Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

144. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 4, 1980, 11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan
• Dr. Brzezinski

Ambassador Sultan Khan called on Dr. Brzezinski on January 4th, 1980. Shaikh and Thornton sat in. Sultan opened with an expression of gratitude for Brzezinski’s public reaffirmation of the 1959 agreement. Brzezinski noted that this had been done at the instruction of the President. Sultan went on to stress Pakistan’s sense of isolation and the questions that Pakistan had about whether the level of interest now visible in Washington will be durable. (S)

Brzezinski confirmed our view of the Soviet action in Afghanistan as one of major and lasting importance, carrying with it a threat to Iran and Pakistan. He emphasized that the Soviet action should not be cost-free and that the Afghan resistance should get widespread support. He reassured Sultan that we will act, preferably in concert with other countries, to meet Pakistan’s security needs and we will consult with Congress to reduce impediments to security assistance. Secretary Brown will be discussing the situation fully in Beijing. (S)

Brzezinski stressed that continuation of Pakistani “ambiguity” about its nuclear intentions poses a difficult problem. While we are not making any specific linkage at this point, the Pakistanis must understand that cooperation, especially for the long haul, once the drama of the moment subsides, will be much easier if the “ambiguity” is resolved. The situation has changed in South Asia, and Pakistan should rethink its position just as we have rethought ours. Sultan reiterated Pak positions and said that Pakistan could not abandon its nuclear efforts. Brzezinski responded that we are not asking abandonment, but a greater Pakistani realization that we must minimize all problems between us. (S)

On the problem of assistance to the Afghan insurgents, which Brzezinski again emphasized, Sultan said that Pakistani actions would depend on their perceptions of US assistance and reliability. Brzezinski said that we are considering what we can do in military and economic terms, in addition to public statements. He said that the President would be stating our initial reaction soon. (S)

Sultan recalled that the Pakistanis had asked Ambassador Hummel whether the US was prepared to talk in specifics, and what the extent and nature of US aid would be. Pakistan needs an answer. Brzezinski agreed that the US and Pakistan should discuss this as well as the multilateral support that could be generated, and what could jointly be done for the Afghan rebels. The USG would also continue to consult with other governments and with Congress, and would fashion a tangible response to Pakistan’s needs. (S)

Both sides noted that each seemed to be waiting for the other to take the next step. Thornton stressed that in order to make a realistic presentation, we need a better general idea of what Pakistan thinks it needs, even if Pakistan is not ready to make specific requests. Sultan agreed that a US response that fell far short of Pakistani hopes would be counterproductive. Brzezinski pointed out that we cannot generate a massive package instantly, and we will need to talk to others. Sultan hoped that this process would not take months. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 95, Pakistan: 1/79–1/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.