216. Memorandum of Conversation, Tokyo, December 8, 1975, 11 a.m.1 2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: December 8, 1975
PLACE: Prime Minister’s Residence,
Tokyo
Time: 11:00 A.M.
SUBJECT: President Ford’s Visit to China and Miscellaneous Economic Subjects
PARTICIPANTS
- Japan
- Takeo MIKI, Prime Minister
- Toshio YAMAZAKI, Director General, American Affairs Bureau
- Hiroshi KITAMURA, Private Secretary, Foreign Office
- Sadaaki NUMATA, Deputy Director, First North American
- Affairs Division (Interpreter)
- United States
- The Secretary
- Joseph J Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
- James L. Hodgson, American Ambassador to Japan
- Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary, EA
- William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary, EA (Notetaker)
COPIES TO: S (Barbian), S/S, WH(Rodman)
Miki: Thank you for coming. I amazed at your energy.
The Secretary: I will go down in history as an athlete. Nancy has — fallen in love with Japan; if your economy improves it will be because of her purchases.
Miki: I understand that in Peking you spent much time with Vice Premier Teng. Since neither Mao nor Chou is likely to live very long, we wonder how well established Teng is and what sort of changes you foresee after Mao and Chou?
[Page 2]The Secretary: Chou seems totally out of things He was never mentioned. He is too sick politically or physically — we think physically. Most of our talks were with Teng. I must say we were very impressed with him. He becomes more impressive with every successive meeting we have. He is in apparent control. Mao said so and made the point that there would be no policy changes in China so long as Teng was in charge. Nevertheless, we don’t know what will happen after Mao. If it is like the case of the Soviet Union after Stalin and Khrushchev, then the ambitious persons who want to succeed Mao may be hiding their intention. Teng seems to be the successor but our information is unreliable.
Chinese policy will be determined by China’s strength. As long as they are weak, they need against the Soviets. After they are stronger, we will all have trouble. I don’t think this will be for 10 or 15 years.
Miki: I think I agree regarding your point that major changes in China are not likely for about ten years. Policy changes will take time.
Did you touch on Japan in your discussions with the Chinese?
The Secretary: Yes. The Chinese said US/Japan relations are most important while Sino/Japanese relations are at best only second most important. They are a little worried that some time — not under you — there may be a more military orientation in Japan. In any event, they will not compete with us in our relations with Japan, and this is helpful.
Miki: Did you talk about the Sino/Japanese friendship treaty?
The Secretary: Yes. We said that you cannot accept their definitions. They said that they can wait, meaning that they will not change their basic position. But they said this in a not-very unfriendly way.
Miki: What impressed you most?
[Page 3]The Secretary: The self-confidence and ability of Teng and their geopolitical interest in containment of the USSR. If I ever teach again, I must get some help from the Chinese. They have no sentiment. For example, they show no concern about the fate of other Communist parties. Because of the impact in Moscow the Chinese were eager that I say in Peking that US/PRC relations are improving. We also sensed that we are witnessing the beginning of more normal economic relations between China and other countries.
Miki: Regarding Taiwan, how long do you intend to preserve the status quo?
The Secretary: Certainly beyond November. (Laughter) I am assuming this is a private conversation. Seriously, the Chinese did not press us very hard on Taiwan and we have more trouble with our own press over this issue. The Chinese are realists. However, I assume that over the next three or four years some progress on Taiwan will have to be made. We will decide the timing after our elections.
Miki: The Philippines and Indonesians, which the President visited, are important anti-Communist members of ASEAN. How can the Japanese and the United States cooperate to preserve ASEAN as an anti-Communist grouping?
The Secretary: The President’s visit to these countries was most important because it showed we continue to support the freedom and integrity of countries despite the impact of Viet-Nam. The visits gave us an opportunity to express our support. We are encouraging development of the economies of ASEAN countries and we want to work with Japan We have parallel interests.
