Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

287. Telegram 4088 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹ ²

Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1130Z

Subject:

• Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part IV of VII: The Simla Conference.

1. Bhutto then commented on the Simla conference by saying that he did not in any way assume India was trying to mediate difficulties between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan knows the Indians. Pakistan had lived with them. It was obvious from the Simla conference that they were not interested in finding a solution to the prisoners’ return or war trials but rather were using Bangladesh and prisoners as leverage to settle the Kashmir problem. They said that if they could get the boundary dispute settled they might be able to use their influence with Mujibur to return prisoners. Bhutto said he didn’t delude himself for one minute. The Indians were going to try to use every device they could, including duplicity, to solve their problems at Pakistan’s expense. The Indians look upon themselves as great leaders, but they couldn’t lead anything, including their own nation. They didn’t have the capacity or qualities of leadership and he told them that. Foreign Minister Singh asked him what he meant and he told him leadership involved more than geography and numbers of people, it involved character, background, work, climate, and resources. Many things went into developing leadership. He said that India would never supply leadership for Pakistan. On the contrary, the leadership for India has always come from what is now Pakistan or Kashmir, never from what is now India.

2. I said I had heard he had organized two new divisions since the end of the war. He said that was right—he had. He said that India was holding four divisions of Pakistanis now. The idea Pakistan could continue to be vulnerable to the Indians was unthinkable. The Indians had taken and were taking land from Pakistan and would continue to do so unless there was restraint on them.

3. Bhutto went on to say that the Indians have tried to play one nation against another. They think they can establish rapprochement with China but that will be long coming. There will be many years before that happens, because the Chinese knew the Indians as the Pakistanis did. They have dealt with them. The Indians propose to use their friendship and alliance with Russians until they no longer need them. They are introducing the Russian influence into Bangladesh. Bhutto was not at all sure either knew what they were doing, because the Russians are not like Americans or Chinese. The Americans are at times very magnanimous, the Chinese frequently rely on time and their wisdom and take the postion that if a matter will not be settled immediately it will be settled in next 100 years to their interest. The Russians on the other hand want their pound of flesh and last drop of blood now. Both Bangladesh and India will find it more difficult to extricate themselves from the talons of the bear than they now realize.

4. He went on to say that obviously Pakistanis did not know how to put their best foot forward. They were not experts in public relations as the Indians were. For instance, every American Ambassador—Ambassador Galbraith and other (he named no other)—were only in India a short time before they become completely mesmerized. This was true of every American Ambassador. They begin selling the Indian philosophy around the world.

Connally

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 266. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.
2. Pakistani President Bhutto offered a pessimistic assessment of the Simla conference and the prospects for future dealings with India.