206. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 5, 1975, 8:45 a.m.1 2
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: August 5, 1975
SUBJECT: Prime Minister Miki’s Visit
PARTICIPANTS:
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Hodgson
- Assistant Secretary Habib
- Deputy Assistant Secretary Zurhellen
- EA/J- William C. Sherman
PLACE: The Secretary’s Office
DISTRIBUTION: Mr. Bremer, Mr. Adams), S/S, WH (Mr. Rodman)
The Secretary: I’ve just expressed my happiness at the arrangements you’ve made for these meetings. Why couldn’t they have given us a few days? The President feels very let down by this Department. He talked to me for an hour about it last night. How can anyone expect him to deal seriously with important issues when he’s still full of Europe and has had no time to go over the papers.
Mr. Habib: We think this will not be a difficult meeting this morning. We expect, of course, that the Prime Minister will open by apologizing for the terrorist attack on our Embassy in Kuala Lumpur.
The Secretary: Yes, I’m sure he will. But they don’t have to apologize for that; that’s something we should apologize for.
Mr. Habib: Then he will want to hear from you and the President about the results of the meetings in Europe and how you view the prospects for détente. I should point out that one of the things that concerns the Japanese is whether détente in Europe will free the Soviets to exert greater pressure in Asia. They will be very interested in your analysis of the situation.
The Secretary: That’s exactly what I mean. How can you expect the President to deal with a subject like that with five hours sleep?
[Page 2]Mr. Habib: Well, I think they will welcome your opinion, perhaps during the luncheon conversation. Secondly, they have a great interest in Korea. However, in our discussions regarding the communiqué, it is apparent that Miki wants to tone down the earlier Japanese statements regarding the security of the ROK as essential to the security of Japan, and widen it to something like the maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula is essential to the security and stability of Asia.
The Secretary: Why did we agree to that?
Mr. Habib: We didn’t. We are still trying to get a more straightforward statement.
Mr. Habib: It is still unclear. I think Miki may be looking in the direction of some sort of great power guarantee of Korean security.
The Secretary: All that means is that once they get us out, the North moves in on the ROK. China and the Soviet Union are not going to fight for South Korea.
Mr. Habib: The Japanese understand the importance of our presence, but Miki is looking for new initiatives—perhaps tying to loosen up the framework for dealing with North Korea.
The Secretary: Look, Miki has got to understand that the reason the American people support the US troops in Korea is because of Japan. The people are not interested in the security of Asia as some abstraction.
Ambassador Hodgson: I think you should make that point strongly. They should hear it from you.
Mr. Habib: Another related question is UN membership for the ROK. We have been hung up over language on this. The Japanese don’t want to say they support only ROK membership; they would like to add “and other divided countries.”
The Secretary: Do you want us to support the admission of the Vietnam, only six months after the war?
[Page 3]Mr. Habib: How would you feel about a package deal?
The Secretary: I’m not interested in being maneuvered into a position where we wind up having to vote for the Vietnams because we cosponsor and then see the ROK defeated. That would create a situation where we’re loused up for the next ten years.
Mr. Habib: No sir, the deal would be a package of all three and we would vote on all three at once not separately country by country.
The Secretary: As long as I am here, the United States is not going to be voting in the Vietnams and losing the ROK memberships — I don’t care how much Moynihan agrees.
Mr. Habib: I think we need to let the UN tacticians look at it.
The Secretary: If we wind up being euchered on this there is going to be blood on the floor.
Mr. Habib: I’ll make sure they are aware of your views. Another area they will wish to discuss is Southeast Asia. As you know, they are continuing their aid there, even stepping it up. They also are hoping to establish formal relations with the Communist states. They’ve agreed on an aid package with North Vietnam and hope to set up their Embassy in Hanoi soon.
The Secretary: What do they want from us?
Mr. Habib: They want up to maintain our aid to the region.
The Secretary: What does that mean?
Mr. Habib: To Indonesia, Malaysia — the ASEAN countries. Miki also has a vague Pacific Basin plan which he may raise. It would involve economic and political collaboration among the developed countries — the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand — but also including some of the developing countries like the Philippines. Miki has also mentioned the possibility of an arrangement like the Lome Agreement which would serve to stabilize export earnings of LDC’s with primary products resources. We’ve thought that these ought to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
[Page 4]The Secretary: Personally I rather like the Lome arrangement and think it might be more workable and less trouble than dealing case-by-case. But I’m the only one who feels that way and Simon would not go along.
Mr. Habib: Another thing I should explain is the nature of the communiqué. The Japanese have proposed the issuance of a relatively brief joint statement dealing in broad principles and supplementing it with a jointly worked out press release which would made a record of the specifics of the talks.
The Secretary: I believe that’s not a bad idea.
Mr. Habib: The Japanese are still not decided on the format or how the two documents could be linked. We have been working out the text on an ad referendum basis and have reached general agreement with a couple of exceptions. We sent them up last night, but I don’t expect you’ve had time to look at them.
The Secretary: No.
Mr. Habib: Our remaining problems are in the language regarding Korea — “the security of the ROK is essential to Japanese security” is language they are not yet ready to buy.
The Secretary: If they don’t believe it is essential then what are we there for? We should have strong language on this.
Mr. Habib: Then there is also the support for ROK UN membership. We might have some flexibility on that with reference to the principle of universality.
The Secretary: What else?
Ambassador Hodgson: Miki will always want to be as vague as possible.
The Secretary: Why?
Ambassador Hodgson: That’s just his style — avoiding being pinned down, playing the domestic political aspects.
[Page 5]The Secretary: Miki can go into whatever fan dance he wants to with his intellectuals. But he has to recognize the basic facts and understand why we are in Korea.
Mr. Habib: Over and above this they will be wanting to talk about the world economic issues — energy, food, and so on. But you’re fully familiar with that. On energy, you’ve made your point with them about consumer solidarity, but they’re still very leery about any confrontation. They also are very lukewarm about the minimum safeguard price.
Ambassador Hodgson: One of the reasons is the long procession of senior Americans coming through telling the top level Japanese that the MSP is not going to go through — that it’s not a good way of dealing with the problem.
The Secretary: Like whom?
Ambassador Hodgson: Presidents and top officers of Esso, Caltex, Gulf. They had the International Petroleum Institute meeting there, you know. And some of the big bankers as well.
The Secretary: They’re simply afraid they’ll lose profits. Meanwhile we lose any motivation to develop alternative sources.
Mr. Habib: On food, the Japanese are not enthusiastic about a system of grain reserves. As Miyazawa indicated last April, they’re afraid that it will open them to demands from the LDC’S for more food aid.
The Secretary: We could play that game — make a corner on the market the next time there is a shortage and drive them up against the wall. I’ve supported the grain reserves plan, but I’m not sure that we couldn’t pursue foreign policy aims better by using food supplies as a weapon. The USSR needs our grain and can’t get it anywhere else. We could drive them up against the wall. It’s certainly not to the Japanese advantage to be in that kind of game. Is there anything else? I have to go.
(Here the Secretary ended the meeting.)