197. Memorandum of Conversation1

SUBJECT

  • Ambassador Popper’s Meeting with the Secretary

PARTICIPANTS

  • The Secretary
  • Ambassador David H. Popper, American Ambassador to Santiago, Chile
  • Assistant Secretary William D. Rogers, ARA
  • John E. Karkashian, Country Director, ARA/BC (notetaker)

Secretary: Is this just a courtesy visit or do we have some problems in Chile?

Popper: There are some substantive points we wanted to discuss with you.

Secretary: I want to know what happened to the $50 million that we were going to give the Chileans in housing guarantees. How did that get cut in half?

Rogers: It didn’t get cut. It was split in half for optical purposes. We anticipate going ahead with the second half in the next fiscal year.

Secretary: We’re in the next fiscal year. Are they going to get it now?

Rogers: We signed them up for $30 million before the end of the last fiscal year and we can go ahead now with the remaining $25 million in this fiscal year.

Secretary: I can’t get a straight answer on this question. Have we or have we not cut this program in half? How do the Chileans perceive [Page 528] what we have done? If this is a technical matter, fine, but if this is an actual cut-back, I am against it.

Rogers: No, it isn’t a cut-back. We did not want to appear too generous with the Chileans in FY 1975. Therefore, we divided the original amount in two parts; the Chileans are not losing anything.

Secretary: Will this action preclude the Chileans getting something else in this fiscal year?

Rogers: No, this will have no effect on the rest of the program. It is just an optical split.

Popper: This won’t hurt them if they get the second tranche. If I may raise some other points, the Chileans must have some kind of a death wish. Their cancellation of the Human Rights Working Group visit has had a very adverse impact on our ability to be helpful.

Secretary: Why does Chile have to be the only country that must receive a human rights investigating body? Why doesn’t Amin receive a human rights commission? What about some of the other African countries where people are executed in the public square? There has to be some limit to this screaming hypocrisy.

Popper: The cancellation of the UN visit was tactically a bad move. It makes the problem that much more difficult. Chile also has some very serious economic difficulties: the high cost of petroleum imports and the depressed price of copper exports have brought it to dire economic straits. If things don’t pick up, the Government will have to adopt some very tight controls over the economy. The economic prospects for the months ahead are very bad. Also, the Chileans are paranoid about the threat they perceive from Peru and their belief that there is a worldwide Communist conspiracy being conducted against them.

Secretary: Well, isn’t it true?

Popper: The Chileans think we have misled them on our commitments and they are very disappointed about the delays in arms sales.

Secretary: Why don’t we give them the arms now?

Rogers: Well, we are going ahead.

Secretary: When the hell are they going to get the arms? What’s the answer?

Popper: There are $9 million in old credits that are available to them. However, the things they want are TOWs and tanks. We were on the verge of giving them those items.

Secretary: Why didn’t they get them? Why haven’t we delivered the M–48 tanks we promised to them?

Rogers: We couldn’t move before July 1 because of the restrictive legislation and then they cancelled the UN visit.

[Page 529]

Popper: There are also some bureaucratic problems and the question of availabilities—TOWs and tanks have not been readily available. More recently, of course, the Chileans further complicated the problem by cancelling the human rights visit.

Secretary: There can be no doubt about my policy. I want to strengthen Chile. I don’t want to drive them to despair. Is it true that we told Defense to put a ‘hold’ on arms sales to Chile?

Rogers: Since July 1, yes. I gather that in your meeting with Fraser an understanding was reached on what items might be released to the Chileans if some progress were made on human rights.

Secretary: I knew that would happen. Did you think that I told Fraser that Chile wouldn’t get arms? Not even remotely did I say that. Who said that I did? Where did you get that information?

Rogers: We got it from Fraser’s office.

Secretary: I said I would be willing to listen to the kinds of things that he felt needed to be done, but not to tie our program to them. That approach always has the opposite effect. If we say that you must do something so that we can do something, it will not happen that way. I don’t agree with that approach.

Rogers: The other alternative is to tell the Congress that we are going to go ahead because we believe it is technically and legally permissible. The third alternative is to do it and let the Congress find out about it.

Secretary: How much assistance can we provide to Chile?

Rogers: Under the Continuing Resolution, the ceiling is $20 million in military credits. The practical problem is whether to go ahead with tanks and TOWs. We were prepared to move ahead when the GOC cancelled the UN visit.

Secretary: I believe your analogies are correct. There is a great deal of foot dragging all over this building. Just enough so that nothing happens and it is difficult to pin the responsibility on anyone. When a Portuguese-type government takes over in Chile, you will all sit around and wring your hands.

Rogers: Where do we go from here?

Secretary: I favor the delivery of some military assistance to Chile. I told Fraser that I wanted to assist the Chileans and then we would see what we could do to improve the situation. I did not say that first there must be human rights improvements and then we would assist the Chileans. It cannot work that way.

Popper: Perhaps we can move forward on both fronts.

Secretary: I have no trouble with that.

Rogers: The crucial point is whether we advise or do not advise the Congress.

[Page 530]

Secretary: What is your view?

Rogers: I think we must advise the Congress. There is too much at stake and we would be asking for trouble if we didn’t.

Secretary: Let me think about that. What other problems do we have?

Popper: There appears to be a tendency in the Congress to cut economic assistance to Chile. This would really hurt them because U.S. aid is really critical. It could lead to a chaotic situation. A cut in PL–480 allocations for Chile may be in the making. Chile is by far the most important recipient in the hemisphere. I hope we can keep the same level that has been projected for Chile—400,000 tons, valued at $55.1 million.

Secretary: How does that compare historically?

Popper: It is about the same.

Rogers: Back in the 60’s, Chile was very high on the wheat side so it is not out of line.

Secretary: I have no intention of having Chile cut. What is the population of Chile?

Popper: 10 million.

Secretary: Peru?

Popper: 15 million.

Secretary: I am still thinking of going to Latin America some time.

Popper: Including Chile?

Secretary: Well, if those madmen do something on human rights.

Popper: Well, I hope that with time we can have some effect on the Chileans. There are a number of people in the Chilean Government who are actively working toward the right objectives, but they need time and some encouragement from us.

  1. Summary: Kissinger, Rogers, and Popper discussed U.S. policy towards Chile, including issues relating to the level of U.S. assistance to be provided to the country, the human rights situation, and the status of weapon sales. Kissinger expressed a desire to strengthen Chile and to deliver military assistance.

    Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820123–1831. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Karkashian on July 21; cleared by Rogers. The hold on sales of armaments before July 1 is discussed in Document 191. Ingersoll reported to Kissinger on July 15 that he had met the previous day with Popper and representatives from NSC, ARA, H, PM, and L, all of whom agreed that it was politically impossible to initiate any new military assistance for Chile, but that the U.S. Government would inform the Chilean Government that FMS credits from prior years were still available to them. (Telegram 165671/Tosec 70003 to the Secretary, July 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–2305) On July 24, the Department informed the Embassy that FMS sales agreed to prior to July 1, 1974, and a few items contracted in early FY 1975 before the suspension of assistance would be delivered. (Telegram 174230 to Santiago, July 24; ibid., D750254–1055) In telegram 737204 from the Central Intelligence Agency, August 30, the CIA sought information on what steps might be taken to exert positive influence on the Chilean Government. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 2, C–7: Chile)