Peru
606. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger updated President Nixon on the passage of a far reaching agrarian reform law passed in Peru the previous month and noted the possible effect the law would have on the political, social, and economic structure of Peru. Kissinger then discussed the fisheries situation, the IPC, and the overall implications of recent developments on U.S. policies. He concluded that U.S. economic sanctions had most likely played a part in convincing the Velasco government to seek better relations with the United States. As such, the U.S. Government should maintain the pressure, while continuing to negotiate.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 795, Country Files, Latin America, Peru–IPC–Hickenlooper Amendment, Vol. 2. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon wrote in the top right hand corner: “K Don’t be too nice too soon—Let them stew some more.” In the margin in the section “Implications of Recent Developments,” next to the paragraph on non-overt economic pressures, Nixon wrote: “note.” In a July 22 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger concluded that the agrarian reform would have a limited impact on U.S. economic interests in Peru and it would bolster Velasco’s political position. (Ibid.)
607. National Security Decision Memorandum 21
Kissinger transmitted President Nixon’s decision to maintain non-overt economic pressure on the Peruvian Government while deferring the application of Hickenlooper sanctions and investigating the possibility of extending the deferral beyond the end of the administrative appeal process.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–211, NSDM Files, NSDM 21. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. The NSC IG/ARA paper is published as Document 600. The August 4 report came in the form of a memorandum from Richardson to Nixon, ibid., Box H–209, NSDM Files, NSDM 21.
608. Memorandum of Conversation
President Nixon declared to the Ambassadors to Australia, Barbados, Canada, Iceland, Peru, and Romania, as well as Haig that it was important that other Latin American nations not replicate Velasco’s “Nassarist” model. Nixon also hinted that there were “signs” Velasco was beginning to realize that a confrontation with the United States would not be in the best interest of Peru.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. Secret. An attached August 26 note indicated Haig dictated the memorandum and Kissinger saw it before it was filed. The meeting took place in the President’s Office at the Western White House in San Clemente. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting took place on August 19 from 11:58 a.m. to 12:15 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
609. Telegram 7265 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State
Ambassador Belcher provided his preliminary views on the salutary effects that the announcement of the Southern Peru Copper Company (SPCC) and International Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T) agreements would have on United States-Peruvian relations. The Ambassador concluded it might be necessary to reconsider NSSM 42—maintaining pressure on Peru while working with friendly governments in the region to ensure they do not lend support Peru in its conflict with the United States.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, INCO 15–2 PERU. Confidential; Priority. Crimmins sent a November 4 memorandum to Rogers detailing the SPCC-Peruvian Government accord. (Ibid., Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Assistant Secretary and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, Subject and Country Files, 1964–1975: Lot 74 D 467, CAM [Charles A. Meyer] Chronological File, November 1969)
610. Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Vaky summarized a CIA report that outlined President Velasco’s observations of Peru’s attitude toward the United States and the USSR. The report summarized four key points of Velasco’s perception of Peru’s relationship with both nations and his opinions on the Peruvian investigation of a U.S. citizen who had worked for CIA and had run private security firms in Lima.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum is stamped “HAK [Kissinger] has seen November 14, 1969.” Attached but not published is Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB–315/04774–69 from [text not declassified], November 12.
611. Memorandum From Viron P. Vaky of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Vaky provided a status report on U.S. objectives toward Peru. Some of the results of U.S. policy included Peru’s softening of its negotiating stance on the expropriation of U.S.-owned companies and the fisheries dispute. Vaky was uncertain that U.S. negotiators could pursue U.S. interests by continuing economic pressure.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. Secret. Sent for information. The attachment, “Summary of Peruvian Situation,” is not published. NSDM 21 is Document 607.
