Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

359. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 16, 1980, 10:09–11:29 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Third Meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Vice President Walter F. Mondale
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
• Ambassador Samuel Lewis, United States Ambassador to Israel
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Ambassador James Leonard, Deputy Negotiator for the Middle East Autonomy Negotiations
• Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (Notetaker)
• Prime Minister Menachem Begin
• Yitzhak Shamir, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Dr. Yosef Burg, Minister of Interior
• Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Ambassador of Israel to the United States
• Chaim Kubersky, Director General, Ministry of Interior
• Jacob Nehushtan, Minister, Embassy of Israel
• Yehiel Kadishai, Director, Prime Minister’s Bureau
• Brigadier General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary to the Prime Minister
• Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
• Elyakim Rubinstein, Assistant Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Professor Ruth Lapidot, Legal Adviser to Foreign Ministry
• Gilad Stern, Assistant to the Minister of Interior

(The Vice President and David Aaron entered during the plenary meeting.)

The President began by saying that so far the meetings had been constructive.² We had an enjoyable evening at the White House last night,³ and he hopes that our Israeli guests enjoyed themselves. There are several important issues to be resolved. Egypt has replied⁴ to our message that it is all right if the intensive negotiations be in Egypt and Israel. However, Egypt very much wants the establishment of a security committee, as an integral part of the Camp David Accords. They told us that General Ali will represent Egypt if and when the committee is set up to carry out this provision of Camp David. We had alleviated the problem of the Continuing Committee in a way gratifying to Egypt. It is important under the Camp David Accords for it to function. For the U.S., we need to discuss alternatives if the Israeli position on East Jerusalem Arabs is that they can not vote in any elections that are carried out. If so, then we need Israeli suggestions for Egypt on alternatives to elections. We see only two such alternatives: to establish a procedure involving the mayors; or (less acceptable) to implement an agreement in Gaza first. As Prime Minister Begin has pointed out, Sadat is likely to insist on gaining agreement on both the West Bank and Gaza before implementing it in Gaza first. These are his (the President’s) items for discussion in this group. He will also have a couple of items to discuss with Prime Minister Begin privately.

Prime Minister Begin said he wanted to be clear in his mind. Did Egypt agree on the venue for the intensive talks?

The President said yes. Khalil said he would devote full time to them; but he made strongly the point on the need for the security committee. Also, he (Khalil) would like to keep the option open, near the end of the 40 days, to have a brief session here to confirm what has been done. This is an option the Egyptians would like to have.

Prime Minister Begin said that this could be considered at the proper time. With regard to the draft on the Continuing Committee, in accordance with the Camp David Accords, in the transitional period the Continuing Committee could deal with other matters of common concern, with the U.S. invited to take part, and decisions to be taken on the basis of unanimity. First, he did not like to change Camp David, and this could be written into a protocol, that this is not a precedent. Second, we don’t need all the words of Ambassador Linowitz (from yesterday’s U.S. proposal),⁵ if they say “in accordance with the Camp David Accords.” We should also put in the word “also,” to show that we are leaving in the original text (on the uses of the Continuing Committee). It will “also” deal with other matters. He has accepted the U.S. idea on citing some examples (of the work the Continuing Committee might do). It should also cite the development of sources of water, for the benefit of all. In accordance with paragraph five (of the Camp David Accords Associated Principles), the United States would be invited to join. He had a problem with the word “operate” (in the U.S. draft). Rather we should say that “decisions will be taken.”

The President asked the Prime Minister to reread his draft.⁶

Prime Minister Begin said that it was his handwriting. Nobody else could read it; and even he could only read it with difficulty! (laughter)

The President said he wanted to hear whether Prime Minister Begin could read it the same way a second time! (laughter)

(The Prime Minister reread his draft.)

The President said he preferred actually listing the three nations to be involved, as stated in Camp David that they “will constitute” the Continuing Committee.

Prime Minister Begin asked if the President wanted to list all the names.

The President said that if we were going to change the words of Camp David, then he would like to add the word “immediately,” since the Accords just say the Continuing Committee should function soon.

Prime Minister Begin asked if the words “as soon as possible” would be all right.

The President said that Camp David did not contemplate any delay.

