Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

50. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 5, 1974, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• EC-Arab Initiative

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Mr. Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador at Large
• Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
• Mr. Winston Lord, Director of Planning and Coordination
• Mr. Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Mr. William Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Secretary: Do you think we could get our Chargés to shut up?

Sisco: Which one?

Secretary: Tripoli. The idea suggested requires careful exploration with our other friends. I have commitments. Why does he have to comment? What is his name? Stein. What is a nice Jewish boy like this doing in Libya? Let’s talk about the EC-Arab initiative. What are your views, Hal?

Sonnenfeldt: I think we should make an issue of the consultation question but take the substance of this initiative and fold it into what we are doing multilaterally.

Secretary: Be more concrete.

Sonnenfeldt: We do this by demonstrating that the Washington Energy Conference machinery can operate more effectively than this EC proposal.

Secretary: But how do you fold it in?

Sonnenfeldt: That will depend on what comes out of the Coordinating Group, on the financial and economic side. . .

Secretary: But only bad things can come out of this EC-Arab Foreign Ministers meeting. The Europeans can’t control the pace and they will be forced into an early meeting no matter what they tell us privately.

Sonnenfeldt: We have a real problem if the meeting happens in three weeks but that is not what the Europeans are saying to us.

Secretary: How can the Europeans delay if the Arabs ask for an immediate Foreign Ministers meeting? Given that it is a European initiative, on what grounds can the Europeans refuse? Look at the evidence. They are scared to death of the Arabs and they saw four Arab ministers at the Copenhagen Summit when they wouldn’t see the Secretary of State.

Sonnenfeldt: As I said we have a problem if the Europeans are forced into a conference three weeks from now. But if it happens down the road in the misty future, that is an entirely different issue and requires a different tactical approach.

Secretary: It is clear what the Europeans are up to. They have set up one thing to please us, the Washington Energy Conference, and one thing to please the French, the initiative toward the Arabs.

Hartman: If we believe our own analysis, the Europeans won’t be able to accomplish anything on their energy problems through this initiative. It is going to fail.

Secretary: Can’t anyone focus on the issue that I am interested in? The best way to insure our energy needs would be to go bilateral. Jobert was absolutely right when he said the energy conference was purely political. I don’t give a damn about energy; that is not the issue. The issue is to break the other Europeans away from the French. And you don’t do that by mumbling.

Hartman: You don’t mumble, but will a strong U.S. response break the Europeans away from the French in the way you want?

Sonnenfeldt: Let’s don’t. . .

Secretary: Can’t someone focus on issues that interest me? I will be candid. I have already decided to go bilateral as a result of the Washington Energy Conference and the European behavior there. They went along with our proposal as far as they thought they had to, but no further. They want to milk us technologically. They pick Brussels for the site of the Coordinating Group meeting. They choose a lousy chairman. The Coordinating Group is not going to be important. I have already made up my mind and the question of bilateral deals with Iran and Saudi Arabia is settled. So let us quit talking about it. And about energy. What I consider more important is the anti-American tendency developing in Europe.

Hyland: But can we defeat that tendency by brutalizing the Europeans at every turn? I think not. It is not in our interest to break up the Community nor to strongly object to each EC initiative that we think is not in our interest. They will have different interests from ours, and we have to accept that.

Secretary: Name one single European political action recently that has not been against the U.S.

Hartman: Their position on trade negotiations.

Secretary: That is obviously in their own interest. But look at the declarations, their handling of Japan, and their activities in the Mid-dle East. In each case they have pursued deliberately anti-American policies.

Hartman: They broke with France at the Washington Energy Conference.

Secretary: That was only because of our pressure.

Hartman: That is the only way.

Lord: But do you break this anti-American tendency by breaking off the Coordinating Group?

Secretary: Will you stop asking about the goddam Coordinating Group. The Coordinating Group will go forward in a lower key. I have already decided that. But the Coordinating Group and energy is not the issue. Can’t you understand that?

