Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976

48. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs¹

Washington, February 23, 1974.

THE IMPACT OF THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN UNITY AND THE ALLIANCE

The Situation

The French arrived at the Washington Energy Conference determined to block a major U.S. initiative to unite the leading industrialized countries in a cooperative approach to the energy crisis. They saw the Conference as a political event whose significance lay in the crucial question of American “hegemony” over Western Europe. While not opposed to some forms of cooperation on energy, France did not want the WEC to become the vehicle for that cooperation. Nor did they want the Conference to constrain their freedom to conclude bilateral agreements with producing countries and maintain an independent posture vis-à-vis the Arabs.

In the end the other eight Community members abandoned the French and a common EC position when France proved unyielding. The Conference then endorsed an essentially U.S. position. French intransigence angered her European partners, presented France in an unfavorable public light, and raised questions about future cooperation within the Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

Perspective

French efforts to diminish U.S. influence in Europe are hardly new. They began at least fifteen years ago when General DeGaulle returned to power. During the past year the French have vigorously opposed a stress on Atlantic partnership in the declarations by which we seek to reinvigorate our relationships with Western Europe. Jobert’s behavior at the Washington Energy Conference demonstrated that the French tendency to characterize major issues in terms of American hegemony has changed little in more than a decade.

French willingness to defy her Community partners is also not new. France conducted an historic and unprecedented boycott of the EC Council in 1965 to prevent a weighted majority voting procedure from taking effect. The French have on occasion made veiled threats to break up the Community if France failed to get its way on major issues. And just recently, they dealt a serious psychological blow to Community cooperation when they unilaterally and without consultation withdrew from the common monetary float. Tension between France and her partners had clearly been building up in the months prior to the WEC, especially between Paris and Bonn.

French efforts to diminish U.S. leadership in Europe have succeeded to an extent, and other Community members have become increasingly self-conscious about consulting with the United States in advance of Community decisions. We, in turn, have hesitated to provoke a confrontation. The WEC marked the first major occasion where the other Community members had to choose between Atlantic cooperation and French insistence on an independent European approach. French rigidity, compelling need to deal with the oil problem, and strong U.S. insistence on squarely facing the issue forced the choice on the Europeans. For these reasons, the Conference marks a major departure from the situation of the past several years.

Short Range Impact

In the aftermath of the WEC there exists no European sentiment for forcing a showdown with France or permanently putting her in a corner. While private anger exists, especially in Bonn, conscious effort at conciliation has become a common objective and, at least on internal EC matters, this includes Paris. The British believe in “hot tea and rest” to weather the shock and most EC member countries will probably skirt for the time being any dramatic new Community initiatives which might put the French on the spot. Indeed, current internal political uncertainties in Britain, France, and elsewhere might alone insure the lack of significant movement in the short run. The British, French and the Germans will try to insure that the WEC, as well as its follow-on, exert as little impact as possible on the day-to-day business of the European Community.

The Germans have emerged from the Conference feeling privately that they have become at least temporarily the strongest force in Western Europe. They will most likely take pains not to show it, because they do not believe their partners ready for German “resurgence.” There is an attempt in both Bonn and Paris to soften the impression that the WEC was a Franco-German dispute in which Germany emerged the victor. But it will remain clear that, if forced to choose between Paris—even if this means Europe—and Washington, the Germans will most likely pick Washington. The realization of a German proclivity for a Bonn-Washington axis of power is causing concern in other capitals than Paris.

There will be a noticeable lack of “warm feeling” within Europe for awhile. Considerable puzzlement exists over French motives, and there is conflicting evidence as to whether Jobert may have overplayed his hand with respect to his instructions from Pompidou.

With respect to the follow-up to the Energy Conference, the French have indicated that they will not participate in the work of the coordinating group. They have also objected to participation by the EC Commission, since this would imply Community involvement. On the other hand, France will probably want to participate in concrete measures of cooperation—such as sharing technology and oil—measures which would provide them with more than they would give. The other Community members may wish to give France every opportunity to join in the WEC follow-up work, and will want to keep the follow-up from worsening the break with France. This would cause some delays in the progress of the coordinating group. On the other hand, the Eight clearly will proceed, even in the face of French objections.

Long Range Impact

In the long run, the forces evident in Western Europe prior to the WEC will reassert themselves. Most Europeans believe as a consequence that French isolation will prove short-lived. Even if the French hang back for awhile, they will find themselves very much involved in EC affairs again in July when they take over the Council and EC Nine presidency.

The French have tried to minimize the importance of the WEC. They will, however, surely be studying the longer-term implications of three aspects of the Conference. First, the Paris-London axis in the EC fell apart in the crisis and the British sided with the Germans. Secondly, the French were unable, in a crunch, to carry the day on their thesis of a Europe independent of U.S. influence. And finally, the French were unable for the first time to make their veto stick on EC affairs.

The disarray in the Community evident before the WEC will continue, and the Nine will find it as difficult as before to deal with long-range problems such as economic and monetary union. However, there remains a strong and genuine sentiment in Europe, including France, for further European integration, and the Community will make some progress—for example, on regional policy—during the remainder of 1974. The Germans still find in European unity their best guarantee of acceptability and safehaven from serious internal political divisions.

On the other hand, most Europeans believe privately that Europe will not return to quite the same position as before. The British see the Conference as a watershed in EC internal politics, with the Germans at last demonstrating a willingness to exert their political weight, where necessary. Community countries such as Belgium, Ireland and Italy may find it easier to say no to the French in the future, instead of hanging back. They will worry, however, that the U.S. may be tempted as the result of the WEC to deal bilaterally with the member states, even on issues where the majority of the Community would not prefer it.

The WEC also made clear to many that European unity must progress in association with a strong Alliance, not in defiance of it. As a result, the other Eight may become less susceptible to French insistence that advance consultation with the U.S. “prostitutes” the Community. With respect to the Alliance itself, the WEC experience could diminish French willingness, noticed of late, to be more cooperative. The Germans and British, however, seem determined to continue resisting any French effort to construct European defense arrangements independent of NATO.

Whether the WEC results in lasting advance for Atlantic cooperation will in the final analysis depend significantly on the success of our efforts to establish through the WEC and its follow-up genuine and significant international cooperation on energy. Should the EC, at French urging, enter at an early stage into independent and inherently discriminatory arrangements with the Arab producers, should others follow suit bilaterally, should the WEC initiative end in disarray, and should ongoing U.S. efforts in the mid-East fail to pay off, a reaction against Atlantic cooperation might well set in. The French at least would lose no opportunity to point out the folly of following American leadership on issues of major importance to Europe.

1. Summary: The paper assessed the impact of the Washington Energy Conference on European unity and the Western Alliance.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Helmut C. Sonnenfeldt, 1955–1977, Entry 5339, Box 9, Pol 2 EC. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William L. Dutton, Jr. in EUR/RPE. Sent to Sonnenfeldt under cover of a February 24 memorandum from Hartman, in which he noted that the paper was prepared at Sonnenfeldt’s request and in consultation with INR.