Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

466. Memorandum From Samuel M. Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland)¹

Washington, August 17, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Covert Action in the Caribbean

Bill Wells has sent you the attached paper concerning the possibilities for covert action in Jamaica and the Caribbean in general. His basic conclusion is that there is little or nothing that can be done at this time in the way of covert action to influence Manley or the outcome of Jamaica’s forthcoming elections. Wells does promise, however, to provide a proposed program to counter expanding Cuban influence throughout the Caribbean.

Outside the covert action arena, Wells recommends offering Manley significant economic assistance as an inducement to stay out of the Socialist camp and keep his distance from Castro. David Lazar believes that the amounts involved are simply not realistic and doubts that they would in any event buy much good will from Manley.

The success of Cuban initiatives in the Caribbean—especially in Jamaica and Guyana—is worrisome. It certainly deserves some high priority attention by the DDO which should be encouraged to develop a covert action program for OAG consideration. You might probe Wells on how this paper is coming at the Working Group meeting.

Attachment

Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Wells) to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Hyland)

Washington, August 5, 1976.

SUBJECT

• Situation in Jamaica and the Caribbean

1. Cuba has been acting with skill and energy to expand its influence in the Caribbean. Cuban initiatives have been highly successful in both Guyana and Jamaica and are beginning to bear fruit in the smaller Caribbean countries. But while the growth of Cuban influence in Guyana is of concern to Guyana’s Latin American neighbors, particularly Brazil and Venezuela, Jamaica’s fate is not of major importance to other Latin nations. The United States, however, does have a primary interest in trying to prevent an irreversible Jamaican commitment to the Cuban/Soviet camp. Further Cuban expansion in the Caribbean could trigger a new U.S.-Cuban confrontation, while a reversal of the Jamaican Government’s pro-Cuban policies could cause the Cubans to lose much of the ground they have been gaining elsewhere in the area.

2. The current situation in Jamaica is described in detail in the attached 19 July 1976 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum entitled “Jamaica at the Crossroads.” The memorandum documents Jamaica’s steady leftward shift since Prime Minister Michael Manley assumed office in 1972, noting that this shift became pronounced following Manley’s first meeting with Fidel Castro in 1973, and that the shift is reflected in the increasing Cuban influence on Jamaica and in the growing belief in Manley’s circle that Cuba provides a model for meeting Jamaica’s needs. The paper also outlines the measures being taken by Manley to debilitate the opposition Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) and to guarantee that Manley and his People’s National Party (PNP) will win the national election which must be held by next May. The memorandum concludes that Manley is determined to continue as prime minister and will employ all tactics necessary to achieve this end, but that he probably has not yet committed himself to ending democratic rule in Jamaica. Jamaica is therefore “at the crossroads.”

3. In anticipation of the upcoming Jamaican elections, this Agency had prepared a draft proposal for the Operations Advisory Group. The proposal contained two options: the first was to attempt to turn Manley around through economic assistance and diplomatic pressure; the second was to provide covert electoral support to the opposition JLP, which then seemed to have a good chance of winning a free election. Since the declaration of a state of emergency in Jamaica on 19 June, however, it has become apparent that Manley will not permit the JLP to mount an effective electoral campaign. JLP leaders, feeling they have no chance of taking over the government through legal electoral means, are increasingly inclined to adopt terrorist opposition tactics. Under these circumstances, we concluded that covert support to the JLP would be a high-risk proposition with little chance of success.

4. Having ruled out the JLP option—a true covert action operation which would have required OAG consideration—we are left with the proposal to try to turn Manley around. Since this proposal would have to be implemented by the Department of State and other U.S. Government components, with the Agency playing a very minor supportive role, submission to the OAG does not appear appropriate. Nevertheless the proposal itself still seems valid, and the objective appears important in terms of U.S. security interests. I am therefore bringing it to your attention for possible presentation to the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) or whatever other forum you may consider appropriate.

5. The proposal is that the U.S. Government attempt to keep Jamaica out of the socialist camp and thus reduce the risk of a future U.S.-Cuban confrontation in the Caribbean by offering Manley significant economic assistance through a combination of direct U.S. financial grants, funds from international financial institutions, and possible investments by the private sector. Concurrently, a variety of diplomatic pressures would be brought to bear on Manley through third country leaders as well as through high-level U.S. diplomacy designed to convince Manley that Washington really cares about Jamaica and the other black Caribbean states. The cost initially would probably be as high as $200 million, with substantial annual increments thereafter. Since Jamaica is not an attractive investment prospect it will be difficult for the U.S. to generate significant new loans from international financial institutions, and it is estimated that the U.S. will need to provide about half of the $200 million which Manley has previously requested, using whatever funds can be made available from AID and the President’s Fund. This in turn would probably generate an additional $20 to $50 million in loans from the IADB and the World Bank.

6. Regardless of the policy decision on Manley, the Agency believes that a covert action program may be useful and desirable as part of an overall effort to counter expanding Cuban influence throughout the Caribbean. The details of such a proposed program will be the subject of a separate submission to the OAG.

William W. Wells

1. Summary: This memorandum commented on the possibilities for covert action in Jamaica and the Caribbean in response to worrisome developments in the region.

   Source: National Security Council, Ford Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–L, Jamaica 20 July 1976–17 August 1976. Top Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information. Hyland wrote, “I agree,” next to statements asserting that aid to Jamaica was unlikely to buy much good will and that rising Cuban influence in the Caribbean was worrisome. Hyland wrote, “OK,” next to the suggestion that he ask the CIA about the status of a paper on possible covert action in the region; the paper is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P860055–1161. Also published is the attached August 5 memorandum from Wells to Hyland. Secret. The July 19 memorandum referred to in the attachment is published in part as Document 465.