Lord: I am not talking about energy as energy. I am talking about the symbol of the Eight against France at the Washington Energy Conference. Do you throw that away? Is it in our interest to shut that off?

Secretary: We won’t shut off our energy initiative or the Coordinating Group. It will continue, but it will be less active. We will ask for European views.

Lord: What I am saying is do you go bilateral now or hold open the possibility of multilateral efforts.

Secretary: The conclusion I drew from the Washington Energy Conference, notwithstanding the articles in the New York Times and Time magazine, was that it was a success only because Jobert was totally irrational. If Jobert had given them anything, the Eight would have snapped at it. It was only the totally irrational action of the French that made the Washington Energy Conference a success. The President’s remarks scared some of them and with an election coming up in Great Britain, none of them had the guts to break with us. But they decided to give us just enough to keep our proposal going but not enough for it to mean anything serious. No matter what they say to us they will not work seriously. We can use the energy group for multilateral efforts, but we would be insane to depend on it for our energy needs. I will be candid. I talked to Faisal bilaterally before the Washington Energy Conference and you have seen intelligence reports that Ohira decided after the energy conference that Japan’s only course was to go bilateral. Do you see any alternative, Joe?

Sisco: How do you see the effect of a lifting of the embargo on bilateral deals?

Secretary: We have to get a handle on the next embargo by bilateral security, economic and technical deals with some of the producers. The press has given me much credit for the energy conference but it was a tactical victory only, and not significant for the long term.

Lord: The EC Eight decision to break with the French was significant. We should try to exploit it.

Hartman: This difficulty with the Europeans is a long term problem. We need to look for specific ways to make the point that we are not satisfied with what they are doing. One possibility is the declarations.

Secretary: I think we should send an icy letter from the President to the EC Heads of Government saying they went ahead without consultations and that I learned about the final document at a press conference. We should tell them that we reserve the right to act similarly, that we have ordered a review of the entire EC Declaration process and that we will not meet with them pending the results of that review. That will give them something to react to.

Lord: That will mean a postponement of the President’s trip?

Secretary: That is premature. We don’t ask that question here. But look at the governments that agreed to this Arab-EC initiative. No government in Britain, no government in Italy, the French are against us, the Germans are scared, the Irish support the French.

Sisco: What do you think will be the European reaction in ten days or so if the President sends them such a letter?

Secretary: I think the Eight will react the same way as they did to the French after the energy conference. They will back away, tell us they didn’t mean it, and privately grumble that it was forced upon them.

Sisco: If they do that, would that mean a better EC Declaration?

Secretary: No, the French will never agree to a satisfactory EC Declaration.

Hyland: If that is true, why don’t we put the onus on the French and on the Europeans instead of on the U.S.—then we can blame the breakdown in US-European relations on the Europeans and deal bilaterally.

Secretary: That depends by what we mean by bilateral. We won’t have bilateral oil deals but we will take care of our needs. But imagine what the Arabs will think of the Community. They will consider Jobert spokesman of the Common Market. Who else can the Arabs look to? We must face the fact that the Europeans are competing with us. I am not trying to keep Europe out of the Middle East but look at this initiative. There was no normal consultative procedure. There were mumbles and leaks but no serious effort to elicit our views. They never gave us a chance to say formally what we thought about their proposal. Even the British were offhanded and the Germans misled us the night before the initiative was announced. Scheel told me that the document would never mention a Foreign Ministers meeting. He left me with the definite impression that it would be a vague statement about European-Arab scientific and technological cooperation. I had no idea that they would deliver themselves of the kind of document they released the next day. The Europeans are operating against us in the Middle East, an area of critical significance to the United States. We must stop them. Europe’s anti-Americanism has gotten worse and worse every month since last July and the only exception was the Washington Energy Conference. And that was only because it was worse for them to stand up to me than to stand up to Jobert. A weak government in Britain will not stop the French. The West Germans will not stop the French and the Common Market is becoming organically anti-American. It will be harder to stop a year from now, so we must stop it now.