Prime Minister Begin said that Camp David actually says “during the transitional period,” but. . .

Minister Burg suggested saying: “As the Camp David Accords say.”

Secretary Vance said the words are “will constitute.”

Mr. Nehushtan said that Ambassador Linowitz’ draft had said “will be established.”

Prime Minister Begin suggested “in accordance with Camp David.”

President Carter suggested “immediately.”

Prime Minister Begin said that then they would have to repeat the names of the members. This would complicate matters. Perhaps we should just say “as soon as possible.” Or how about “without delay?”

The President said he preferred to repeat Camp David exactly.

Prime Minister Begin asked if this was with all the names.

The President said he preferred this.

Prime Minister Begin said he had no objection, and read: “During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-Governing authority will constitute a continuing committee.

The President and Secretary Vance concurred.

Prime Minister Begin said that then we should have a semi-colon, followed by the rest.

Secretary Vance concurred.

Prime Minister Begin said that, with agreement, we can print it.

The President said fine.

(At this point, Ruth Lapidot and Robert Hunter left the room to work out the precise wording of the statement.⁷ They reentered at 10:36, in the midst of a discussion on a possible security committee).

The President said that, in summary: if the Israelis accept his proposal, that would be fine. Security will be discussed soon at the plenary. Then advisors or some other sub-group will be established on issues of security. This committee will make recommendations back to the plenary and ultimately to the heads of state. He would like to be able to tell Sadat that, at an early plenary meeting, the issues of security will be assigned to an advisory group, and this committee will make recommendations to the plenary and the heads of state.

Prime Minister Begin suggested that we go by stages—he is not prejudging the issues. The President may tell Sadat that we discussed this subject. He (Prime Minister Begin) wishes the President would accept his proposal: Issues of security will be discussed after Israel puts together its maps for the Egyptians. Then the main negotiating terms can take up the issues, as the Camp David Accords provide, with military experts taking part. Then what the plenary decides, he will accept. Today he can’t accept the words “security committee.”

The President said that this causes a problem. Sadat did not make this a proviso in regard to having continuous discussions, but Prime Minister Begin should not underestimate Sadat’s concerns on this issue. Prime Minister Begin should be flexible—which is natural for him (the Prime Minister) and help him (the President). If the plenary just states that the advisors will discuss these issues, then there will be ten days to get the maps, and then report back—this will delay the entire process for 10 days, which is bad.

Prime Minister Begin said that the President had said he (Prime Minister Begin) is flexible: he is used to hearing different compliments! The negotiating teams will consider this approach.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Israel had said publicly that a security committee could be set up.

Prime Minister Begin asked who said it.

Ambassador Linowitz said Minister Burg.

Minister Burg said yes, provided he was quoted exactly!

Prime Minister Begin said he could always say that they had made a mistake in saying that. It had happened before, on Khalil’s part, as well. It happened at Camp David and elsewhere. Minister Burg shouldn’t be put on the spot!

Minister Burg said he liked to be quoted.

Ambassador Linowitz said: “primo.”

Minister Burg said he had said that at some stage there would need to be talk about security issues. He had not excluded that there could be a security committee at some point.

Secretary Vance said that Minister Burg had said. . .

The President said that he hoped the Israelis would think it over. This is crucial to Sadat; and he has said so to his own people, in the Assembly, and to the Palestinians. Sadat and he (the President) see this as part of the Camp David process. What it is called is of secondary importance. If we continue the plenary without discussing security, there will be serious and unnecessary problems. We need cooperation to avoid problems.

Secretary Vance said that to accelerate progress in the talks, we need to deal with security problems promptly. This is important from the standpoint of general expedition.

Prime Minister Begin said that they would start on the maps now. It would take 10 days to two weeks to complete them.

Minister Burg said that there are no Egyptians here to speak for themselves. Why is this the crux of the matter? First there can be meetings (Note: accent on the plural), with security taken up, then the advisory committees can be set up.

The President said that this was fair enough.

Prime Minister Begin asked whether Minister Burg is suggesting this. Then it is his (Minister Burg’s) suggestion!

Minister Burg said that Begin is the Prime Minister!

Prime Minister Begin said that, after Ambassador Linowitz’s comment, he (Prime Minister Begin) had no option but to accept!

