Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

214. Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, October 24, 1975, 8 a.m.¹ ²

Tokyo, October 24, 1975, 8 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: October 24, 1975
PLACE: Prime Minister’s Official Residence, Tokyo, 8:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: China Trip and Economic Summit

PARTICIPANTS:

• Japanese
• Takeo Miki, Prime Minister
• Keosile Arita, Deputy Vice Minister
• Toshio Yamazaki, Director General, American Affairs Bureau
• United States
• The Secretary
• James D. Hodgson, American Ambassador to Japan
• Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
• Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning staff
• William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA (notetaker)

COPIES TO: S (Adams, Bremer), S/S, WH (Rodman)

Miki: We will have to talk as we eat. I have already heard the gist of your discussion last night with Foreign Minister Miyazawa. I am interested in the leadership question in China, also the Soviet Union. I would have thought you would have seen Chou En-lai.

The Secretary: No recent visitor has seen Chou. They told me he was too ill.

Miki: There are rumors of a change in the Soviet leadership affecting Brezhnev and Kosygin. Perhaps new leaders are taking over from the old. Perhaps this will lead to changes in the Sino/Soviet situation, but not in the immediate future.

The Secretary: In China there was absolutely no sign of change in their attitude toward the Russians. Teng was as hard and violent toward the Soviets as Chou — more so. We have no idea who will come into power after Mao.

Miki: What will happen between you and the Chinese during the President’s visit?

The Secretary: One of our correspondents, Mr. Growald of UPI, has said that Mao lectured me about the dangers of detente. I don’t know how he would have known. Publicly, before I went to China, I said we did not expect spectacular events to come out of the President’s visit. The only one that could, we don’t want.

Miki: You discussed China and Korea with the Foreign Minister, and although I may come back to it, I would like to touch on other things. Concerning the summit conference, on the one hand we don’t expect a great deal in the way of major results. At the same time, it should not be a failure. We wish to cooperate with the United States. How do you see the conference?

The Secretary: Quite frankly, we have just got started in our preparations. We are planning meetings next week. We have reached no final conclusion. I think the key issues for us will be energy, monetary matters, financial matters, economic recovery, North/South relations, and trade questions.

Hodgson: What subjects look most promising from Japan’s viewpoint?

Miki: Japan is to lead off the trade discussion. We are also interested in monetary, energy, and economic recovery matters. I am personally greatly interested in the North/South problem.

The Secretary: Who leads off on the North/South problem?

Lord: England.

Miki: We have been studying your North/South suggestions at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly. I feel that the industrial nations should work out some kind of assistance proposals.

The Secretary: Do you think it will be possible to work out specific agreements at this meeting?

Miki: It is difficult to tell. Developed countries alone can’t work out agreements. We must find a way where both the developed and underdeveloped countries work together.

The Secretary: We are somewhat torn. If we try to be too specific at the Economic Summit, we will spend all our time on the communiqué, which would be a rather difficult process.

Miki: Do you envisage an actual document?

The Secretary: What do you think?

Miki: I personally feel we might try for a declaration type of document rather than a detailed document.

The Secretary: Yes, I agree.

Miki: I would like to study North/South relations to see how we could cooperate. In Japan we are still suffering from a stagnating economy although our inflation is down. I understand the US economy is moving up.

The Secretary: That is correct. But our newspapers have a vested interest in seeing that it is down.

Miki: What is the direction of the economy?

The Secretary: There has been a big upturn, and our experts believe it will continue. Our biggest problem is psychological. But all indicators — our GNP and others — are up; unemployment is down, although still too high. Opponents of the Administration and the press have a vested interest in playing up the gap, which may in turn adversely affect the economy.

Miki: We fear a contraction in the world economy. We should seek ways to prevent this from happening.

We are trying to study ways of expanding the world economy. Are there ways the Free World or industrialized countries can cooperate?

The Secretary: I know the French and the Germans are extremely interested.

Miki: Will there by any new energy proposals?

The Secretary: I don’t think so. But we are eager to get the IEA program moving.

Hodgson: Would the Summit really be a good forum for energy discussions?

The Secretary: It will only last two days, and there will be six leaders, each with an ego that is not small. They must all speak. Any energy proposals would be better at the Consumer/Producer Meeting.

Miki: Have you had any discussions with the French regarding the Consumer/Producer Meeting?

The Secretary: Yes, and it is going rather well. We should consult with you. We don’t want any surprises. Mr. Yeo will be here next week from our Treasury Department.

Miki: Do you feel, all in all, that there will be no heated discussion about anything at the Summit?