Hyland: But, if we break up the Community and if Europe falls apart, the Russians will be the winners. We can make clear our unhappiness, our serious disagreement with current European policies without breaking up the Community. But we can’t ask for a veto of EC decisions.

Secretary: A veto is not the point but we have got to stop this anti-American behavior on the part of the Europeans. Take the example of the trilateral declaration which means absolutely nothing to me. What is the reason to resist an EC-US-Japanese document unless it is to establish a European identity by pursuing anti-American policies.

Hyland: But I think we will accelerate that process if we respond brutally to the Europeans time after time. We will break up the Community.

Secretary: Then, we will have to accept that.

Sonnenfeldt: There is another alternative. We can say that the EC-Arab initiative is a crucial issue for the U.S., that we are disturbed that we were not consulted, but that now that initiative should only go forward in close consultation with the U.S. We should take the same position with the EC–9 Declaration, with respect to consultation.

Hyland: I agree we should take a tough stand on consultations in the Declaration.

Secretary: We aren’t going to get together with them on the declaration next week.

Sisco: I think a pause on this is useful.

Sonnenfeldt: We should give the Europeans another chance. It is not in our interest to break up Europe.

Hyland: We must be very careful not to exaggerate this problem publicly.

Secretary: I will say nothing publicly.

Hyland: Any letter we send would be published in the New York Times within a few days.

Secretary: No Presidential letter has ever been published in the newspapers.

McCloskey: But the substance of it will be in a Flora Lewis column within days.

Sonnenfeldt: As I said I think we should give the Europeans a second chance. We should tell them how seriously we view this matter. We should offer to consult. We should proceed with the Coordinating Group work. We should tell them how serious we are about all this but do so in a measured way.

Secretary: How does this fit into a Presidential letter?

Sonnenfeldt: We call in Von Staden and tell him that we are responding to Scheel’s approach to you about the EC-Arab proposal. I am not sure a Presidential letter is a good idea. We may wish to give them an aide-mémoire. We can tell the Community through Von Staden that Donaldson and McCloskey are ready to consult on this issue but that until we hear from them the EC Declaration is in abeyance.

McCloskey: I have a question. How much conflict with the Europeans can the President stand?

Secretary: His popularity is down to 27 percent, so the President might as well do what is right. In any event, this Administration has always done what is right.

Sonnenfeldt: The Presidential trip is no longer a carrot for the Europeans.

Secretary: It is no longer a carrot for the President either.

Sonnenfeldt: The trip is double-edged. There will be demonstrations. I am not so sure about the President signing the NATO Declaration either.

Hyland: But we must come to terms with the Europeans.

Secretary: You are living in the Europe of the ’50s not of the ’70s. The Europeans are actively hostile to our efforts in the Middle East and in Latin America. They oppose us everywhere.

Lord: Will anything be better after Pompidou is gone?

Secretary: Things will be worse. The trend in France is toward the left and the left is anti-American. We have every reason to break the French now.

Sonnenfeldt: But we break the French by giving the rest of Europe a choice, not by forcing them to side with the French.

Secretary: When I was in Bonn I was struck that Frank was trying to make a sucker out of me with his syruppy language. I never met him before, but he must be on the French side. I would rather break the European Community than have it organized against the U.S. Only the French have a strategy and it is anti-American. If they were only mean, but logical, I wouldn’t mind it. If they were even like the Japanese, and God knows I dislike the Japanese, I could understand it, but they are absolutely irrational. At the Mexico City conference the Brazilian Foreign Minister told me that the French had given him an aide-mémoire on the June 22 agreement and warned him against a US-Soviet condominium. They are a bunch of maniacs! What possible good can actions like this do the French? Jobert’s remarks in Baghdad that the hand holding the key is turning slowly. If the Syrians decide I am a son of a bitch and start the war again, how is that in French interests? There is no scenario you can think of that makes it in the European advantage if the U.S. fails in the Middle East and the Soviet Union picks up the pieces. What I am talking about is a trend which seemed harmless enough at first but is now clear. It shows in quibbles over the EC and NATO Declarations, EC initiatives toward Japan, the EC Middle East Declaration, the trickery of the arrival of the four Arab Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen, the resistance to our energy work program. I learned in Damascus that some European governments made démarches against the halt to the oil embargo on the U.S. because it would hurt Europe. You are right that the EC-Arab initiative will come to nothing. The fact that they have picked a crappy subject only proves how incompetent they are. But they will eventually pick a good subject. On energy they are weak reeds and we will drive them against the wall. But we cannot afford an antagonistic Europe. It is only détente that is keeping them from making a deal with the Soviets.

