Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

215. Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, December 8, 1975, 8:30 a.m.¹ ²

Tokyo, December 8, 1975, 8:30 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 8, 1975
PLACE: Foreign Ministry
Guest House, Tokyo
Time: 8:30 A.M.

SUBJECT: President Ford’s Visit to China, Indonesia, and the Philippines

PARTICIPANTS:

• Japan
• Kiichi MIYAZAWA, Foreign Minister
• Shoji SATO, Vice Foreign Minister
• Keisuke ARITA, Deputy Vice Minister
• Hiroshi UCHIDA, Chief of Protocol
• Toshio YAMAZAKI, Director General, American Affairs
• Yosuke NAKAE, Deputy Director General
• Hiroaki FUJII, Director, First North American Affairs Div.
• Tatsuo ARIMA, Foreign Minister’s Private Secretary
• Sadaaki NUMATA, Deputy Director, First North American Affairs Division (Notetaker)
• United States
• The Secretary
• Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• James D. Hodgson, American Ambassador to Japan
• Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary, EA
• Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, S/P
• William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA (Notetaker)

COPIES TO: S (Barbian), S/S, WH(Rodman)

The Secretary: (Responding to a comment by the Foreign Minister that it was sensible to include Indonesia and the Philippines on the itinerary of the President) The Chinese like to give the impression of being a central kingdom with people coming from all over the world to pay tribute. The President’s stopovers in Jakarta and Manila helped offset this.

Miyazawa: I assume Marcos and Suharto posed no real problems for you. It’s nice to see Mr. Sisco. I didn’t know he was along.

The Secretary: I brought Sisco along because I didn’t dare leave him at home. If I left him at home, I might have found him in my office when I got back. You may not know it, but he is always in my office measuring the rug. (Laughter)

I want to say Mr. Foreign Minister that our special relations with Japan are reflected by the fact that you are the only country that our distinguished Ambassador to the United Nations has failed to attack so far.

Miyazawa: On the question of the recent racist resolution in the General Assembly, I should note that it did not have the same significance for us that it did for the United States and Europe so we decided — perhaps this did not please you to abstain. There is no intensity of feeling on the issue here in Japan.

The Secretary: We didn’t like the resolution as you know. But, it hasn’t affected our relationship.

Miyazawa: In the preparatory talks in London before our meetings in Rambouillet, I discovered that the Europeans have very strong feelings about the matter.

The Secretary: We are continuing to work with the Arabs.

(The group moved to the breakfast room.)

Are you going to Paris? After I get back to Washington, I will only stay there about 40 hours; then I will go to the NATO Meeting; then to London for a Chiefs of Mission Meeting; and then to the CIEC in Paris.

Habib: This is such a hard schedule that we offered the Secretary a way of easing the pressure by having someone else come to Japan to brief you. But he insisted he should come himself.

The Secretary: I never really thought seriously about skipping this stopover in Japan. My real problem is that I can’t afford to bring Nancy here. She has fallen in love with Japan and if she continues to come, it will be a financial disaster for me. She has redecorated our house so that it is entirely filled with Japanese objects except for one Chinese piece. Seriously though, I am extremely fond of Japanese art. I like it better than Chinese. It is more subtle; it has such an economy of strokes, and it makes such Effective use of space.

Mr. Minister, given my own problems in Washington, I have been admiring your skill in handling the Diet.

Miyazawa: Actually I have had real problems in the Diet. There has been a rather serious complaint about my handling of Korean matters. The left wing of the Japan Socialist Party has attacked me concerning our dealings with the Korean Government over disposition of the man who allegedly abducted Kim Dae Jung. They have brought what amounts to a sort of contempt of Congress charge against me.

Habib: If the Koreans jail Kim, will it reopen the issue in Japan?

Miyazawa: There are two aspects to the Kim matter. The Korean Government and the Japanese Government accept the official line concerning the Kim affair, but the opposition here in Japan does not.

Habib: What will be the effect if Kim is jailed?

The Secretary: Habib, do you want to run Korean internal affairs?

Miyazawa: Has Kim been invited to visit the United States?

Habib: He has invitations but can’t accept them.

Miyazawa: Is it that he doesn’t want to go, or that he can’t go?

Habib: The problem has fluctuated; sometimes Kim doesn’t want to go, other times he can’t go. He can’t go while he’s on trial.

The Secretary: Habib brought up this issue because the EA Bureau likes to change the forms of governments.

Habib: This is an issue we will leave with Japan.

Miyazawa: There is a peculiar complex in Japan regarding South Koreans, and Koreans generally. I am ashamed of it. It reflects a mutual distrust. It makes relations somewhat difficult.

The Secretary: Does this problem also extend to the North Koreans?

