Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

207. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 5, 1975, 10 a.m.¹ ²

Washington, August 5, 1975, 10 a.m.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 5, 1975
The White House
10:00 a.m.

SUBJECT: President’s First Meeting with Prime Minister Miki

PARTICIPANTS:

• Prime Minister Takeo Miki
• Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
• Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa
• Toshiki Kaifu, House of Representatives and Deputy Cabinet Secretary
• Sadaaki Numata, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
• The President
• The Secretary
• Ambassador James D. Hodgson
• General Brent Scowcroft, NSC
• James J Wickel, Department of State (Interpreter)

President: First of all let me say that I am most grateful for the warm reception I and all of my associates received in Tokyo last fall.

Miki: I appreciate the cordial reception I, my wife and the members of my party are receiving here in Washington.

Before I left Tokyo for Washington I had an audience with the Emperor, who asked me to convey to you his warm appreciation for the thoughtful arrangements being made for his visit to the United States this fall, and for the personal consideration you have shown, Mr. President, in several areas including whales. The Emperor also asked that I convey to you his warm personal regards, and to tell you that he is looking forward to meeting you again this fall.

President: When you return to your country, Mr. Prime Minister please convey my warmest regards to the Emperor. I look forward to his visit early in October, and I am delighted to hear that the arrangements are proceeding smoothly.

KUALA LUMPUR TERRORISTS

Miki: I regret the unfortunate incident that occurred in Kuala Lumpur. I regret it particularly because the guiding principle throughout my political career has been to promote dialogue and cooperation. And I regret it especially because the terrorists who resorted to blatant violence are Japanese.

I was first informed of this unfortunate incident at 2:00 a.m. day before yesterday. I immediately called Tokyo and instructed the Acting Prime Minister to organize a Task Force to deal with it. I instructed him that respect for human life and the safety of the hostages are to be given top priority. I have been informed that a plane carrying five of the seven prisoners whose release was demanded by the terrorists left Japan about 2:00 a.m. (EDT) this morning, and arrived at Kuala Lumpur about 8:30 a.m. (EDT). The other two prisoners refused to go. No one knows yet where these terrorists and released prisoners wish to go, but I fervently hope the hostages in this regrettable incident are released without harm.

President: I know these terrorists acted totally independent. It is unfortunate that they are Japanese, but we recognize that other terrorists from other countries do the same thing. I am grateful, Mr. Prime Minister, that you are personally involved.

Our nation’s view is, was, and always will be as long as I am President, that we cannot and should not respond to the demands of terrorists. I know that some may feel our policy does not respond to the lives and safety of hostages, but if it were our policy to respond to terrorist demands, the United States would become the repeated target of terrorists who operate around the world.

Our instructions to our diplomats are not to respond to terrorist demands under any circumstances. That is the only way I know to meet forthrightly those foreign terrorists who want to disrupt the world. I told the Secretary of State, and he has told the Foreign Service not to respond to terrorist demands. I appreciate that this might cause difficulty for others, but I wanted you, Mr. Prime Minister, to know what our policy is.

Miki: Mr. President, I hope to have as forthright a discussion as possible with you this morning, within the limits of the time available. Let me say that when I met you last January, when you were Vice President and I was Deputy Prime Minister, I did not expect to meet you again on such an occasion as this, with you as President and I as Prime Minister.

On my first trip abroad in 1929 the United States was the first country I visited. Later I studied for several years in a university in California, although my English has since gotten rusty. As a result of these experiences my whole life and my 38-year career in the Diet have been guided by the ideals of freedom and democracy. We have something in common, Mr. President, our long careers in our nation’s legislatures, and I share with you the same strong faith in democracy.

My purpose in this visit is to discuss frankly the whole range of Japan-US relations to affirm the unshakeable friendship between our two countries. I hope you will forgive me if I happen to offend you with some of my questions, but may I ask you about several matters of interest.

President: By all means. If we could not speak frankly with each other, this meeting would not be beneficial.