612. Telegram 26 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State
Ambassador Belcher noted that he did not think it possible the IPC compensation could be written into contracts being negotiated between U.S. companies and Peru. He also questioned the utility of non-overt financial pressure.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 PERU–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. The December 10, 1969, draft memorandum for the President, referred to in the first paragraph, was not found. A December 24 version of the memorandum is ibid., Executive Secretariat National Security Memoranda, 1969–1977: Lot 83 D 305, NSDM 21. This memorandum suggested that U.S. corporations explore with IPC the possibility of obtaining compensation for IPC’s expropriated assets in its contracts with the Peruvian Government.
613. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
Secretary of State Rogers informed President Nixon that there was public and congressional acceptance for the deferral of the Hickenlooper Amendments to Peru and recommended that Export-Import Bank policy regarding U.S. commercial endeavors in Peru remain unchanged.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PERU–US. Confidential. Drafted on January 12 by Crimmins and Stedman. The January 7 comprehensive review is attached to a January 7 memorandum from AID General Counsel Stephen Ives to Poats. (Washington National Records Center, EXSEC, Office of the Administrator, 1968–1973: FRC 75 A 013, Chron FY 79, January 2–14, 1970). The Peterson Report set forth a new approach to U.S. foreign assistance, clearly delineating the different aspects of U.S. assistance policy, and advocating setting up new institutions to implement the new policy. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 128.
614. Telegram 14287 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru
In this telegram, the Department of State stated that the Peruvian Government was attempting to defuse the conflict over fishing rights. The Department intended to inform the CEP nations that the U.S. Government appreciated their restraint regarding the conflict over fishing.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 PERU–US. Confidential. Drafted by VanCampen; cleared by Stedman; and approved by McKernan. Repeated to Quito, Santiago, and Guayaquil; to Mexico City for the Regional Fishing Attaché; to Caracas for Meyer.
615. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Eliot provided Kissinger an information report on the principle provisions of the April 1970 Peruvian mining law and described possible implications for U.S. investment and relations with Peru.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 70. Confidential. Robert Snow signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature. Watts requested the study in an April 17 memorandum to Eliot. (Ibid.)
616. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers
In response to the May 31 earthquake that resulted in catastrophic consequences for Lima and its surrounding region, President Nixon issued this memorandum outlining his plans for U.S. aid to be sent to Peru, as well as his ideas for longer-term reconstruction relief.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 1, Through June 1970. No classification marking. The memorandum was also addressed to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Administrator of AID; the Director of the Peace Corps; and the Director of USIA. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and the Interior; the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; and the President of the Export-Import Bank. In an August 19 letter to President Velasco, Nixon did not offer U.S. assistance, but instead thanked Velasco for his hospitality during Mrs. Nixon’s visit. (Ibid., Box 760, Presidential Correspondence, Peru, President Velasco)
617. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Eliot discussed the Soviet airlift bringing disaster relief supplies to assist Peru in rebuilding following the May 31 earthquake. He discouraged interference by the U.S. Government to avoid negative publicity. In addition, he opined that the U.S. Government should not promote the Soviets’ relief operations beyond the requirements of courtesy and safety.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Secret. Brewster signed for Eliot. Attached but not published is a map of the world, a picture of a Soviet AN–22, and the Department’s Contingency Press Guidance.
618. Telegram 5166 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State
Edward W. Clark and Garcia Bedoya discussed the matter of overflights through territorial limits claimed by Peru. Clark reported that he told Bedoya that the problems may be taken up “at the very highest level.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 PERU. Confidential; Limdis; No Distribution Outside Department.
619. Telegram 5850 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State
Ambassador Belcher reviewed two years of Peruvian political, economic, and social developments, as well as U.S.-Peruvian relations, and concluded that Peruvian Government policy would harm U.S. businesses interests. Belcher feared that the communists were gaining strength within the government.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 PERU. Confidential. Repeated to La Paz, Santiago, Quito, Buenos Aires, Asunción, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro, Santo Domingo, Port au Prince, Bridgetown, Georgetown, Kingston, Port of Spain, San José, Managua, Guatemala City, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, Mexico City, Bogotá, Caracas, Panamá, Moscow, and USCINCSO.
620. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger summarized a memorandum by Secretary of State Rogers in which he discussed options for earthquake aid to Peru. Kissinger recommended a specific amount of approximately $100 million dollars to be distributed over three years. President Nixon, however, approved Rogers’s recommendation of assistance on a case-by-case basis.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. Nixon approved Rogers’s recommendation on October 19. Nixon wrote: “I agree” in the left-hand margin next to the sentence that begins “A personal message from you might draw adverse.” Next to the last recommendation, Nixon wrote “No” in the right-hand margin and wrote below: “I want to give Velasco just as little as we can—in specifics—He is using the earthquake to build his socialist state.” Tab A, a September 8 memorandum from Rogers to the President, has not been found. Tab B is published as Document 616.
621. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger stated that it might be possible to work with the anti-communist President Velasco and induce his government to avoid modeling itself on Cuba and Chile. Kissinger ultimately believed the U.S. Government could convince Velasco to take a more pro-United States stance.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. Nixon wrote on the bottom of the memorandum: “Makes sense—perhaps we should make a gesture toward him—as we continue our coolness toward Allende.” Tab A, telegram 6837 from Lima, has not been found.
622. Telegram 23385 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Peru
The Department of State instructed Ambassador Belcher to inform the Peruvian Government that the United States would show restraint in applying sanctions if Peru did not seize U.S. fishing boats.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33–4 PERU–US. Confidential. Drafted on February 10 by Weber; cleared in draft by VanCampen and Hamwell; and approved by Crimmins, Smith, and Feldman. Repeated to Mexico City, Quito, and Santiago.
623. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Nachmanoff recommended that the U.S. Government delay any action on FMS suspension and quickly devise a strategy for settling the fisheries dispute.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum was sent by means of electronic transmission to Kissinger in San Clemente. Telegram 1694 from Lima has not been found.
624. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Connally to the President’s Assistant for International Economic Policy (Peterson)
Connally outlined his reasons for reluctantly supporting an Inter-American Development Bank loan to Peru because he saw no other alternative. He argued it was counterproductive for the United States to provide assistance to nations that were hurting U.S. economic interests.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (IDB) 9 PERU. Confidential. Printed from a copy that bears Connally’s stamped signature.
625. Telegram 2280 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State
Ambassador Belcher commented on the Chilean Air Force request to purchase F–5s and C–130s from the U.S. military and reported how that action would influence United States-Peruvian relations. Belcher noted that if the United States sold arms to Chile, and not to Peru, U.S.-Peruvian relations would suffer.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 70–13 December 1971. Secret; Nodis. A stamped notation on the telegram indicates it was received in the White House Situation Room at 4:51 p.m. on April 27.
626. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Policy (Peterson) to President Nixon
Peterson requested President Nixon’s agreement that the United States should avoid raising the issue of Peru’s economic policy in the Inter-American Development Bank. Peterson said Kissinger and Irwin concurred with his views.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Secret. Sent for action. Haig wrote “done” in the margin next to Nixon’s approval. Nachmanoff sent the memorandum to Haig on May 3. NSDM 21 is published as Document 607.
627. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon
Haig argued that the U.S. Government representatives at the May 4 Inter-American Development Bank meeting should not read a statement critical of Peru because it could potentially jeopardize President Velasco’s upcoming visit to the United States and possibly reverse the gradual shift toward more favorable relations with the United States.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig approved for Nixon. Attached but not published was an undated memorandum to Nixon, in which Peterson stated that Connally wanted to make a “strong statement on Peru’s economic policy and its treatment of private investment.” On May 4, Haig wrote to Connally: “As I mentioned to you last night, for purely tactical reasons and in view of certain shifts which have recently occurred in the Peruvian Government as well as the pending visit of Velasco to the United States, the President has asked that on this occasion we not single out the IPC nationalization issue and the treatment of US contractors specifically.” (Ibid.)