Miyazawa: Yes. But not as much, perhaps because the North Koreans are not so close to us. The difficulty with the South Koreans is obviously affected by the intimacy of our relations. The South Koreans get news about Japan at almost the same time as we Japanese. They make judgments on the same basis as we do. On the other hand, we do not get their news. In any case, we don’t pay any attention to it and it causes problems.

Regarding the trip to China, our basic understanding is that you adopted a reasonable position in Peking, that the Chinese seem to have responded in a reasonable way, and that the trip went well.

The Secretary: That is substantially correct. One of our greatest problems is our difficulty with the press in the United States. It is so bad that it reminds me of something I told someone else the other day. I said that if the press were discussing the 1901 Russo/German alliance, they would have reported it as a failure because no exchange of paper took place. (Laughter on the American side)

On the whole, our discussions in Peking this time were more detailed than President Nixon’s discussions in 1972. There was no spectacular development, but the only possible spectacular issue is Taiwan. I told you the last time I was here that we have exhausted our quota of countries we can give up this year. We indicated our need to be cautious toward normalization to the Chinese and they understood.

The Chinese want us to follow the Japanese model for normalization of our relations. This may not be entirely satisfactory for us. All in all, relatively little time was spent on Taiwan and the discussion was non-contentious. Most of the time was spent on international issues. We also touched on some US/PRC bilateral matters in addition to normalization. I think you must have seen the formula I used in Peking to describe our relations; that our relations are good and will be gradually getting better. I used this with the approval of the Chinese. Eighty percent of the discussions were international. The atmosphere was cordial; there was less discussion of detente than the press reported. In fact, there was little talk of detente beyond the exchanges in the toasts.

Lord: Even the toast was less pointed than last time.

Miyazawa: Of course the Chinese had already discussed detente with you in October and perhaps with President Ford they wished to avoid an ideological dispute. I think the President’s personality may also have encouraged them to avoid arguments.

The Secretary: You mean to say that my personality encourages arguments?(Laughter) I am reminded of Gregory Peck in the movie “Gunfighter.” Have you seen this movie?

Miyazawa: I know Gregory Peck but...

The Secretary: The movie is about a hero who is forced to fight on even when he doesn’t want to because his rivals force him to. Finally, one of them shoots him in the back. When I get shot in the back, I am sure it will be by an American.

Miyazawa: Will it be with two or three bullets? (Laughter)

We have had an overdose of shocking news in recent years. No news is now good news referring to the lack of a communiqué and drama from the President’s trip to China.

The Secretary: I think we have developed a clear understanding with the Chinese of our respective positions and what we can do in parallel. We had fairly cool discussions regarding our policies toward the Soviet Union. We made clear we will resist any massive Soviet moves to expand their influence. If the Chinese are right in their view of detente, it will be all right because we are prepared to resist. If the Chinese are wrong, then the only loss will be that lots of words were exchanged between us and the Chinese. If a conflict proves inevitable, a Soviet attack on Europe is less likely than an attack on China. Moreover, I don’t think any attack is likely, at least for the next three or four years. After that, there will be new leaders in China and the Soviet Union, and I don’t know what the prospect will be. This leadership referring to the Soviets won’t go to war easily. The Chinese are trying to create a balance of power around the Soviet Union. We don’t disagree with them; we agree.

Miyazawa: Is the Chinese goal still world revolution?

The Secretary: They are very determined people, but they don’t have the means. They don’t necessarily believe they should attack other countries with 50 divisions. They think that being Chinese they are morally superior and that as revolutionaries the world will radiate Chinese influence. Their sense of superiority allows them to relax and wait for others to be drawn in. The Russians are quite different. The Russian style has never attracted others. They know they are not lovable. Thus, the Russians require force for expansion. Yet even in Russia one has to balance the thrust of ideology against force. For example, Stalin was very ideological but he was weak and thus cautious. The present group is less ideological but they are strong. They will get more aggressive when they complete their growth.

Miyazawa: How about the Chinese?

The Secretary: The Chinese will also.

Miyazawa: Then detente will have to be revised.

The Secretary: Detente is misunderstood. We are trying to avoid a repetition of the impact of our Viet-Nam experience. We are trying to position ourselves on the left so we are in a position to fight the Communists. The fools who attack our policy of detente create domestic weakness. Senator Jackson is a fool. If we followed his policy, we would he attacked within a year for not pursuing peace.

Miyazawa: We understand correctly about detente. Do you think “basket three” is an essential part of detente? Might it help undermine Soviet strength in Eastern Europe? Some people don’t.

The Secretary: Do you believe it will?