As I said repeatedly in Peking, we have parallel interests with the PRC. This is true, but our parallel interests with Japan are deeper and have more meaning. There is more candor and friendship. This is totally different from the parallelism of our relations with China. The US/PRC relationship is a marriage of convenience. [Page 4] In Djakarta the Indonesians raised with us the problem of diminished oil purchases by Japan. Of course, it is no tragedy for us that anyone would worry over oil sales. However, we the United States and Japan should cooperate regarding Indonesian economic development. The Indonesians want weapons and training. You cannot be so helpful in this respect. In the Philippines the situation is similar but less acute. We have solved, in principle, our base issues in the Philippines. We will find some face-saving formula to meet the Philippine concern about sovereignty without complicating operational control. We will begin meeting with the Philippines in November — I mean March. I seem to have November on my mind.
Miki: When I visited Washington you remember what I said about my impression that ASEAN was not drifting away from the United States. Did you confirm my impression?
The Secretary: Yes, exactly. We find that they want a new relationship.
Miki: I feel confident that if this trend continues, the ASEAN countries won’t draw nearer to the Communists.
The Secretary: In Indonesia there are no relations with the Chinese. In the Philippines they are flirting with the Chinese which would be dangerous if we were not giving them protection.
Miki: It is important that we give them ASEAN further confidence.
The Secretary: I agree. We have achieved an arrangement in Indonesia for consultations of our foreign ministers. We are making a major effort in this respect in East Asia. No one meets as regularly as Miyazawa and I. Our meeting next week will be the tenth in only a few months.
[Page 5]Miki: In the Soviet Union there is speculation that Brezhnev is under fire from the hawks regarding detente and he may be challenged at the Communist Party Congress in February.
The Secretary: There are also rumors that I am under attack from the hawks. We will both survive. Brezhnev’s position is weaker — partially because of health — but he will survive the Party Congress. There is no precedent of a leader giving a report at the Congress and then leaving. Within a measurable time, however, I believe Brezhnev will go largely because of his health.
Miki: What about the Middle East? There has been pessimistic speculation.
The Secretary: Just one more point on the Soviet Union. We do expect some changes at the Congress in February but not Brezhnev.
As for the Middle East, we have a complex situation. There is the dispute between Egypt and Syria as well as the problems of Lebanon. We have a Sisco plan, that is our failures are Sisco’s and our successes are mine. (Laughter) I have Sisco with me to keep an eye on him. (More laughter) There are a number of complications in the Middle East. First, the problems are basically difficult. Second, Israel is not very cooperative. Third, we have a domestic situation in tie United States. Fourth, the Arabs have great difficulty distinguishing between epic poetry and foreign policy. (Miki’s translator had great difficulty with this.) We must distinguish between appearance and reality. We got a six-month extension of the UN Force in the Golan Heights; even the Israelis will not be able to transform this victory into defeat (laughter on the American side), but they are trying. The Syrians can now present the UN debate in January as an achievement even though any member can bring about a debate. The end of the debate will more or less coincide with the full implementation of the Sinai agreements. Thus, the Syrians won’t need to object to these any [Page 6] longer. Objective conditions exist in the Middle East for being optimistic — barring, of course, some unpredictable event.
Miki: What steps, what scenario do you see for peace?
The Secretary: There will be the debate in the Security Council in January and then subsequent discussions will lead to Geneva or a Geneva substitute. Once the debate begins, it must be brought to a conclusion.
Miki: In the near future?
The Secretary: No, but over a period of time, two years, we can envisage very concrete progress.
Miki: I would like to touch on the North/South problem which we talked about in Rambouillet. You made certain proposals; others did also. We need to adjust and make further efforts. What should we do first?
The Secretary: Incidentally, I thought your intervention at Rambouillet was very effective, both in spirit and approach. Naturally the United States takes a stronger position than Japan. We accept the need for this. We must make clear on oil that we can’t accept a situation whereby with one stroke the Japanese balance of payments is wiped out for a three-year period or where inflation surpasses our aid programs. We only ask that you not make our lives more difficult. I will say in Paris that we can’t ask for aid to meet deficits not made by us. This is the negative side. On the positive side, we are ready to work out new formulas, such as borrowing from the IMF. There will be many proposals in Paris or later. Nowadays we have to work by consensus in the United States and it is taking us a little longer to reach our positions. (Laughter) However, we will achieve consensus. We are prepared on other issues, such as investment easement. We should study an international code for foreign investment. There simply is not enough government capital available. If people could only overcome their ideological blinders, they would discover there is less danger from private as opposed to government capital. Of course I don’t need to argue this in front of [Page 7] Ambassador Hodgson. I remember an extreme case of how far a company will go to avoid being offensive — a foolish American company executive in Saudi Arabia called on Faisal to congratulate him when the oil embargo was imposed. The idea was to improve the company’s relations with Saudi Arabia but the move was ridiculous. We will also have proposals on food and alternative sources of energy. We intend to follow a constructive approach. However, it is not healthy to let the less developed countries think that the developed countries can be panicked into making all the concessions.