EUROPE - CSCE

Miki: Turning to Europe, Mr. President, you just returned from there last night. In everyone’s eyes the European Security Agreement appears to have resulted from Soviet efforts to realize their original concept of freezing the status quo in Europe. I am aware that the United States and other nations attached conditions to their acceptance of participation in the Helsinki Conference, but what I wish to ask, Mr. President, is what is your foremost diplomatic objective in the United States’ Soviet policy?

President: First, let me comment on the CSCE. I believe there is a lack of sufficient background information on what the CSCE really does. In the first place, with respect to borders, it reaffirms the borders agreed to in treaties signed in 1947 and 1948, and nothing further, except in the case of Germany, where the CSCE reaffirms the borders agreed to by West Germany in 1971. Therefore, the CSCE does nothing more than reaffirm borders agreed to in 1947, 1948 and 1971. This point is not well enough understood.

Second, the CSCE Agreement adds an element of integrity and morality, in terms of the right way of doing things, so that the Soviet Union would not do again what it did in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The Eastern Europeans, if I may interpret what they said in the meetings and elsewhere, believe the CSCE is a document that wills prevent the kinds of action from being taken as in the instances I described. They do not say this is guaranteed, but they seem to feel they have added protection that they didn’t have before. In that sense CSCE is constructive. We will have a meeting in Belgrade in 1977, to review what happens in the subsequent two years.

My endorsement of CSCE is based on the good faith of those who agreed to it, including the Soviets. I expect all 35 signatories to live up to the agreement language.

In our relations with the Soviet Union we do not agree with their system (nor do they agree with ours). We do not feel that détente between the Soviets and the United States is a solution to all the world’s problems, but it can be used, End has been in some cases, to ease tensions and avoid confrontations. I expect it to continue as a vehicle for those purposes.

Détente is a two-way street; it is not all one-way for the Soviets (and won’t be as long as I am President). It is a mechanism for use at a time of rising tensions and confrontation. In some cases it has been disappointing, in other cases helpful. I do not mean that it is one-sided. It is mutually beneficial, and hopefully, can help solve some of the problems facing the world.

Secretary: If I may add a word, Mr. President, the debate about CSCE is totally cynical. It is generated by those who for 20 years advocated the exact opposite of what they now say. As the President has said, there are two realities in Europe, frontiers and political influence. There bas been Yalta, and then the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947 and 1948, and the German Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. As a result there are no contested frontiers in Europe. To talk about frontiers is to reaffirm Treaties and legal language.

The political influence of the Soviets in Eastern Europe is not related to this conference. The Soviet Union has some 40,000 tanks between the Urals and the Elbe, and no Western nation wants to build that many tanks. Until someone does these critics are only engaging in an exercise of expressing demagogic platitudes.

I’m talking very frankly, but then I didn’t have much sleep last night. I’m reading a new novel about Japan (“Shogun”) and realize everything I’m doing is totally wrong.

Strategically we wish to weaken Soviet political influence in Eastern Europe, not confirm it. And we believe we can weaken it mole effectively by détente than we could by cold war. During the cold war period we could use military force, but under détente we must use diplomacy.

If the President can be welcomed by tens of thousands as he was in Warsaw, Bucharest, Kracow, and Belgrade, this weakens the Soviet Union. This could not have happened without détente.

We are under no illusions about the Soviet Union. If they have the opportunity to use pressure, they will do so. We (and you) must adopt positions that our domestic opponents can’t attack if we have to resist. I used the example yesterday of the prize-ring — is it better for us to fight flatfooted in mid-ring where we can be hit easily, or to move around and make ourselves harder to hit? Then if the Soviets do something, and we can tell our people we have done all we can for peace, we will be in a stronger position to resist.

If we look at the Middle East, détente has not helped the Soviet Union. We do not aim at hegemony, and dividing the world between us, because that would be suicidal. We wish to contain the Soviet Union with modern methods, which are not those of the cold war period but are entirely new.

SALT, MBFR

Miki: Based on the outcome of the CSCE conference what prospects do you see for further progress in SALT and MBFR?