Miyazawa: I am skeptical

The Secretary: It is childish to think you can undermine a government without that government noticing it. This is especially true of Bolsheviks who specialize in seizing and holding power. The Chinese are cautious about cultural contacts. Did I tell you what I told them about cultural contacts? I told them that China had managed to survive for several thousand years without cultural contact with the United States and I thought that they could go on somewhat longer without help from us in this field. (Laughter)

Miyazawa: Our trade and other contacts with the Communist countries may help discourage war. “Basket three” is another matter.

The Secretary: Trade, including grain sales, gives us leverage against the soviets. We can stop it in times of crisis. “Basket three” is good domestically bit it is without foreign policy significance.

Miyazawa: Giscard said that we should not deceive the world again the way we did in Helsinki.

The Secretary: “Basket three” is a posture for governments to strike with their own populations. It has no foreign policy significance. People forget that in Hitler’s Germany there were still liberal newspapers. Totalitarian regimes can control their societies despite contact with the outside. I remember going down to buy newspapers in Germany. That’s the way I learned my English. Don’t make the expected remark!

Hodgson: That explains a lot. (Laughter)

The Secretary: I do not read English with a German accent. (More laughter)

Miyazawa: Are there any hints of Chinese movements toward revisionism? Can you see it in the way they dress, for example?

The Secretary: Except for Mrs. Chiao Kuan-hua, there is no sign. They are interested in increasing oil exports, but I don’t think it revisionism can happen wile Mao is alive.

Miyazawa: Does Mao still have that type of grip?

The Secretary: I don’t understand how he does it but his control is still there. Physically he seemed in better shape this time than last time.

Miyazawa: Recently the Chinese proposed to buy steel for oil. Such an arrangement cannot be concluded unless the payments in oil are spread over a number of years. In effect, the Chinese are asking for credit. They say they object to loans out credit seems acceptable. I think the Chinese are bound to become engaged to some extent in the capitalist structure.

The Secretary: Good point. I agree they are thinking a little more about the world economy. They did raise with us certain international economic issues, unlike in the past.

Miyazawa: Did you see Li Hsien-nien?

The Secretary: Yes.

Miyazawa: Where does Teng get his power?

The Secretary: I don’t know. He strikes me as more secure. He is quite able and skillful. I was really impressed by him this time. He seemed quite independent; even when Mao was present he demonstrated some independence. He talked mare than before in the presence of Mao. I don’t know if you noticed, but the Communiqué mentioned that in the conversation between Mao and Ford, Teng and I participated. This is an unusual mention.

Miyazawa: Teng’s position as heir apparent seems to be consolidating.

The Secretary: I am not so sure. Teng has control now. But, nobody knows who will eventually emerge.

Miyazawa: It is probably even beyond the control of Mao.

The Secretary: That would be my reading of history. One cannot clearly foresee now who will be the successor. In these circumstances, in the Soviet Union or China, the Siscos hide their ambition. I keep a balance of power among the applicants for my job. I agree that today in China the successor seems likely to be Teng. Yet, it is not self-evident that he will be the successor. It was interesting that Madame Mao came to shake hands but did not stay at the welcoming banquet.

Miyazawa: Was there any cultural entertainment?

The Secretary: The press focused on my sleeping during the entertainment during the Nixon visit. (Laughter) Schmidt told me that he also slept during the cultural entertainment and to make himself more comfortable, he loosened his belt. After it was all over, he stood up and his pants fell down (Laughter)

Miyazawa: Schmidt told me quite a bit about his visit to China, about Mao’s mumbling, and so on.

The Secretary: This time his articulation was better.

Miyazawa: Did Lord or Gleysteen understand Mao?

The secretary: Gleysteen was not there. Only the President, myself, Scowcroft, and Lord were there.

Miyazawa: Have the disturbances around Shanghai settled down?

The Secretary: I don’t know.

The Chinese wanted the Ford visit badly. After my October trip we made it clear to them that we were going to Asia, not just China, and that we wanted the visit in Peking shortened. This provided them the opportunity to delay, but they didn’t. Clearly they thought it important to go ahead. The importance of the trip was very obvious from what they said. For example, they must have wanted me to say what I said about our relations in Peking. They fear the Soviets.

Miyazawa: But the US/Soviet SALT agreement may be coming anyway.

The Secretary I told them that I would go to Moscow in four to six weeks. I told them good US/Soviet relations don’t mean bad US/Chinese relations. I said in Peking that I was going to Moscow...

Miyazawa: Do they agree?

The Secretary: I said in Peking that I was going to Moscow. I can assure you that if we had bad relations with the Soviet Union, we would have worse relations than we do now in Peking.

Miyazawa: Maybe even the Chinese agree you should go to Moscow.

The Secretary: They treated me personally with enormous politeness. Did you see the television coverage of the Mao meeting?

Miyazawa: They didn’t want to embarrass the President.