Ambassador Linowitz said he was glad he had found the right formula!

Minister Burg said: “advisory teams.”

(Prime Minister Begin then read the redrafted statement on the Continuing Committee). He said that Professor Ruth wants the word “may” instead of “will” (on issues to be dealt with by the committee). Is this in Camp David?

Professor Lapidot said that it is, if we stick with Camp David.

Minister Burg said as with the 26th of “May.”

The President accepted the word “may.”

Prime Minister Begin agreed. (See Attachment II)⁸

The President said that if this flexibility continues, there will be no other matters!

Prime Minister Begin said that this is very good.

The President agreed it was very good (i.e. the agreement on the Continuing Committee). Next is the problem of alternatives to the electoral process.

Prime Minister Begin said he had told his friends of the President’s two proposals.⁹ (He then conferred with his colleagues, who nodded agreement). This is a very serious issue.

The President agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that the soul of the Camp David Accords on the Administrative Council is elections. There should be no misunderstanding. The negotiating teams on security . . . all depends on the principles he presented yesterday. They expect an answer today or tomorrow. They could have said (at Camp David) that they would just appoint the Administrative Council. But people would say that this is a masquerade, and an indirect aid to Israel. So Israel proposed free elections—though they may be difficult to do. Sadat is mistaken in saying that he could impose autonomy on Gaza. Sadat can’t do it; no one can. Can we drag people to the polls? In Belgium, there is a fine for not voting. But it doesn’t help; people just pay the fine, of about 50 francs. So you can’t drag people to the polls. Israel stands by the elections. It is objectively difficult if the Palestinian Arabs will not take part. First, the Mayors could appoint the Council—but this can’t be done. It would be like having PLO-types. Israel would prefer known PLO people if it came to that. That is, if the mayors would agree anyway, which is doubtful. So what if we postpone the elections—as with the mayors—and they appoint the members? The same difficulty would arise. If there are free elections, the President says, PLO sympathizers could be elected anyway. Israel would say, so?—this happened through free elections. It would ask the elected individuals not to be with the PLO, but what can Israel do once there have been free elections? Therefore, there should be no proposal to say that anyone acquiesces in non-elections. His proposal is, let us work to get done in 40 days. Then after 30 days or so, we can assemble, and the President can empower Secretary Vance to come together with them, and to reason together. Now there is no other proposal that seems reasonable. We should stand by the democratic process of free elections.

(At this point, Robert Hunter left the room for about two minutes).

Minister Burg said that surely, before May 26, talking about not having elections would be psychologically bad.

The President said that this was a wise statement.

Minister Burg said that since it came from a sage, it was appropriate. (laughter) He would add that if we leave the idea of free elections, it would be a grave deviation from Camp David. We do not wish that now, at least until May 26.

The President raised the other option—Gaza-first. Minister Burg has assessed it well: to say today that we would abandon free elections would be bad. But the Camp David Accords would not come into being if the elections are not carried out. When we reach the final stages of the negotiations, it all becomes a failure if there is no means to get the Self-Governing Authority in place, then it will fail, and other provisions will be lost. Maybe we need to keep our option open to have a brief transitional period—maybe a committee—in Gaza or of mayors—to negotiate on a limited number of issues . . . We don’t need to cross that bridge now. We will work now, and with Israel and Egypt, on free elections—as in the Camp David Accords. We won’t put this issue aside, but keep it on the top of the agenda.

Secretary Vance asked: in 40 days?

The President said yes. If we get near the end, then we can look at this again.

Prime Minister Begin said there is a problem of control in the Sinai. In the peace treaty, a UN force is provided for. There is the problem of Sharm-el-Sheikh, in particular. But the Soviets vetoed this approach.¹⁰ And there is the U.S. letter¹¹ about efforts to be made to find acceptable alternatives—i.e. a multinational force. Maybe the United States had talks with the Soviet Union, and it said that it would use the veto. Therefore, it was necessary to try an alternative.

The President said that we had been talking primarily with Secretary General Waldheim.

Secretary Vance said we talked with the Soviets at the end.