President: I had two meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev, in which we made some headway on SALT. There are some problems which are very technical, and some which are very fundamental. I believe the odds on an agreement are better than 50-50, but not certain. We will continue to negotiate. I believe that SALT is in the interest of the entire world as well as US-Soviet relations. We will continue to work at it, but we will insist that whatever materializes must be mutually beneficial.

Regarding MBFR, we recognize that the negotiations have been stalled for some time. We are working with our European allies to try to develop a position that might move the talks forward, but this depends on the reaction the Soviets have.

We believe that a MBFR that reduces military forces on an equitable basis is in the best interest of Europe, but the talks are stalemated. We hope the Soviets will be as flexible as we will. We will continue to work closely with our allies so that our efforts will lead to greater unity and not split us

When are the MBFR talks scheduled to reconvene Henry?

Secretary: September, Mr. President.

CSCE EFFECT ON ASIA

Miki: Turning to the repercussions generated in Asia by the CSCE, the Soviets extended an invitation on July 30 to (LDP Diet Member) Hirohide Ishida, Chairman of the Japan-Soviet Parliamentarians Friendship Association, to hold a meeting to discuss an Asian Security Conference.

In the long term, although it may not be visible yet except in special circumstances, what the Asians are most sensitive to is Soviet and Chinese influence in Asia. The Chinese, for example, view the Asian Security Conference proposed by the Soviets as an attempt to encircle them...

Secretary: They’re right.

Miki: ...and therefore oppose any third nation hegemony. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship Japan is negotiating with China, as you know, has been stalled by opposition to the inclusion of the hegemony clause. It is obvious that the Chinese are vigilant against any increase in Soviet influence in Asia. What do you feel will be the effect of the CSCE on this trend in Asia, in the context of Soviet influence?

President: First let me speak about the United States’ relations with the People’s Republic. Our relations were initiated by Mr. Nixon. I fully support these relations, and believe they are of vital importance. I expect to go to the People’s Republic sometime late this fall. I feel that our relations are moving along on schedule. The Shanghai document is the basis for continuing and expanding our relations. I see no serious problem developing in that regard.

We all recognize that there is competition in Asia between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic. We believe that our continuing relations with China are important in maintaining stability in Asia, and we will make every effort, in a responsible manner, to broaden our relations with the People’s Republic. Secondly, we expect to maintain continued close relations with your government, Mr. Prime Minister. We feel this is vitally important for the stability and security of the Pacific. I have been encouraged by our discussions in Japan, and this morning. Tomorrow we can reaffirm the importance of our relations.

I recognize there are problems in the Pacific area, not in our relations but in peripheral areas. We should be frank in discussing those relations, as they refer to relations between the United States and Japan.

Therefore, we seek to broaden our relations with China, while maintaining and strengthening our relations with Japan. This will have an impact on the influence of the Soviet Union in the Pacific area. Henry, have you anything to add?

Secretary: I was asked in Helsinki about an Asian collective security conference, and said if there is such a meeting, it would take place without the United States. I do not think Asia can be compared with the situation in Europe.

Miki: I agree.

Secretary: We will not participate in an Asian collective security conference, or anything of that kind.

Second, we believe the Soviet Union is trying to encircle China, and in no way do we wish to participate. China has its own aspirations, and in ten years may cause trouble for all of us, including Japan, but at the present time it is not in our interest to weaken China. Therefore, we will not cooperate with the Soviets in any anti-Chinese maneuver in Asia. It was for that reason that we signed the Shanghai Communiqué, with its hegemony clause. We knew what we were doing, and made it explicit.

SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION IN ASIA

Miki: How do you view the present state of the Sino-Soviet conflict in Asia?

President: I might repeat what I heard from a number of sources in Helsinki. The Soviet Union has 44 divisions on the Chinese border. That certainly indicates to me that their relations are not better, and may even be considerably worse than before.