Secretary: I don’t think we are in fundamental disagreement. At a minimum we should so toughen the EC Declaration that it will fail. There will be no meeting on the declaration next week. We will tell the Europeans that in view of the EC-Arab proposal we want to review EC–US relations and we are not ready to meet with them until we do so. The only issue remaining is do we want a letter from the President.

Sonnenfeldt: And do you give the Europeans a ladder to climb down with?

Secretary: How do we give them our views?

Sonnenfeldt: We can give them to the Germans as representatives of the Presidency.

Secretary: That is the worst way to do it.

Sonnenfeldt: It is better than a letter to all the EC Heads of Government.

McCloskey: You have been bruising for a fight with the Europeans since last year. I am convinced this issue can be managed if we don’t blow it out of proportion. Let us reply to Scheel and forget the letter to everyone.

Secretary: I have not been bruising for a fight but the entire organization of the Common Market is against the U.S. A year ago people would have called someone a madman who said that, but today the evidence is clear and anyway, any declaration we get with the EC will be useless.

Sonnenfeldt: Do you want Donaldson to stay in Europe?

Secretary: I want Donaldson to do what I told him. He is to continue his talks in a low-key way. He is to tell the Europeans we are prepared to discuss energy matters and welcome their views. He is to confer with the OECD in the way he suggested last week. But he is to be told in the light of this EC decision, he is not to push the Coordinating Group. The meeting with the EC on the declaration will not take place. I want someone to draft instructions saying that we have to review the relevance of the declaration in view of the EC initiative and that the review will not be ready by next week, and that we will confer with them again when it is. But what about a letter from the President. What about a Presidential letter to the EC Heads of Government.

Sonnenfeldt: I think that would be a mistake.

Lord: What about a Presidential letter to Brandt?

Sonnenfeldt: You didn’t get a letter. The President didn’t get a letter. We don’t have to send a letter back.

Secretary: The President has a right to send a letter if he wishes.

Sonnenfeldt: Of course he does, but that would engage him in a way that doesn’t do any work for us and has a terrible backlash possibility. I think we should give the EC the message here through Von Staden.

Secretary: No, let Hillenbrand deliver it in Bonn. At least then our Ambassador will know what we are doing. The only issue now is whether I do it or the President does it. I will think about it.

1. Summary: Kissinger, Sisco, McCloskey, Sonnenfeldt, Lord, Hartman, and Hyland discussed the U.S. response to the EC-Arab initiative.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 9, Pol 2 EC Arab Cooperation. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. Drafted by Robert Blackwill in C on March 6. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office. Under cover of a March 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt forwarded an options paper, prepared at Kissinger’s request, outlining U.S. responses to the EC-Arab initiative. (Ibid.) In a March 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Hyland concluded that “the general thrust and substance of what the EC planned to do with the Arabs was, in fact, made known to the US in January and February in more and more detail, but never officially.” He also noted that the U.S. twice requested official consultations with the EC and warned of the harm that could arise in their absence; that France vetoed such official consultations; that the U.S. knew of the March 4 aide-memoire by February 22; and that Belgium was the only EC government to provide the text, even informally, to the U.S. (Ibid., Records of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 3, Nodis Letters HAK 1973–1977, Folder 3)