Prime Minister Begin said that UNTSO was not for the time of the peace treaty; it was for the armistice period. The U.S., Israel, and Egypt joined in agreeing that members of the UN group should carry out the functions. This was not signed.

Then there was a promise that, a year before the ultimate withdrawal from the Sinai, we would meet again. The former foreign Minister (Moshe Dayan) said, and he (Prime Minister Begin) subscribed to his view, that if there is no UN force, and no multinational force—the former foreign minister would like it (multinational force) now. So they accepted the agreement, but stated that if neither of the forces is established, then Israel can’t withdraw from its positions in the Sinai. They want the commitment to be fulfilled. Also, the U.S. commitment is one of the most vital parts of the peace treaty—bearing in mind problems like Sharm-el-Sheikh. Nobody knows what will happen. We could have a situation one day with the Straits (of Tiran) closed. That would be, in the European concept, a casus belli, but Israel does not want that. He suggests accelerating the talks on the tripartite agreement, where now there is no agreement. What should be done if there is no UN or multinational force? This should be decided bilaterally between Israel and the United States. Otherwise, a vital part of the peace treaty would be out. Therefore, he suggests that we accelerate the tripartite agreement and sign a bilateral agreement. The U.S. has noted Israel’s announcement. There is a vacuum: let’s fill it up.

The President called on Secretary Vance.

Secretary Vance said that he would describe the negotiations. We want a tripartite agreement: let’s work on it.

The President said he recalled that Israel had suggestions on Articles 4 and 6.

Secretary Vance said he had discussed them at breakfast, but can’t remember the details now.

The President called on Ambassador Evron.

Ambassador Evron said that the problem is that Egypt now takes exception to the whole paragraph.

Professor Lapidot called on Mr. Rubinstein.

The President said he had not been in this issue.

Mr. Rubinstein said that Egypt did not see Israel’s declaration, that if there is no agreement reached (on the follow-on force), then Israel will not withdraw in 1982. There is more than a hint of that in the document, in section (sic!—paragraph) six to that effect. Egypt says that it is not acceptable, any hint that Israel might not withdraw. The Israelis think that the Egyptians know the Israeli position.

Prime Minister Begin said that, therefore, let’s have a trilateral and a bilateral. . .

The President said he sees.

Secretary Vance said we have. . .

Prime Minister Begin said: . . . and an exchange of letters. They should become an integral part of the treaty.

The President asked: who?

Secretary Vance said that this didn’t need to be crossed to the year before withdrawal.

The President said that he could see that Sadat would be reluctant to sign a document saying that Israel might not withdraw. We need to reserve the prospects on that. It is not in the (agreement?). He sees a problem.

Prime Minister Begin said that Israel would not require that of Sadat: the United States gave the commitment.

The President agreed.

Prime Minister Begin said that this was central to it (the treaty?).

Mr. Rubinstein said that Egypt would object to a U.S.-Israeli agreement saying this.

The President said he knows.

Mr. Rubinstein said that this is a crucial thing, which Israel cannot accept.

The President said that it was not necessary to get agreement with Sadat, but we could see, and try to remove it (the problem?).

Ambassador Evron said that we did reach agreement on a text¹² here (in Washington last September), and he thought that took care of the Egyptian problem.

The President said that that was not the case.

Secretary Vance said that it was not yet the case.

Prime Minister Begin asked whether they (Israel) would be notified.

Secretary Vance agreed.

Prime Minister Begin asked for a reply on their 4-point document.¹³

The President said he wanted to save some time to meet privately with Prime Minister Begin.¹⁴

Prime Minister Begin asked whether the President wanted to see him.

The President said yes.

Prime Minister Begin said thank you, sir, it would be a pleasure.

Ambassador Linowitz said (in reference to the second document, attached), that he thinks Prime Minister Begin would agree that it is important not to change Camp David. The problem is not what the authority is called but what it does. This is what the negotiations are trying to do. This formula will not help in the negotiations. We should work now on what the authority should do, not on what it should be called.

Prime Minister Begin asked him to clarify.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the import of point one is that the Self-Governing Authority is an administrative council.

Prime Minister Begin said that it is in the book (the Camp David Accords).

Ambassador Linowitz said that therefore we should say it like it is in the book. Why give it a different name?

