 14th and has been encouraged by what he has seen and heard of response from other friendly countries in Europe and Asia.6 I briefed him on Christopher conversations in London and at NATO HQ.7 He also expressed hope that proposed meeting of Islamic Conference would condemn Afghanistan and possibly aid in easing Iran-U.S. dispute. I stressed to him our view—as already expressed to Pak FonAdvisor and FonSec—that Khomeini policy was providing opportunity for Soviets to meddle. Shahi chimed in to say he had made this point to both Gotabzadeh and members of the Revolutionary Council, including Khomeini, but was not sure what effect he had had.
11. Zia reverted to his original point, after a brief discussion of various theories to explain Soviet actions in Afghanistan. He said he hoped to hear from Washington “very soon.” He said he did not wish “to create the impression that we are scared or going down the drain” . . . but there is an urgent need to “know who is standing by us.” We need “clear-cut assurances and an idea specifically what will be provided. If taken literally, President Carter’s statement could mean everything,” he said; “we need to know for sure.”
12. I said I would convey his message immediately to Washington and expressed the hope that my instructions would not be long in coming.
[Page 420]13. Comment: None of us has yet seen account of Brzezinski conversation with Pak Ambassador Sultan reported in Pak press 5 Jan.8 Nor did Zia seem fully conversant with extent of my continuing conversations with Shahi and Shahnawaz this week, or even this noon. Zia made no mention of Shahi proposal (septel) re making 1959 executive agreement into a treaty—a proposal which gives me concern because it could be a Shahi creation designed to produce a negative U.S. reaction which he might then use in arguments against us.
14. There can be no doubt, however, of seriousness of Zia’s interest in what we will have to say and what we will propose to do [garble—across] the whole range of assistance—military, economic, and political. There should be no doubt in Washington that in order to remain credible with the Pakistanis and to overcome their resistance to too close a re-identification with us, what we will propose will have to be substantial in volume and composition.
15. I want to reiterate forcefully my recommendation that in our own interests we should find ways to lay aside for the time being the crippling strictures of the Symington Amendment in order to produce an effective local response to Soviet aggression. Now is the time to reorder our priorities, and to decide which of our objectives is most important during the next few months. We obviously cannot pursue all of our objectives simultaneously because they conflict, and in my strong view our longer-range nonproliferation actions should be temporarily subordinated to the more immediate necessity of making an effective response to Soviet aggression.
16. I should add that Zia gave sharp warning—as Agha Shahi had earlier—against any leaks with Western datelines on plans regarding proposed meeting of Islamic Conference. In order to have any chance of success, he said, conference must not be accused of being Western inspired.
17. Zia was in good form, dressed in uniform for the first time in a long time—at least during my visits with him. Atmosphere was friendly but very businesslike.
18. Action requested: Instructions.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 24, 1/1/80–1/6/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote: “Cy, Zbig: Pak←U.S. Commitments should be spelled out clearly & approved personally by me. C.”↩
- The United States-Pakistan Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed in Karachi, May 19, 1954. (Department of State Bulletin, May 31, 1954, pp. 850–851)↩
- See Document 111.↩
- Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister of India on January 14.↩
- In his Oval Office address, January 4, Carter laid out the actions his administration was taking in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He pledged: “Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the North.” For the text of his address, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 21–24. It is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 136.↩
- The Embassy reviewed Lord Carrington’s visit, January 14–15, in telegram 379 from Islamabad, January 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800027–0342)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 107.↩
- See Document 144.↩