195. Telegram 4824/Tosec 60104 From the Embassy in Chile to the Department of State1
4824. Tosec 60104. Subject: Meeting with President Pinochet on UNHRC Study Group.
Summary. President justifies decision on UNHRC working group; indicates ban on visit not necessarily final; suggests willingness receive “truly impartial” investigative group; recognizes decision poses difficulties for USG; but nevertheless requests US assistance. End summary.
1. President Pinochet asked me to see him at his home at 11:30 a.m. today, July 10. FonMin Carvajal and DCM also present. Meeting lasted forty minutes and was cordial throughout.
2. Pinochet began with a justification of his action in banning visit of UNHRC working group. This was couched in now familiar terms of evidence that by communist design cards are stacked against Chile in international organizations. Recital on this point included allegedly improper transmittal to UN by OAS Human Rights Commission Secretary Reque of incomplete and classified report on Chile, without Chilean comments submitted thereon, which subsequently published by UN and now selling in US; the procedural irregularities in the ILO condemnation of Chile and the action of the Mexico City Conference on International Women’s Year; evidence that communists were determined to utilize working group visit, through staged seeking of asylum in embassies, demonstrations, etc., to provoke GOC reactions which would mar Chilean image; and improper behavior of working group itself in taking testimony in Paris, New York (allegedly with help of Cuban Ambassador) and Lima, before coming to Chile, with intention of subsequently preparing its report in Caracas, a hotbed of Chilean refugees.
3. I said I could appreciate Chilean motivation and could understand an emotional reaction. However, I wondered whether cost of [Page 523] taking this step might not exceed cost which GOC foresaw was involved in visit.
4. President said he had considered matter very carefully and was persuaded that the group would condemn GOC if it came. He thought that the very act of accepting the visit of this working group tended to convey an impression that its impartiality was likewise accepted. If group then condemned Chile, as he fully expected, consequences would be worse than those of denying the group entry.
5. I said that part of the problem was the dramatic impact of this after Chile had admitted a number of other investigative groups and had agreed to admit this one. If group came and then condemned Chile, and GOC then wished say there was evidence that it could not obtain a fair and impartial investigation and would not accept such groups in the future, that would be one position. But to have accepted the group and then to refuse entry seemed difficult to justify publicly in a convincing way. Furthermore, a report issued by the study group without visiting Chile would probably be worse for Chile than one issued after a visit.
6. President reverted to point that Chilean experience with previous groups had been highly unsatisfactory. He was persuaded it was better to refuse UNHRC group entry than to lend credence to its inevitable condemnation of Chile by permitting it to come.
7. I said that Col. Valdes, Under Secretary of Foreign Relations, and Amb. Trucco had seen Acting Secretary Ingersoll and Asst. Sec. Rogers yesterday. I understood that the Acting Secretary had explained that while we had made every effort to be helpful to Chile, inevitably this decision made it more difficult for us to continue to do so. The hope had been expressed that it might be possible to consider the decision taken not as a cancellation of the visit but as a postponement, and to work toward rescheduling the visit.
8. The President said that the decision could be regarded as a postponement rather than a definitive cancellation. Possibly something could be done toward the end of the year. He said he was not opposed to the visit of an impartial group; indeed he would welcome a visit by trustworthy, prestigious “men of good will”. He then commented again on the evidence of partiality in the behavior of the working group in taking testimony before coming to Chile and in planning to go to Caracas thereafter.
9. I said I did not find it unreasonable for the group to take testimony prior to arrival in Chile, to gain perspective on the present situation, though perhaps its plan to proceed to Caracas could be considered imprudent. However, these items were not necessarily evidence that it would be impossible to obtain a fair hearing from the working group. Obviously the group was not going to depart saying [Page 524] that the situation in Chile was perfect. On the other hand, I thought it entirely possible that having seen the situation in Chile for itself, having had freedom to talk to detainees and the man in the street, as well as to government officials, it might very well produce a balanced report.
10. The President laughingly said that I was a good advocate, but he still thought decisive action of the kind he had taken was what the political situation at the UN required. He noted that the US sometimes acted decisively too, and in his opinion to very good effect. He recognized the decision posed problems for us and our relationship with Chile. He reiterated that Chile is and has been a greater friend of the US than the US is of Chile. He remarked, as he had with me a few days previously, upon Chile’s truly desperate plight in terms of lack of military supplies and said he really did not know where to turn. He expressed hope for US understanding and support.
11. I said I would be departing this evening on consultation in Washington and naturally these matters would be of top priority in my talks.
12. Comment: The President really has not provided anything new in the way of justification for his action, save possible his concern that condemnation by an investigative group would represent a serious watershed in terms of Chile’s future in the UN and related agencies, and possibly with US.
13. The President now takes the position that his decision was to postpone rather than cancel the visit of the group. My impression is that position is more formal and tactical than a matter of conviction. But it is something for us to work on.
14. President’s reference to the visit of a truly impartial group might later conceivably provide a basis for some progress in this area. Of course, what Chile most wants is a prestigious group which will justify GOC actions past and present. This is obviously impossible to achieve. On the other hand, it might be possible to suggest a group sufficiently objective to be free, even in Chile’s eyes, of the taint of communist infiltration or manipulation and which would be willing to carry out an investigation here. One possibility might be a group of jurists selected from the membership of the international court of justice, or some similar group of uncommitted personalities. There would still remain, however, the question of who would create, organize and finance such an operation. End comment.
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Summary: Pinochet indicated he would be willing to receive a “truly impartial” group to investigate human rights abuses, but not the UNHRC. Although he understood that it would be difficult for the U.S. Government to provide assistance, Pinochet requested it anyway.
Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables for Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, 7/9–12/75, Europe, TOSEC 5. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Kissinger as telegram 163457/Tosec 60104 on July 11. On July 4, Pinochet cancelled the visit of the UNHRC three days before it was scheduled to arrive in Santiago. (Memorandum From Rogers to Ingersoll, July 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P810150–1244) A summary of the July 9 conversation between Ingersoll, Rogers, Valdes, and Trucco is in telegram 164813 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 12. (Ibid., D750242–0058)
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