212. Transcript of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting1
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]
Mr. Rogers: Meloy is predicting and I think probably correctly that if the British-supported resolution on Belize goes through the United Nations, the Guatemalans will invade. The fuse is getting very short. We are going to suggest to you along the lines that Meloy has talked about in his most recent cable a communication pointing out to them our assessment about the strength of feeling involved and making some suggestions about an early overture by the British to the Guatemalans.
Secretary Kissinger: And point out I have talked to the Guatemalans in order to dissuade them, so that it doesn’t look as if we are siding with the Guatemalans.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: This is another issue on which Callaghan is extremely martial.
Mr. Hartman: I know. And very wrong-headed.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, he is wrong-headed, too, on the Ministerial Conference.
Mr. Hartman: Yes—but he gets himself dug in this way. I think some of the suggestions that Frank [Meloy] has made about what could be offered to the Guatemalans at the time of passage of the resolution are good, and we really ought to put those to the British.
Secretary Kissinger: What are they?
Mr. Rogers: For example, a commitment by the British that whatever government emerges in Belize will be subject to the Rio Treaty. [Page 594] That Belize will commit itself not to be a base for invasion or threat against Guatemala. And that both countries will limit and qualify their right internationally to make military accords with other governments. That is a code word for relations between Belize and Cuba.
Secretary Kissinger: But the Guatemalans, if I understand correctly, would accept any of this as long as they get the southern half of Belize.
Mr. Rogers: This proposal would be a proposal which would go beyond, ignore, if you will, the possibility of territorial concessions.
Secretary Kissinger: But if they could get the southern half of Belize, they would not give much of a damn whether they did have relations with Cuba. Then they would let them have relations with Cuba, too, wouldn’t they?
Mr. Rogers: Probably.
Secretary Kissinger: What they are after really is the southern half of the country.
Mr. Rogers: But the possibility exists, and Frank is looking in this direction, that the Guatemalans would buy a deal without territorial concessions. The problem of the UN resolution and the thing that makes it so difficult for the Guatemalans is that it affirms the territorial integrity of the territory of Belize. In other words, it blocks the possibility of territorial concessions. The British say this establishes the new ground rules for negotiations.
Secretary Kissinger: You better let me see the message. But we have to show to Callaghan that we have at least heard him. Because he has talked to me several times. And you better list in that message all the things we have done.
Mr. Rogers: You have said it and we have said it very strongly to the Guatemalans. This is the reason they are so upset. They were hoping we would be much more in their corner on this issue. But we have been very strong about the fact that we could not go for use of violence.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Guatemala or Belize.]
-
Summary: Assistant Secretary Rogers provided Secretary Kissinger with an update on the Belize situation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 9, Secretary’s Staff Meeting. Secret. Kissinger chaired the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. All brackets except those indicating text omitted by the editors and “[Meloy]”, added for clarity. In telegram 6086 from Guatemala City, November 2, Meloy had noted that the Guatemalan Government and “the informed public” would consider passage of the draft resolution a “humiliating defeat,” and warned that passage would “increase the odds of a Guatemalan military move into Belize.” (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy File, D750380–0663) Meloy communicated his suggestions in telegram 6088 from Guatemala City, November 2. (Ibid., D750173–1554) In a conversation with the President, November 3, 9:20–10:13 a.m., Kissinger commented that “Callaghan gets emotionally involved in these things. He wants British Honduras independent and he has a resolution in the U.N. But the British can only send 200 troops in and Guatemala can defeat that. I think we should try to get a compromise out of it. I think we can.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 16, November 3, 1975—Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft)
↩