As the Secretary said, we do not adopt a policy of favoring one over the other, but at the same time we will keep our relations with you, Mr. Prime Minister, because of the strong influence of our relations on peace and stability in Asia.

Secretary: If there is a danger it is that Japan might over-analyze our policy, and initiate a leap-frog exercise that would be detrimental to both our interests. We are not following a parallel policy with the Soviets in Asia, bat if Japan does something to get ahead of us, we might have to do something. Thus it is very important that we coordinate our policies toward the Soviet Union and China. We should not cooperate in the Soviet efforts to isolate China.

Miki: On my part, I believe we should have a full understanding of your China policy. Therefore, I wish to as your view of the prospects for improving your relations with China, and how far you might go, Mr. President, in developing your relations during your visit to China?

Also, I would appreciate hearing a frank explanation of your long-term policy views regarding China.

President: As I said just a few minutes ago the Shanghai Communiqué is the basic document by which we are proceeding to develop our relations with China. We feel, and we believe the People’s Republic feels, that our relations are within the context of the Shanghai Communiqué.

As I said, I will visit China later in the fall. There is no agenda, and no details have been worked out. The Secretary will probably go to the People’s Republic before my visit, and at that time the agenda will be finalized.

We have made no commitment at this time with regard to our relations with Peking except in the context of the Shanghai Communiqué.

Secretary: Peking has told us that we need not complete the process of normalization to have a successful visit. We do not believe it desirable this year, after the tragedy in Indochina. On top of that we would not wish to bring about a political change in our relations with Taiwan, all the more so since if we did not recognize Taiwan, we could not honor our defense treaty with a part of a country. We have told the Chinese we have no desire for a change in the legal status of our relations, but we do wish to improve our relations.

Miki: I have the feeling the PRC wants to see the status quo maintained in Taiwan for the present.

Secretary: That is our impression.

President: That is an interesting observation. They have pressed us, but just enough to say they have pressed us.

Secretary: The biggest problem for us is our newsmen who go to China and plead with the Chinese to say something about Taiwan that they would never volunteer. As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, we have the Jackson Amendment relating emigration. I told Chiao Kuan-hua if China wants MFN treatment, they will have to allow free emigration. Chiao replied that we can have 30 million Chinese any time we want.

Miki: I accept your statements as authoritative, since you know the Chinese psychology best. I myself feel confident that Peking does not desire any abrupt change.

Secretary: I believe that is correct.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Miki: In preparation for these meetings, Mr. President., I sent Saburo Okita, a well-known economist and President of Japan Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, to the ASEAN nations as my Special Envoy to get a feel for the post-Vietnam situation. Also, our Chiefs of missions from the Southeast Asian countries met in Tokyo in July to discuss the situation.

On the basis of Okita’s report and the discussions in the Chiefs of Mission Conference I have concluded that the real intent of the SEA nations is to develop a greater degree of stability. If they have learned one lesson from the Vietnam experience, it is that they must concentrate on stabilizing their own political situations and improving the livelihood of their peoples. The leaders of these nations currently are making many public statements that create a certain superficial impression, but I believe they are doing this for reasons of domestic politics. I believe what they really want is a continued American presence.

President: Do you mean the Philippines?

Miki: Yes, and Thailand too. They realize that the United States can continue to be a great force in assisting their own efforts, and as the emotions of the Vietnam War cool they are making a post-war assessment that they need the great power of the United states. Therefore, I feel that whatever the Thais say about opposing U.S. military bases, or the Philippines say about ending American extraterritoriality on military bases does not alter what they have in the back of their minds. The Prime Ministers of Thailand and the Philippines have both recently visited Peking, following which one may detect a subtle change in their statements. I believe that Peking also wants the United States to maintain its presence, or course, in the context of the Soviet threat.

I wish to make the point that it would be a mistake to argue that the SEA nations are drifting away from the United States. They believe there is a role for the United States to play, and I believe it important for the United States to maintain its interest in Asia.

