Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 2, Documents on South America, 1973–1976

196. Memorandum From Stephen Low of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, July 16, 1975.

SUBJECT

• Chile Arms Sales

We may be running into difficulties on the Chile arms sales.

President Pinochet raised with Ambassador Popper the question of $11 million in FMS credits which were left over from FY 71 to FY 74. We have all along told the Chileans that this was theirs. After the Section 25 restriction in last year’s Foreign Military Assistance Act, we told them they would no longer be able to use it for FMS items, and Defense would not permit them to use it for commercial consumables. They have always been able to use it for other commercial purposes. At the meeting with Maw, it was decided that the money would continue to be available to them and that Popper could assure them of this. That is, that we would not take steps to withdraw it. It was also decided that no FMS sales would be authorized even for the $52 million of valid obligations signed under the FY 75 Continuing Resolution before Section 25 prohibition was voted in December, until the Chileans took some steps in the human rights field which would compensate for the very bad impression left when they cancelled the visit of the UN Human Rights Commission Group.

Clint Granger and Les Janka along with OMB are concerned that this decision will get played to Congress and the press in the form of “our finding new money” or “releasing new credits,” which is not the case. We could explain ourselves, of course, but that might not preclude Senator Kennedy’s introducing a new punitive provision in the new Foreign Military Assistance Act. Defense feels that this is likely to happen in any case and therefore that we should go ahead and authorize not only Chilean use of the $11 million they already have, but also the further $52 million. This would at least be of some significant help to the Chileans. Then the Congress can decide whether it wants to take responsibility for cutting off further assistance or not.

In any case I do not see how we can prohibit to the Chileans use of money from earlier years. We could find a legal justification, but we are certainly not required to do so. I can see some merit in Defense’s position.

In this connection, ISA is pushing hard to go ahead soon with the $52 million sale. It is my understanding they are going to Secretary Schlesinger with a recommendation that he request an SRG meeting on this subject.

Their interest in this is to get HAK personally involved, because they are not convinced that lower levels of State are reflecting his views in this matter.

It is possible that Secretary Schlesinger could bring this up with HAK.

1. Summary: Low informed Scowcroft of disagreement between Congress and the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government over arms sales to Chile.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Latin America, Box 3, Chile 2. Confidential. Sent for information. Scowcroft wrote “OK” on the memorandum and initialed it. The Pinochet-Popper conversation mentioned here took place on June 30 and is referenced in the source note to Document 195. The Maw-Popper meeting referred to here took place on July 14 and is described in telegram 174230 to Santiago, July 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750254–1055) In telegram 4698 from Santiago, July 5, the Embassy reported on Pinochet’s July 4 announcement that he had decided not to allow the United Nations Human Rights Commission to visit Chile. (Ibid., D750233–0196)