Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents on American Republics, 1969–1972

627. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon¹ ²

Washington, May 3, 1971

SUBJECT:

• Statement on Peru in IDB

Dr. Kissinger strongly endorses Acting Secretary Irwin’s and Pete Peterson’s recommendation that no critical statement on Peru be made at the IDB meeting tomorrow morning. Such a statement would certainly provoke a strong nationalistic reaction by the Peruvians and would:

• —Jeopardize the proposed visit of the Peruvian President to Washington, which we have planned as a means of offsetting developments in Chile;
• —Possibly reverse the gradual shift to a more moderate course in Peru favorable to our interests. (The Peruvian Government is still strongly nationalistic and reformist, but it has become increasingly concerned about Chile, suspicious of the Soviets, and tough on their indigenous Communists; recent Cabinet shifts have given the Government a more moderate cast.)

While our continuing bilateral problems with Peru are frustrating, ineffective pin-pricks, such as a critical public statement, can only complicate our relations. Our approach of correct restraint, humanitarian aid, and behind the scenes pressures, has been designed to bring the Peruvians around to a point where we can work out our differences, and to avoid giving ammunition to radicals in Peru who would go in the Chilean/Cuban direction. Our approach has been successful so far though progress is sometimes slow and almost imperceptible. The visit of the Peruvian President can be a crucial turning point. We should not jeopardize it, and our chances for a more constructive relationship by an ill-considered and probably ineffective public statement.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Pete Peterson’s recommendation that no critical statement on Peru be made at the IDB tomorrow.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 793, Country Files, Latin America, Peru, Vol. 2, July 1970–13 December 1971. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig approved for Nixon. Attached but not published was an undated memorandum to Nixon, in which Peterson stated that Connally wanted to make a “strong statement on Peru’s economic policy and its treatment of private investment.” On May 4, Haig wrote to Connally: “As I mentioned to you last night, for purely tactical reasons and in view of certain shifts which have recently occurred in the Peruvian Government as well as the pending visit of Velasco to the United States, the President has asked that on this occasion we not single out the IPC nationalization issue and the treatment of US contractors specifically.” (Ibid.)
2. Haig argued that the U.S. Government representatives at the May 4 Inter-American Development Bank meeting should not read a statement critical of Peru because it could potentially jeopardize President Velasco’s upcoming visit to the United States and possibly reverse the gradual shift toward more favorable relations with the United States.