372. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State and the White House1

11060. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to President Carter on Suspension of Negotiations. Ref: Cairo 11043.2

1. Secret-entire text.

[Page 1244]

2. Under Secretary Osama El-Baz called me to the Foreign Ministry Friday at 1630 local to hand me the text of the following letter from President Sadat to President Carter. El-Baz said this was intended to supplement the oral message conveyed last night in reftel.

3. Begin text:

May 16, 1980

Dear Jimmy:

I was very pleased to talk to you on the phone3 and have another stimulating conversation with you. As you well know, I highly value the bonds of friendship and solidarity that bind us together and consider them among the main pillars of our policy. It is my deep conviction that coordinating our stands and agreeing on a common strategy should remain as an overriding factor in shaping our moves and actions. I view this as an important contribution to world peace and stability in the Middle East.

It is in this spirit that I am writing to you this letter to share with you some thoughts on how best to deal with the present situation. You will certainly recall that I told you, in our telephone conversation, that I was quite willing to agree to the resumption of the autonomy talks despite the discouraging signs which emerged from the Hertzliya Round. In that session, the Israeli Government took an unyielding hard line position on such sensitive issues as the settlements and the planned expansion of Jerusalem. To be sure, we are never deterred by such positions, however unreasonable, for they can be said to be merely negotiating positions. But the situation becomes different and those positions acquire new dimensions when they are accompanied or followed by certain steps which are designed to consecrate them and confront both Egypt and the United States with a fait accompli every now and then. Unfortunately, experience reveals that the Israeli Government is liable to interpret our willingness to continue negotiating despite its uncooperative actions and statements as a proof of our acceptance, or at least acquiescence, to its policy.

This has often resulted in encouraging the said government to take more untenable positions rather than moderating its views, a fact which has been recognized and regretted by many Israelis. It is for these reasons combined that my colleagues and I found it imperative to take a firm stand in response to a new Israeli move which could undermine our efforts if it goes unchecked. The move was initiated in the Knesset to turn the annexation of Arab Jerusalem into a basic law, an act which amounts to a constitutional amendment under the Israeli system. Such an act would be extremely difficult to reverse. Undoubt [Page 1245] edly, it was intended to intimidate future Israeli governments and curtail seriously their freedom of action. It has been suggested that such a move was undertaken by a Knesset member and not by the Israeli Government. However, it is evident that the government acted in parallel with the member’s move and associated itself with it. Both Premier Begin and his chief negotiator found it opportune to endorse the move and state that it was nothing new. Furthermore, the Israeli Government submitted an additional draft of its own to formalize the annexation of East Jerusalem and render it irrevocable. One of the arguments Prime Minister Begin used was that he confronted us both with that at Camp David. On the other hand, Israeli officials have been making provocative statements about their settlement policy and their determination to build 14 new settlements [garble] The content as well as the timing of such actions came as a negative development to which we could not remain passive. It would not be in the interest of the negotiations and, in fact, the entire peace process to hold the talks in this atmosphere of rising tension and unilateral actions which run contrary to the spirit of reconciliation. As you know, the issue of Jerusalem is a sensitive one that invokes the interest and sentiments of eight hundred million Muslims. We recognized quite willingly the religious and cultural rights of sixteen million Jews in the city. By the same token, the rights of eight hundred million Muslims must be respected and observed.

Thus, it was inevitable for us to move to check such Israeli defiant attitude which is criticized by many moderate Israelis. We called for a pause, not a breaking-off of the negotiations. Such pause is intended to serve Israel notice that its policy of imposing preconditions and creating fait accompli is counter-productive. It is also meant as a signal to the Israeli public that their government is undermining the peace process with these rash and uncalled for actions. In the final analysis, the pause could, if utilized skillfully, help the peace efforts and boost the chances for reaching agreement. The Israeli Government must be brought to understand that it is under an obligation to exercise self-restraint and refrain from any precipitate action which is likely to affect adversely the peace process or render the negotiations meaningless. Afterwards, we will be ready to resume the talks in a more conducive atmosphere.

May I also suggest that we utilize this interval to discuss and coordinate our views of the major issues of substance which were raised in the course of the last round of talks. Our aides have started such thorough examination of substantive issues following the Hertzliya talks and I think that it would be fruitful to pursue this joint study prior to the resumption of the talks. Of course, you are at liberty to hold consultations with the other side as well. My confidence in you and your judgment has no limits. As usual, I will be delighted to receive your thoughts and observations.

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With best wishes and regards.

Sincerely,

Mohammed Anwar El Sadat

End text.

4. As I did with Boutros Ghali last night, I told El-Baz that, according to our information, their interpretation of the Knesset action on the Jerusalem bill was erroneous; it had been introduced by an opposition member of the Knesset and the government had moved to bury it in committee. El-Baz refused to buy this explanation, saying that the government could have taken the position that submission of this bill was untimely and opposed its introduction at this time. Instead, the government had permitted the bill to be introduced and referred to committee.

5. I then asked El-Baz what the GOE considered should happen before negotiations resume. He said their position was as stated in last night’s oral message—namely, that there should be assurances that the Jerusalem bill will not be voted into law while negotiations are going on. In addition, Israel should stop provocative announcements of plans for new settlements such as that in the recent Dobbles’ report; it was one thing for Israel to state its position in negotiations that it had a right to settlements but quite another thing to announce specific plans to establish new settlements.

6. Noting that President Sadat’s letter called for coordination and a common strategy between us, I reiterated the point I had made last night to Boutros Ghali that the GOE announcement which caught us by surprise was hardly an example of coordination and consultation and could not help but make a bad impression in the United States, after President Sadat’s statement to President Carter and in his People’s Assembly address that Egypt was prepared to resume negotiations. This would inevitably be seen as a reversal of the Egyptian position. I thought it useful to make this point again since Mansour Hassan, Minister of State in the presidency, with responsibility for information and cultural affairs, was in El-Baz’s office during our conversation. Hassan was apparently there to discuss a press briefing which El-Baz was going to give immediately after our meeting to further clarify the Egyptian position on the autonomy talks. I believe the Egyptians are genuinely worried about the effect on President Sadat’s credibility which their announcement has created and are seeking to minimize the damage, particularly with the American press.

7. Department may wish to repeat this message to Tel Aviv.4

Atherton
  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–6/80. Secret; Flash, Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, indicating that he saw the document.
  2. Telegram 11033 from Cairo, May 16, outlined the substance of the message Sadat sent Carter in light of the Egyptian Government’s March 15 decision to continue the suspension of the autonomy negotiations following the Knesset’s decision to refer the East Jerusalem annexation bill to its legal committee. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–1919)
  3. See Document 369.
  4. The Department transmitted the text of the telegram to Tel Aviv in telegram 128862, May 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800006–0404)