Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

465. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum¹

Washington, July 19, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Jamaica at the Crossroads

KEY POINTS²

Prime Minister Manley’s outlook and methods of governing have shifted steadily to the Left since he assumed office in 1972.

—The shift became pronounced following his first meeting with Fidel Castro in late 1973 and is reflected in an increasing array of ties and in the growing belief in Manley’s circle that Cuba provides a model for meeting Jamaica’s needs.

—From an early belief in romantic socialism, Manley has progressed to a vague program of “democratic socialism;” more recently he has asserted that the capitalist system is corrupt and moribund and incompatible with democracy.

—Manley is breaking with his conservative and middle class advisers—including most of his fellow members of Parliament—and is replacing them with a “kitchen cabinet” composed of young radical leaders of his People’s National Party.

—Mounting evidence suggests that Manley is attracted to the radicals’ efforts to impose one-party hegemonic rule.

—He increasingly sanctions the confrontational techniques favored by the radicals—most of whom performed their political apprenticeships in the Black supremacist, New Left, and Marxist groups that thrived in Jamaica in the late 1960s—and who have intimate ties with Cuba.

—Since last summer Manley has brought the military and police forces more under his control by replacing apolitical officers with individuals who are personally loyal to him.

—The traditionally independent media have come under mounting pressure to report favorably on Manley and his programs.

We believe that Manley, in his determination to continue as Prime Minister, will employ all tactics necessary to achieve this end, but he has probably not yet committed himself to ending democratic rule in Jamaica.

—The state of emergency, imposed on June 19, has been enforced in a blatantly political manner to debilitate the opposition Jamaica Labor Party and to help guarantee that Manley and a majority of his party’s candidates will win in the elections that must be held by next May.

—In November he will be allowed by the Constitution to create seven new parliamentary districts, and he undoubtedly plans to make most of them safe for his candidates.

—Fraudulent voter lists will be prepared.

—Manley holds another trump card in being able to conclude favorable agreements with the U.S. and Canadian aluminum companies before the elections; this would be highly popular.

Prospects for an early agreement between Jamaica and the aluminum companies are only fair, because Manley will have to further increase their taxes to stem spreading economic decline.

—The three U.S. firms and one Canadian firm involved have been prepared to sign final agreements, but Manley has delayed.

—He may be waiting for an upturn from world recession to increase his leverage on the companies.

—Jamaican bauxite and alumina account for two-fifths of U.S. supplies, and it would take the U.S. companies, which have invested more than $660 million in Jamaica, several years to develop alternate sources.

—We do not believe that Manley now plans to expropriate the companies during the next few years.

—If the U.S. market were lost, it would have disastrous effects on the Jamaican economy.

—Manley would be unable to sell more than token amounts of the ores to the Communist countries.

A second Manley administration most likely would be more radical than the first.

—He could be expected to move into even closer alliance with the young radicals and become more alienated from the middle and upper classes.

—As this occurred, whatever is left of consensus, ministerial, and parliamentary forms of government would further erode as the party became the central arbiter of national policy.

—Such shifts could culminate, toward the middle or end of a second term, in institutionalized one-party authoritarian rule.

—Manley would probably move cautiously but persistently to expand public ownership and control of the economy.

—Relations with Cuba would become even more extensive; the Castro government is likely to expand human and technical assistance to draw Jamaica into its sphere of influence.

—Manley probably would want to reevaluate relations with Washington, and look for positive changes in U.S. policy. Relations with the U.S. could easily deteriorate into a chain reaction of confrontations, nonetheless.

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Summary: This assessment concluded that Manley’s outlook and methods of governing had shifted steadily to the left since he assumed office in 1972 and that a second Manley administration would most likely be more radical than the first.

   Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council Files, Job 91R00884R, Box 10, Folder 11. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. All brackets are in the original except those indicating footnotes in the original document or text omitted by the editors. In a July 12 report on destabilization charges in Jamaica, INR concluded that Manley’s campaign was “part of an election tactic using the U.S. as a scapegoat for Jamaica’s problems.” (National Security Council, Ford Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–L, Box 11, Jamaica, 20 Jul 1976–17 Aug 1976)

2. This memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and reviewed and coordinated by representatives of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of the Treasury, and the National Security Agency. [Footnote in the original]