Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, the White House, and the Embassy in Israel¹

Cairo, May 18, 1980, 1546Z

11149. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin. Ref: Cairo 11148.²

1. (S-entire text).

2. Following is the text of the letter from President Sadat to Prime Minister Begin which was handed to Ambassador Ben Elissar earlier today (Sunday). In giving me the text, Foreign Minister Ali stressed that we should hold in strictest confidence the fact that it had been provided to us.

3. Begin text. Dear Prime Minister Begin,

—In our meetings and correspondence alike, we pledged to do everything possible in order to facilitate the process of reaching agreement on the establishment of a self-governing authority with full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza. We discussed in length the necessity of making tangible and adequate progress in the autonomy negotiations in the light of our joint commitment to work for a comprehensive peace settlement of which all the parties benefit. In our meeting at Aswan,³ I emphasized to you the need for issuing new directives to our delegations with a view to accelerate the pace of progress and overcome the existing problems. Subsequently, we held separate talks with President Carter in Washington to stimulate movement in this direction.⁴

—However, I must tell you in all candor that I was disappointed by the lack of meaningful progress despite the intensification of the talks. You would recall that I drew your attention to the geopolitical considerations which make it imperative for both of us to set our priorities in such a manner that would enhance the prospects for reaching agreement. Despite our difference of opinions on several issues of substance, it has always been my conviction that it should not be that difficult to reach agreement so long as we are working in the context of a transitional arrangement and not that of a final settlement. We are not working in a vacuum either. We have the “Framework for Peace in the Middle East” which outlined a viable formula for that transitional arrangement.

—Under these circumstances, it would not be advisable for any party to undermine the process through the imposition of any preconditions or the taking of any actions that threaten the essence of the negotiations or purport to confront the other party with a new fait accompli which might jeopardize the rights or positions of the parties. Thus we were pleased when the head of the Israeli delegation, Dr. Josef Burg, in response to a letter from Dr. Moustafa Khalil, stated on May 5 that you subscribe to the notion that no preconditions should be set for the negotiations and that the autonomy talks should be guided by the principles and provisions of the Camp David Framework.

—In this spirit, we did not give much weight to certain statements issued by Israeli officials on matters which are related to the negotiations. We took this as a way of taking a negotiating position in public for obvious political reasons. However, a regrettable development took place in the past few days when certain negative moves were initiated that would result in poisoning the atmosphere of the negotiations and make it very unlikely to reach agreement. I am referring specifically to the move which is being considered by the Knesset to turn the annexation of East Jerusalem into basic law.⁵ You are quite aware of our position on Jerusalem. While we are not calling for a division of the city or the introduction of any barriers between its different sectors, we insist on achieving that without resort to territorial annexation or violating the rights and interests of 800 million Muslims. It is true that we are familiar with your view on this issue and we are not asking you to forfeit your right to state your views in the course of the negotiations. But it is a different matter to take certain actions through your political institutions for the purpose of co-opting the outcome of the talks. These actions seem to be designed to render these issues, however crucial, not negotiable or useless to discuss. Instead of stemming these attempts on the basis that they adversely interfere with the peace process and create a situation which is hard to keep under control, it appears that the Israeli Government is encouraging or even endorsing such moves.

—Another case in point is your position on settlement issue. As that matter was being brought up for discussion in the negotiating chambers, an Israeli official revealed your plans to intensify settlement activities and establish new settlements in the coming five years, i.e., for the duration of the transitional period. I trust that you agree with me that such plans are incompatible with the spirit of negotiations. It is an attempt to predetermine the outcome of the talks through taking advantage of your military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is for this reason that Minister Kamal Hassan Ali wrote to Dr. Burg during the Hertzliya talks to protest the statements your Minister of Agriculture⁶ made on that particular issue.

—On the other hand, at a time when you were expected to carry out the confidence building measures which we discussed several times and provided you with a list thereof as early as October 13, 1978, we witnessed an unfortunate escalation of action taken by Israeli authorities against the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

—How can we possibly win them over and enlist their support for the peace process in the midst of these actions?

—Dear Premier Begin,

—I believe that we have a historic opportunity to make a breakthrough that would bring about the reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. I also believe that, with good will and open minds we can make this cherished hope a living reality. With this in mind, I am urging you to effect the necessary change of attitude that would make it possible for us to resume negotiations. I leave it to your discretion and judgement to choose the ways and means for introducing such a change.

—With best wishes.

—Sincerely. End text.

Atherton

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 5/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.
2. Sent May 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047-2414)
3. See Document 327.
4. See Documents 354 and 356–359.
5. See Document 371.
6. Ariel Sharon.