The Secretary: I think it will be a harmonious Summit, unless you have different plans. (Laughter)

Miki: For our part, we will step up preparations to make it successful. We will cooperate with you. I hope you will…

The Secretary: We will start contact with you next week. Mr. Sonnenfeldt is coordinating things on our side.

Miki: Do you have any suggestions for us?

The Secretary: I am not ready at this time with any suggestions. I have asked for papers so that I could read them on my way home to Washington. Then next week we will have meetings. Since we are trying to work by consensus, (laughter) we must use consensus.

Miki: I would appreciate any suggestions.

Did you come across any issues during your China visit where you found that the Chinese and your positions differed strongly?

The Secretary: They have stated publicly that they oppose our Soviet policy but it is a fact that most of our agreements with the Soviet Union were reached from 1971 to 1973, when our relations with the Chinese were best. Since there have been few agreements with the Soviets since that time, it is possible the Chinese would be less vocal now if they were more concerned about the state of our relations with the USSR. But Peking can’t determine with whom we will have relations. The same thing is true with Moscow.

Miki: Your comment about the role of third countries in determining your policy reminds me of our problem with the Chinese regarding hegemony. My feeling is that so long as hegemony means imposing one’s will by preponderance of power or blackmail, it is universally agreed that it goes against peace. At the same time, opposition to hegemony should not be directed at any third country. We also should not be asked to take joint action against it.

The Secretary: As you know, in the Shanghai Communiqué we had a clause on hegemony, but it did not call for joint action with China. We would not participate in any arrangement that called for joint action with China.

Miki: Miyazawa discussed this with Foreign Minister Chiao in New York. Both sides are studying the matter; we hope to resolve it.

Is the situation in China difficult for major decisions?

The Secretary: That is our impression. The Chinese are not in a position to make major new departures.

Miki: Is Teng the heir apparent?

The Secretary: He is the dominant personality and heir to Chou. Chou no longer plays a significant role. After Mao dies, nobody knows, including the Chinese, what will happen. If there are people ambitious to succeed him, they would be wise to hide their ambitions while Mao is still alive. For example, while Khrushchev was around, Brezhnev did not reveal his ambitions. Of course, there could be a coup. These days we are always being criticized for our inability to predict coups.

Miki: You have a very active US intelligence organization.

The Secretary: We did until Congress got hold of it. Now we have total confession.

Miki: On Korea, is there any way to bring the North Koreans into the framework of our concerted efforts?

The Secretary: As soon as the South Koreans are included. It would be dangerous to include North Korea in talks without the South Koreans. It would give the South Koreans second-class status. I explained to the Foreign Minister that we would accept any forum three, four, six, or even eight countries to participate. We are open-minded.

Miki: Three years ago, the North/South talks took place in Korea. Is there any way we can encourage this again?

The Secretary: We favor such talks.

Miki: Did you talk to the Chinese about the Korean problem?

The Secretary: Yes, I did. The Chinese did not accept or reject my views. They didn’t seem to wish to be actively involved in Korean matters. I found them more moderate than in some of our previous meetings. They seemed to take the position that it was a problem to be settled by the Koreans themselves, or by the United States and the Koreans, or by anybody else and the Koreans.

Miki: Because they want to maintain the status quo?

The Secretary: My impression is that they want the status quo, but not the responsibility of maintaining it, and above all they don’t want the responsibility for bringing about a new status quo. They made no mention really of the UN Command. Incidentally, I told Miyazawa that I tried to get the Chinese to vote against the Algerian Resolution. (Laughter)

Miki: Then we can’t expect a Chinese initiative?

The Secretary: The Chinese are quite willing to continue the status quo. They want no responsibility for it or for changing it. They seem to have little passion about the Korean problem. We took the initiative. They say we are too nervous.

Miki: What about Chinese/North Korean relations?

The Secretary: They didn’t talk with affection. They didn’t say anything. I told them that ideological victories can cause political setbacks. They didn’t argue.

Miki: Now about Hanoi?

The Secretary: Their relations are very cool. They never contradict you when you criticize Hanoi. They seem eager to strengthen their relations with Cambodia.

Miki: How about trade progress?

The Secretary: It will be very marginal, if at all.

Miki: Thank you so much for this talk. I wish to convey to President Ford my thanks for the warm reception given to the Emperor and Empress. Their visit was the highest possible tribute to our friendship.

The Secretary: I agree. I will pass on your appreciation to the President.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P–820123–2324. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held at the Prime Minister’s Official Residence. Drafted by Gleysteen and approved by Covey. On October 23, Kissinger met in Tokyo with Miyazawa, who primarily asked Kissinger questions about his trip to Beijing; a memorandum of conversation is ibid., P–820123–2455.
2. Kissinger met with Miki following his visit to the People’s Republic of China.