Prime Minister Begin said that there is a simple reason: for the last ten months, there have been proposals that there be 40 members. This is an assembly. We need to make clear what it is. What does it mean? We should not turn in circles. He contends, and Barak—whom the President likes, and who sends the President his regards—in an exchange with el-Baz in the President’s presence,¹⁵ said that when the words “Administrative Council” appeared once, then it applied every time. This was agreed. In the year and a half since Camp David, attempts have been made to change the document, without the words “Administrative Council.” He has to return to the document. He showed Dayan, in a paper at the peace treaty signing, seven deviations from it (on not including the words “Administrative Council”). We are now at a stage, in the last year, where we see proposals to change the content and meaning. Israel wants it clear: if “Administrative Council” is not there, then Egypt will say it is an assembly. He wants to make clear that Egypt can’t say this, since it is an administrative council. He does not want a closet state, or a corridor leading to an independent Palestinian state. This is crucial. It is another idea, a proposal. He wants to remind the President that in the joint letter, Egypt and Israel repeated the words “Administrative Council.” Egypt did not want it, but we repeated it. In communiques (of the autonomy talks) it is always there. Therefore “Administrative Council” means something. It is a most essential point. The basic issue is, what is the self-governing authority? Everybody has interpreted it—so what is it?

The President said that he does not favor substituting the words “Administrative Council” for “Self-Governing Authority.” This is fruitless semantics. It is better to look at the powers and responsibilities it will have, not at the name. We put in “Administrative Council” once, reluctantly. We cannot accept giving up “Self-Governing Authority” in all references, and use “Administrative Council” in its place.

Prime Minister Begin said that he does not want to give up “Self-Governing Authority.” He repeats this.

The President said he understands.

Minister Burg said that “Administrative Council” means something.

The President said he knows.

Prime Minister Begin said that these words give an accent: that it is more administrative than political. Therefore, it gives more or less, but the words stand per se. What they are asking for all the time, and Ambassador Linowitz once agreed—then the Egyptians got cold feet—either bring (?) the Israeli model or talk about the three categories. But Egypt backed out. Therefore, there should either be an accent on “Administrative Council,” or use of the three categories. These are two possibilities, and . . . .

The President said he would prefer to accept the latter.

Minister Burg said that Egypt had not agreed.

The President said that there are good prospects for success. Problems of semantics are there all the time: Judea and Sumeria vs. the West Bank; Palestinians vs. Palestinian Arabs—there is always a problem of definition. He understands that Prime Minister Begin and Sadat make statements about aspects of full autonomy that are justifiable, but letting them stand can be a problem. We need to find common ground. The second approach is good. We do not need to decide what, today, should be the division of powers and responsibilities among the three categories, but this approach gives us good flexibility.

Prime Minister Begin: Now there is the question of the number of members.

Ambassador Linowitz said that in the negotiations, Prime Minister Begin feels that this should correspond to the number of functions. Egypt has a different view.

Prime Minister Begin said that the U.S. has proposed a number which is arbitrary. What we need to do is create a basis for establishing the number of members.

The President said that this opens up additional problems: How many fragmented parts into which to divide actual responsibilities? Ambassador Linowitz’s paper has 22 different functions.¹⁶ Should education and culture be one function or two? On administration of justice, is there a separate function for prisons?

Minister Burg mentioned Health, Education, and Welfare.

The President asked whether that should be one function or three. If there is one member for each function, then Egypt will work to get many functions, while Israel will try to get a few. This is a question of balance and imbalance. On agriculture, there can be a function for planting, harvesting, marketing. We do not favor anything that will lead to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. We are prepared to say so in a final signed document. He thinks there is a chance that Sadat would also sign that there is no authority ever (sic!) to declare itself an independent Palestinian state. He (the President) can’t speak for Sadat, but the Israelis should think about it. He (the President) wants the Self-Governing Authority to have the needed authority, and no chance to declare itself an independent state.

Minister Kubersky asked whether there was agreement in principle that the number of members should equal the number of functions, for the negotiations?

The President said that this would make the negotiations more difficult. Then each time that Egypt proposes having more, there will be fragmentation of functions. Israel will try to consolidate them. Why get into that problem?