Miki: Let me revert to Korea. Did the Chinese show any positive interest in simultaneous North Korea/South Korea participation in the United Nations?
The Secretary: The Chinese don’t seem to want any involvement in this aspect of the Korean problem. However, they exercise restraint in Korea.
Miki: Would you characterize the Russian positive as similar?
The Secretary: The Russians have a greater propensity for brutality and stupidity. They have a greater interest in embarrassing us but I don’t believe the Russians would pick Korea because the danger is too great.
Miki: Is Chinese influence greater?
The Secretary: We can’t judge. The Russians are trying to come back in Korea. One of the dangers is that globally the Russians may adopt more radical and aggressive policies because of the Chinese. On the other hand, I don’t think they will in Korea as long as we have our forces there. I stated previously that we are willing to talk with North Korea as long as South Koreans are present. If we do otherwise and begin to deal with the North Koreans without the South Koreans, South Korea will be seen as a puppet.
[Page 8]Miki: I understand that the North Koreans are anxious to talk to you.
The Secretary: True, and we don’t object to the idea as long as the South Koreans are present. What do you think?
Miki: The time is not opportune for US/North Korean direct contacts. At some point in the future, there will be need for direct US/North Korean discussions
The Secretary: We don’t want to diminish South Korea’s status.
We are prepared to talk to the North in the presence of the South Koreans. The North Koreans can talk to the South Koreans about Korea, in which-case we would be prepared to talk to the North Koreans about matters other than South Korea, for example, bilateral problems. But this would only be possible if there were North/South talks; otherwise it would be misunderstood.
Miki: Your position is clear.
I see signs of U.S. economic recovery. I think your rise in GNP for the third quarter is around 13 percent. Will this continue?
The Secretary: No. But we expect about a six or seven percent rate of growth next year which is not bad.
Miki: The recovery of the US economy is the best sign in the world today.
The Secretary: How is your recovery?
Miki: Our present situation is reflected in a minus .6% growth rate for 1975. We have a political difficulty in adjusting public expectations. Having been accustomed to a 10-12 percent rate of growth since 1964, it is hard for our people to think in terms of 5-6 percent as being satisfactory.
The Secretary: You appoint people for life, promote them by seniority, and make decisions by consensus. How you succeed is really a mystery to me.
[Page 9]Miki: These methods do create difficulty for us. There is a feeling of bad times which is hard to overcome. It is difficult to create incentives.
The Secretary: But you have less sense of panic about the ups and downs because more people have been involved in your decisions. Consensus at least has the advantage that the participants know and have more confidence.
Miki: I have been focusing only on the negative aspects of the Japanese attitude. Our firms are under great pressures. What is the focal point in US/Japan relations?
The Secretary: I think we have richer relations with Japan than with any other single country. On our side, we are prepared to consult so that there will be no surprises and so we will have a common understanding. Perhaps the focal point will be the problems of the Western Pacific and North/South issues. But in all relations there must be coordination. An economically strong Japan is essential for the stability of the western Pacific and this is a fundamental premise of US policy. We understand that on some issues you have to pursue your own necessities. We do also, but we can do this in ways that do not strain our relationship.
Miki: I agree. We have differences but in full understanding of each other.
The Secretary: You have been very generous of your time.
Miki: A great deal of my time is consumed in the Diet. I will face that reducing my preoccupation with the Diet after the elections. I think we need elections next year. The demands on a Japanese Prime Minister require patience.
The Secretary: And endurance, and sainthood.
Miki: Please give my regards to President Ford. Please tell President Ford that there is no change in the matter that I discussed with him in private.
The Secretary: I will do so.
(END)