49. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S.
- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
- Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
- Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant to Secretary Kissinger
- FRG
- Walter Scheel, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Guenther van Well, Director for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Peter Limbourg, German Ambassador to Belgium
The Secretary: I had a good talk with your Ambassador to NATO—I gave him a ride on my plane from Bonn to Brussels.
FM Scheel: Ah, good. What I have to tell you is not of such great importance that it needs to be noted with great precision. I want to inform you officially on the deliberations of the Foreign Ministers of The Nine today. They asked me, while you are still in Brussels, to inform you on the decisions taken about the opening of a dialogue with the Arab States.
I want you to know that I repeated the substance of our talks last night to my colleagues.
The decision of The Nine to proceed with contacts with the Arabs was taken on the basis of a paper which the Political Directors noted, in which it was decided that in pursuit of the decisions earlier taken in Copenhagen, the Community was ready to take the necessary steps for the opening of a dialogue with the Arabs. It is not the wish of the Community to hinder current peace efforts or compete with the follow on work of the Washington Energy Conference.
The Foreign Ministers charged me with communicating our Aide Mémoire prepared by the Political Directors to the Arabs, and to tell you about it. The aim of our dialogue has a long-term purpose. We will [Page 205] ask the Arabs to nominate one or more representatives of the Arab States to contact Chancellor Brandt, as President of The Nine. After this initial contact, if things appear auspicious, we would consider working groups to study in more detail ways of cooperation. In the end—if everything is running successfully—one could envisage a conference of Foreign Ministers.
This is the content of the Declaration. I have informally told the press roughly this. All my colleagues share my view that it is necessary that no frictions occur with other ongoing activities. We will not undermine efforts toward peace. The Foreign Ministers charged me with establishing the necessary contacts to avoid this.
After our first contacts with the Arabs, I will keep in touch with you to exclude the possibility of any frictions developing. We would be grateful if, briefing as we do now, we could build up a useful exchange of views.
I have also corrected the impression created by some Israeli ambassadors about the attitude of the United States.
You will note that we have now eliminated any exact timing for a meeting of Foreign Ministers. It is now much more like the CSCE format—if there is sufficient progress, etc.
The Secretary: I note that we are now being informed of a decision after first having read about it in the newspapers and after I have been asked about it at a press conference. This, therefore, underlines our concern about decisions which are prepared without informing us and taken without consultation with us.
Second, the fact that the Community has no interest in undermining peace efforts is largely irrelevant. The Community is not able to guarantee that this will not happen in any event.
Third, I have already told you what our strong views are on bringing the Arabs together in this way.
Fourth, the United States will reserve its freedom of action to take similar steps if we believe them to be in our own national interests, and to report on them to the Community thereafter.
Fifth, I say in all seriousness that the United States will not accept this procedure in the long run without its having a great effect on our relationship.
FM Scheel: I recognize that the procedures of The Nine have weaknesses insofar as the US is concerned. We would have wished to inform the US earlier, but this was not done because of a lack of readiness to take decisions.
Our discussions last night were already a sign of a willingness to increase the flow of information between the United States and the Community.
[Page 206]I informed other Ministers that you had expressed reservations, but in principle were not against a dialogue. This concern of yours caused us to review the progress we had made in the Political Committee so far as the Foreign Ministers Conference was concerned. We could not give up the idea of pursuing the dialogue, because it had already gone too far. But our initiative, we believe, will not have dangerous consequences. Neither peace efforts nor any further work of the Washington Energy Conference will be affected since we did not speak of oil as a central matter.
It is our realistic view that we can continue to discuss this together and avoid difficulties.
The Secretary: There is no purpose to be served in debating a fait accompli—a decision made in the absence of prior discussion. The Community is in no position to decide what acts are dangerous to peace and what are not. Those in the Community who know what they want will push the pace and the others will go along.