Minister Burg said that we should talk more about it.

The President said: later.

Prime Minister Burg [Begin] said that if there is no agreement, then Israel will stand by these points. It can not be otherwise: non possumus.

The President said that Prime Minister Begin should not destroy his reputation for flexibility, which he and Prime Minister Begin worked to protect!

Prime Minister Begin said: “Here I stand; I can do no other.”

Minister Burg said: Martin Luther,¹⁷ 1521.

Prime Minister Begin said: “you know? How did you know?”

Minister Burg said: “I was there.” (laughter)

Prime Minister Begin said that he shouldn’t quote Luther, who once said that all the Synagogues should be burned. He (Luther) did not like the Jews.

The President suggested that he and Prime Minister Begin have a short talk. Would the others please wait, and there would be a group photo for historic reasons. Anyone not wanting to be in the photo could leave!

(The President and Prime Minister Begin went into the Oval Office for a private meeting, where they were later joined by Secretary Vance. At 11:50, they emerged for the group photo and to discuss the press statement).¹⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 21, Hunter: Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty Basic Briefing Book [II]. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter’s handwritten notes on this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Israel, 4/79–11/81.
2. In an April 16 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski commented that during the previous day’s meetings the President, “achieved more than our minimum objectives with Begin, including a commitment to work towards May 26; continuous talks (though not here); and a Continuing Committee that will have both negotiating and coordinating authority. We can be on the Committee in fact, provided that [it] is not made to appear to be a change to Camp David. And Egypt, Israel, and the U.S. can continue to work on unresolved issues in the current format until the Continuing Committee comes into being.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Visits: Box 10)
3. President and Mrs. Carter hosted a State Dinner in honor of Prime Minister and Mrs. Begin at the White House from 7:32 p.m. to 11:13 p.m., April 15. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) During the dinner, both Carter and Begin delivered short speeches to toast the occasion. The texts of these remarks are printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 686–693.
4. Atherton met with Khalil on April 16 to discuss the proposal for continuous talks to take place in Egypt and Israel. (Telegram 8395 from Cairo, April 16; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Visits: Box 10) On the meeting, Brzezinski reported to Carter in an April 16 memorandum that Khalil felt that without the creation of security committee, the talks would have “no value.” Brzezinski continued: “Khalil would also like for the negotiators to meet for a few days in Washington near May 26—if enough progress had been made—to wrap up the heads of agreement approach.” (Ibid.)
5. See footnote 15, Document 356.
6. Not found.

7. The text of the statement, as finally agreed, is attached to the memorandum of conversation as Attachment I. The text reads: “In accordance with the provisions of the Camp David Framework, during the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.

   “The Committee may also deal with other matters of common concern; e.g., the development of water resources for the benefit of all concerned, economic cooperation, etc. The United States will be invited to participate in the Committee which will take its decisions on the basis of unanimity.”

8. A mistaken reference to Attachment I. (See footnote 7 above)
9. See Document 358.
10. See footnote 2, Document 276.
11. See Document 295.
12. See Document 295 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.
13. See footnote 5, Document 357.
14. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Begin privately in the Oval Office from 11:29 a.m. to 11:55 a.m., April 16; the two leaders were joined by Vance from 11:45 a.m. to 11:55 a.m. (Carter Library, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
15. See footnotes 52 and 53, Document 28.
16. Reference is presumably to an April 14 draft version of the draft Heads of Agreement, a copy of which is in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Israel, 4/79–11/81. The draft agreement lists 22 responsibilities to be accorded to the self-governing authority: education, culture, religious affairs, administration of justice, agriculture, health, labor and manpower, social welfare, internal transportation, municipal affairs, housing, tourism, budget, taxation, civil service, administrative operations, police, internal finance, industry and internal commerce, internal communications and post, private property, and local banking.
17. German priest and theologian of the sixteenth century, Luther is best known as the initiator of the Protestant Reformation in 1517. Luther is reputed to have uttered the phrase which Begin quoted in the preceding sentence in his appearance before the Diet of Worms in 1521.
18. The text of the two leaders’ April 16 remarks to the press is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 694–695. The White House’s statement on the talks was released April 17 and is printed on pp. 700–701.