628. Memorandum From Arnold Nachmanoff of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
After discussing the resolved problems in the U.S.-Peruvian relationship, Nachmanoff noted that the fisheries problem still persisted and explained that it would be dealt with in the context of NSSM 125, U.S. Oceans Policy.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. II, July 1970–13 December 1971. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Tab A, an April 29 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, is attached, but not published. Although a memorandum of conversation of the April 16 meeting was not found, Eliot summarized it for Kissinger in an April 17 memorandum, which is ibid. NSSM 125 is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 390.
629. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger speculated that the reasons why President Velasco declined an invitation for a state visit to the United States might include: still-tense relations between the United States and Peru, internal political problems, and/or scheduling problems.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential; Nodis. Sent for information. Nixon wrote on the bottom of the memorandum: “Cool it.” In his May 18 covering memorandum, Nachmanoff recommended that Kissinger sent the memorandum to the President, stating that “a successful Peruvian experiment, with a constructive relationship with the United States, may be a better defense against the extension of Chilean or Cuban models than regimes based on the rapidly deteriorating traditional structures of the oligarchy, the church and the ‘traditional’ military.”
630. Telegram 3356 From the Embassy in Peru to the Department of State
Ambassador Belcher reviewed the last two and a half years of U.S.-Peruvian relations and argued that, despite what appeared to be moderation in its actions against U.S. economic interests, it seemed Peru had recently decided on a firmer policy stance against U.S. business. Belcher though Washington should pursue patient negotiations to resolve disputes.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PERU–US. Confidential; Priority; Exdis.
631. Memorandum of Meeting
Kissinger and Peruvian Foreign Minister Edgardo Mercado Jarrin discussed recent developments in the Peru revolution, emphasizing that the Peruvian experiment was nationalistic, not Marxist, and affirming that any changes would be made solely in Peru, and that there was no intent to export its practices. Kissinger told Jarrin that the U.S. Government hoped to see the Peruvian revolution succeed as an example of a non-Marxist alternative to the Chilean experience.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted from 12:42 to 1:05 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Henry A. Kissinger, Box 438, Miscellany, 1969–1976, Record of Schedule) In an October 1 covering memorandum, Nachmanoff requested that Kissinger approve the release of a copy of the minutes to the Departments of State and the Treasury, and Peterson. Haig approved for Kissinger to disseminate to State, but not to Treasury and Peterson. Davis sent the memorandum to Eliot on October 8.
632. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger summarized the Department of State’s recommendation to lift the FMS suspension on Peru and analyzed the positions of the Departments of Commerce and Defense. He argued that the United States should lift the suspension if Peru indicated that it would maintain its policy of restraint.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–230, NSDM Files, NSDM 147. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger approved the recommendation for Nixon. Attached but not published are Tabs A through C. Tab A is a January 8 memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; Tab B is a January 7 memorandum from Howard W. Pollock, Acting Administrator National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and Chairman of the Department of Commerce; Tab C is a January 8 paper prepared in the Department of Defense.
633. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger reported that President Velasco believed that United States-Peruvian relations had improved in the last year. Velasco thought the United States and Peru should work together more closely to contain communism in the region and resume a liaison relationship between their intelligence services.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–31 December 73. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Next to the second paragraph Nixon wrote “K—! good.”
634. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger recommended making the flood zone in northern Peru eligible for U.S. Government reconstruction assistance.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 792, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 3, January 1972–31 December 73. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger approved the recommendation for Nixon. Attached but not published at Tab A is an April 11 memorandum in which Davis informed Eliot of Nixon’s approval on April 19.
635. Memorandum of Conversation
Gerald Alter stated that negotiations on the International Petroleum Company had broken down and concluded that while an overt solution was not possible, behind-the-scenes negotiations could be efficacious. Crimmins urged the Department of State to take a more direct role in the IPC discussions.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Subject and Country Files: Lot 73 D 353, Peru–IPC Case. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Crimmins. Copies sent to Irwin, Samuels, Meyer, Weintraub, Feldman, and Lancaster.