211. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting1
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]
Secretary Kissinger: Bill.
Mr. Rogers: Let me mention Belize. The British brought us in their final draft of the UN resolution, which they claim they have negotiated vigorously with the Caribbean countries and other interested non-aligned countries, and that it is as favorable to the Guatemalan interests as possible. It is not very favorable. It speaks of independence and self-determination, words which in the theological environment of the situation are, at least we had thought to be, close to unacceptable to the [Page 591] Guatemalans. They have also presented it to the Guatemalans. We do not know the reaction of the Guatemalans. But I think the point is that we have come a step closer to a possible outbreak of violence in the area.
Secretary Kissinger: But why are the British so determined to drive this to a conclusion?
Mr. Rogers: I think Callaghan misunderstands, quite frankly, the temper of the Guatemalans. He is impatient to resolve the problem, and he is taking a Gordian knot approach to it.
Mr. Hartman: This is what he did in Cyprus last year. He loves to call out the troops. And I think there is a little bit of that in what he is doing now. Also the kind of reaction you get in Britain now to the protection of the white settlers in any of these places.
Secretary Kissinger: But they can’t get enough troops in there to defend it. I didn’t have the impression that the Guatemalans were in the slightest impressed by the military threat.
Mr. Rogers: No. The few additional troops that the British are putting in will not impede the Guatemalans, at least from the symbolically significant incursion in the southern part of the country.
Secretary Kissinger: Which is all they want to begin with.
Mr. Rogers: Right. I think there is going to be some blood before this is over. We are talking about a microscopic issue in terms of numbers of troops involved. But the symbolism is significant. And it really will be quite an extraordinary outbreak of violence between a European occupying power and a Western Hemisphere nation.
Secretary Kissinger: Won’t the Latins support Guatemala?
Mr. Rogers: Very largely—not entirely.
Secretary Kissinger: What do we do?
Mr. Rogers: Well, so far we have attempted to urge restraint on both sides. Without speaking to the substantive issue of the form of the resolution, we have made clear to the Guatemalans that we cannot countenance resort to force as a method for resolving this dispute; on the other hand, we have urged the British to carefully consider the possibility of submitting the question to the World Court.
Secretary Kissinger: But what is going to happen?
Mr. Rogers: I think the UN will probably vote the resolution with respect to independence and self-determination of Belize, and I think the odds are something like two-to-one the Guatemalans will put some troops across the southern border.
Secretary Kissinger: And then what do we do?
Mr. Rogers: The issue then is going to go back to the UN. There is going to be a bigger debate up there. The Guatemalans anticipate a call [Page 592] on both sides to cease fire in place. The British may then push for a determination and declaration of independence.
Now, we are also looking at a number of possibilities with respect to the OAS. The last time things came anywhere near this close, the OAS acted and put some observers in. The juridical basis for that was questionable, to say the least. But this cooled some tempers. The basic question, though, is whether or not Callaghan is prepared to be as patient this time as the British were last time.
Secretary Kissinger: I want to make sure we are not going to take any reprisals against Guatemala without seventh floor approval. We have already shut off supplies to them.
Mr. Rogers: The airplanes, the C–47 aircraft.
Secretary Kissinger: That is right.
Mr. Rogers: As a result of Callaghan’s request to you, we did not move on that.
The point is that would tip the strategic balance considerably and increase the capacity of the Guatemalans to put some paratroopers in the center of the country, in the capital.
But your point is absolutely right. We will not retaliate and have not been retaliating—without your approval.
Secretary Kissinger: Which you won’t get. So you might as well not plan for retaliation.
Mr. Rogers: We are not planning to request approval.
Secretary Kissinger: There are two or three countries in the hemisphere that tend to vote with us, so we don’t want to—
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]
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Summary: Secretary Kissinger, Assistant Secretary Rogers, and Assistant Secretary Hartman discussed the draft United Nations resolution on Belizean independence and the possibility that Guatemalan forces might move into Belize.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, October 28, 1975. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. All brackets are in the original except those indicating text omitted by the editors. In telegram 16479 from London, October 28, the Embassy reported that during an October 27 meeting Callaghan told Sonnenfeldt he had sent his Permanent Representative to the United Nations to Guatemala to discuss a resolution that the Guatemalans could accept. According to the Embassy, Callaghan noted that he was unwilling to let the issue drag out indefinitely and that the Guatemalan Government would have to accept the principle of Belizean self-determination. Regarding Guatemalan charges of aggressive British behavior, Callaghan stated that the “British will not let Guatemalans ‘overrun’ Belize, and, in response to his request, UK MOD had now worked out arrangements whereby British troops could be gotten to Belize within 24 hours.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750373–0910)
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