After this visit, you will have to reaffirm your friendship for China from time-to-time. It is perhaps foolish but protocol requires that the Chinese should go to Washington. But it is necessary for you to continue to go to China if they can’t go to the United States.

The Secretary: We will continue to maintain contact. I plan to go about once a year.

Miyazawa: Is there any commitment?

The Secretary: It is sort of expected. We meet at the United Nations in the fall and then I go to Peking once a year. I am sure we will continue the practice.

Miyazawa: Even before 1980, there will be changes.

The Secretary: I had 1980 in mind as the time when there would be changes in the Soviet Union. In the case of China, they will be earlier.

In any event, you will not be confronted by any surprising developments in US/PRC relations.

Miyazawa: There is nothing particularly new on our side. We have established relations with Hanoi and they will open an embassy here. It is interesting that they are willing to use the former PRG office. We are discussing sending an economic team to Hanoi, but they are very suspicious of everything. They refuse to speak any language except Vietnamese, which makes our conversations very slow.

The Secretary: The Vietnamese are among the most obnoxious people in the world. However, we will improve our relations with them. They have taken some tiny steps. They will release three bodies.

Yamazaki: Was there any discussion of Korea?

The Secretary: Yes. We have the impression that Chinese policy will be in the direction of restraint. Their views are unchanged, but…

Miyazawa: Do the Chinese welcome your forces in Korea?

The Secretary: They wish us to be strong. At least they didn’t twist our arm to get our forces out of Korea.

Miyazawa: I think Korea can be taken care of along the lines of our last conversation. The Chinese will not object and the United States will stay in Korea. However, the UN business is very foolish, all the head counts and everything.

The Secretary: Yet if it comes out the same way, so what. Maybe we can avoid the UN debate.

Miyazawa: By all means.

The Secretary: The objective conditions don’t exist today for radical changes in Korea. We cannot put together negotiations at this time.

Miyazawa: The Japanese Government is interested in dialogue. We lave tried not to give the impression here in Japan that the United States is opposed to dialogue. Rather it is the North that is unrealistic.

The Secretary: As I said the other day, if we agree to separate talks with the North Koreans, it would make the ROK a puppet regime. At the beginning of any US/North Korean talks, the North Koreans might be friendly, but in the course of the discussion, South Korea would be undermined. The Chinese don’t want to be present in any US negotiations on Korea.

Miyazawa: Will Kim Dae Jung be jailed, Mr. Habib?

Habib: We haven’t talked to the Koreans. Have you?

Miyazawa: I think the Koreans may trust you more.

Habib: If Kissinger allows me, I will ask about Kim.

The Secretary: Phil, why don’t you ask the Koreans about Kim?

Miyazawa: Just once.

The Secretary: The State Department is full of missionaries.

Miyazawa: Please ask for us. If Park is gentle, it will help with our domestic situation.

The Secretary: (To Habib) Make the point to Park about the impact on domestic opinion.

Habib: Park talks frankly and I think he will understand.

Miyazawa: He also talks frankly to Dick Sneider.

On balance, I think the Ford visits to Indonesia and the Philippines were significant.

The Secretary: They were very significant. They showed that we are still in East Asia, despite events in Viet-Nam. The Indonesians are worried about reduced oil purchases by Japan.

Miyazawa: These reductions are connected with our purchases of oil from China.

The Secretary: I don’t care one way or another. However, the Indonesians are concerned.

Miyazawa: Lately the Indonesians have seized some of our fishing boats. I think this is a kind of retaliation.

The Secretary: I didn’t know there had already been a reduction in Japanese oil purchases.

Miyazawa: Yes. There has been. Mostly it reflects our economic conditions and reduced consumption, not a policy change. But, it is a fact that the Chinese and Indonesians are competing in the oil area. The Chinese price is slightly lower. However, I think we should reassure the Indonesians.

The Secretary: I only mention this for your information.

Our talks in Indonesia went very well. Our presence gives them reassurance.

Miyazawa: Is the consortium going to help Pertamina? There are, I think, two installments of assistance. Can we believe the Indonesians concerning Pertamina?

Habib: I think so. They sound serious about reform of Pertamina.

Miyazawa: Mr. Robinson and our Japanese delegates will meet in Paris to work out our positions for the CIEC. I know that you prefer to do this in Washington, but we appreciate your willingness to do it in Europe.

The Secretary: We will take a conciliatory approach in principle. However, we will say that high oil prices are a mortgage against future development of economies.

Miyazawa: know. I am embarrassed by the softness of our position when you take a tough position which Japan privately appreciates.

The Secretary: We understand; we only ask for your benevolence.

(End)

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–0631. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Gleysteen and approved by Covey. The meeting was held at the Foreign Ministry Guest House.
2. Kissinger briefed Miyazawa following Ford’s visit to the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Philippines.