Japan, of course, also has a crucial interest, and should cooperate with the United States in this area. Indeed, Japan-US cooperation is the basic premise underlying the peace and security of Asia and the Pacific. What is needed at this time is an understanding of the needs of these small, powerless countries in Asia, and the dynamics by which they function.

President: I appreciate your frank views. I respect the way you have assimilated the reports of your Special Envoy and your Ambassadors. It offers us a good insight into the problems of this area. But let me say frankly that American public opinion, rightly or wrongly, is affected by what the leaders of other countries say. All Americans are not sufficiently sophisticated to detect what is happening behind the scenes. In some cases American citizens have been dismayed by the words of one leader of another country or another around the world, not just in SEA, and this has an impact on the Congress. I and the Secretary of State and you, Mr. Prime Minister, understand there is a difference between words and actions. However, leaders in other countries should understand that the support I wish to give our friends in Europe, Asia and elsewhere depends on public opinion. I hope therefore they moderate their language as we try to continue working with them. Otherwise the Congress that I must work with won’t give me the kind of support I need.

I firmly believe the United States should play a global role, in Europe and the Pacific, but to achieve this I need the backing of the Congress, and this can be affected by the words of foreign leaders, especially if Americans don’t see behind the scenes. We wish to work with you, and wall, but we won’t be able to do our best without the support of the American people, who have been deeply traumatized by Vietnam.

That was a great disappointment, especially for me. I believe the American people want us to be strong in the Pacific — I do — but that requires the understanding of the leaders of those countries.

Miki: As a fellow, life-long parliamentarian I can appreciate how difficult your problems are. However, Mr. President, I hope you understand that the end of the war in Vietnam is a turning point in Asia. Freed of the emotional complexities of the war the leaders there can now think of the future of their own countries. They want to stake their fate on a non-Communist future, but if they are to realize their aspirations, it will be necessary to give them some basis for confidence in the future. If not, they may become confused about their destiny. We should extend them support, otherwise if their determination wavers, they face an uncertain future. Therefore, it devolves on us, the democracies, to help them strengthen their own nations. We should try to prevent any uncertainty, by which I mean their coming under the influence of a Communist country. I hope you understand that this is a great turning point. Japan will do its part, and will keep in close touch with the United States.

President: I assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, that we will keep close contact, liaison, and working relations. I recognize the problems these nations face, and we want, and will help, because it is important for the preservation of the values and the kind of government we believe in.

Close working relations will be necessary if we are to meet the challenges presented in that part of the world.

Miki: It is in this spirit that I intend to call on the leaders of the industrial democracies of the Pacific —Canada, Australia, New Zealand — to step up their cooperation both bilaterally and multilaterally.

KOREA

Miki: Do we have time this morning to talk about Korea?

President: We could talk about it tonight, or tomorrow.

Secretary: With respect to Korea in the UN, the United States absolutely cannot vote for the admission of North and South Vietnam to the UN in the same year as the defeat in Indochina.

Miki: Foreign Minister Miyazawa will convey our views to you in detail.

Secretary: We can discuss this matter at lunch. We are not asking Japan’s support on Vietnam, but we do have Japan’s support for South Korea. If South Korea is admitted to the UN, we could vote for both Vietnams.

President: We would wage a vigorous fight against the admission of North and South Vietnam into the UN in 1975 without the admission of South Korea. We feel extremely strongly about this.

Secretary: We could understand if you were to vote differently on Vietnam, but we do ask your strong support on South Korea.

Miki: I understand your position, Mr. President; Miyazawa will elaborate our views at lunch.

President: I appreciate our candid, friendly exchange this morning. It has been most constructive. It is a great pleasure to see you again, Mr. Prime Minister.

Miki: I also appreciate your candor, Mr. President, and look forward to seeing you again this evening.

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 14. Top Secret. Drafted by Wickel. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the conversation took place in the Oval Office from 10:05 until 11:25 a.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary)
2. Miki and Ford discussed the terrorist attack in Kuala Lumpur, the CSCE, arms control, Sino-Soviet relations, and Southeast Asia.