Your decision may well have very serious consequences. Nor will the tendency of the Community to proceed without consultation escape us. As I told you, we will reserve our complete freedom of action. What the relationship of the Community’s decision will be to the Washington Conference and to our security relationship remains to be seen.
I would appreciate it if we could work out a common line to tell the press.
FM Scheel: I will tell them that I have been charged by The Nine to inform you of The Nine’s decision with regard to contacts with the Arabs. I will say that since our effort is a long-term one, it will not be competitive with ongoing peace efforts or the Washington Energy Conference.
The Secretary: Declarations cannot change objective tendencies.
FM Scheel: Second, let me tell you that pursuant to our work on the Declarations, a decision was taken as I indicated yesterday. On the 12th and 13th the Political Directors will meet in Bonn to discuss the texts with our American friends. The texts will be given to Hartman—including the text of the energy section. The energy section text should not be made known in advance of the UN Conference, nor should there be any discussion of the text until it has been agreed upon.
The effort will be to conclude the discussion if possible on the 12th and 13th. Then on the 14th the Political Directors will be in NATO to discuss the NATO Declaration. This suggestion should be seen in the context of the President’s visit to Europe.
I have been asked informally to sound you out as to when an invitation to the President would be convenient. Would the President be prepared to come during the second part of April? If so, then the Foreign Ministers will decide and enable the President of The Nine to issue the invitation.
[Page 207]The Secretary: I would appreciate it if that second part relating to the President’s visit were not made public. I will discuss this with the President and let you know his views about the signing of the Declaration. I will let you know whether the new dates for the Political Directors are acceptable, and when the President might come to Europe.
I regret that our first official contact with you as spokesman for The Nine must be under these circumstances. It certainly will not help the Atlantic relationship, but we have had our differences before.
(Some talk in German which was not translated.)
As to Copenhagen, I find it difficult to refer back to that meeting since we were neither informed of that conference or told how the Arabs got there. Yet that Conference led to work about which we were not told, and now to a meeting about which we were not informed.
I must say in all formality that this is not a procedure that can last long. Please inform your colleagues of this. This is a long-term problem; your term is over in July. This is an organic problem.
FM Scheel: I believe there is every reason to continue to exchange information. There are no obstacles to improvement in our relationship.
The Secretary: The mere fact that there will be an exchange in a manner about which we have the greatest reservations does not guarantee we will not again be faced with a fait accompli.
I have made clear our view. Europe seems intent upon taking a path we will not accept. If Europe is determined to float its foreign policy, then the United States, too, will float its foreign policy. We will then have to see whose specific weight is the greatest.
FM Scheel: I have taken note of what you have said and will forward it to my colleagues. We will continue to exchange information with you.
(The Secretary gets up to leave and there is some conversation in German.)
The Secretary: It would almost be better if this information had been transmitted to us through diplomatic channels. I have been summoned to be informed of something which we are known to be against. It is hardly a good procedure.
FM Scheel: (Says something in German which was not translated.)
The Secretary: I was told that the Foreign Ministers meeting would not be mentioned, even in contacts with the Arabs.
FM Scheel: No decision has yet been taken; the British were not represented at today’s meeting by a Minister. Thus, the decision is not formally in force as yet. The British Government will confirm its acceptance of our decision in writing after a new government is formed.
- Summary: Kissinger and Scheel discussed the opening of
an EC-Arab dialogue and
U.S.–EC relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 4, Nodis Memcons, Jan–March 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Eagleburger. The meeting took place in the German Embassy. Kissinger was in Brussels on March 4 to brief NATO and EC officials on the Middle East peace process. On March 3, Kissinger met with Scheel in Bonn, where they discussed U.S.-West European relations, with particular emphasis on the role of France. They also discussed EC-Arab relations, the EC and NATO declarations, Nixon’s proposed trip to Europe, SALT, MBFR, Berlin, Soviet naval power, the Middle East, and Cuba. (Ibid., Box 7, Nodis Memcons, Mar. 1974, Folder 6)
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