Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

286. Telegram 4087 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹ ²

Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1030Z

Subject:

• Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part III of VII: The Situation in the Sub-continent.

1. He then took off on an extended discourse of the situation in the sub-continent and reviewed the situation in Pakistan. When he came into power the country was in a state of chaos and disorder from a political, economic and military standpoint. The spirit of the pakistan people had overcome the most severe shock in their history. All this was brought about by an international conspiracy—it was not reasonable to assume that in these times any country could secede, as East Pakistan had seceded, without the assistance of outside intervention and finances. This unquestionably was a deliberate and conspiratorial act on the part of India; also by the Soviet Union. This was well understood by Pakistani people. This made it exceedingly difficult for him to move too much too fast. He said in all frankness he has still to deal with the military power in his country. The military regimes of the past dozen years have been disastrous for his country but notwithstanding that they still have still have enormous influence and power with which he has to reckon and deal.

2. He said sentiment in the country goes far beyond the military. It permeates the whole structure of Pakistan. He went on: My counterpart Sheikh Mujibur Rahman know this very well. He and I are old friends and have had many dealings together—among other things I have save his life twice. Not once, but twice. In 1968 when I started the movement against Ayub Khan and created an atmosphere in this country that required Ayub to spare Mujib at that time because he was then charged with conspiracy and treason with India. There was considerable evidence to support the charge, but, as a result of my activities, President Ayub Khan could not move against him. I saved his life again last year. When he came to see me last December 27 and again on January 3 he came to me almost on his knees with tears in his eyes begging for his life and expressing his eternal gratitude for saving his life. At that point I made a great mistake—I did not then extract from him any commitment about his future actions. (Refer to my memo of conversation with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who told an entirely different version. Mujibur said President Bhutto at that point tried to negotiate with him about prisoners of war and so forth and he (Mujibur) told President Bhutto that he could not negotiate anything because he was in jail as a prisoner. Mujibur said on second visit he had with Bhutto, in response to Bhutto’s attempt to extract commitments from him, he responded in same manner: he was in jail as a prisoner.)

4. President Bhutto said that at the time he released Mujib he was severely criticized in his country and citizens and soldiers even asked him what he got for the release. He said he had assumed that his old friend Mujib would be grateful for his life. Although he knew this does not dictate the fortunes of nations, nevertheless he did not think you could separate human equations from the affairs of state—but he had learned differently. Bhutto, said Mujib is now in all his piousness holding forth and demanding that Bhutto recognize him before proceeding with discussions of critical issues such as prisoners of war and trials of some of those prisoners.

5. At this point I told him that I did not want to violate any confidence of my visit to Dacca but that from what I have heard from various members of my party, there would be no attempt to try all the principal prisoners, but rather trials might be limited to something under 300.

6. President Bhutto said if they try five or even two of the principal military leaders he could have such a difficult problem with his military that he did not believe he could withstand their pressure. It is well and good, he said, for other nations to recognize Bangladesh, but the world must understand that Pakistan is in a different position. It had had a secession as a result of conspiracy and it would be as if other nations helped Texas secede from the union-you can image how the rest of the nation would feel. (I did not respond, but I thought in my own mind it might be a welcome move but I didn’t express it.)

7. Bhutto said he was quite critical of the French and British for recognizing Bangladesh when they did and he had begged them not to move precipitously toward recognition. He said he was grateful for the fact that the U.S. did not move in indecent haste to recognize Bangladesh and pleaded with the French and British on the grounds that if U.S. under the circumstances could exercise such restraint surely they could put aside recognition for a time. The problem was that Sheikh Mujib was painting himself into a corner—to the point where he was foreclosing his options and making it impossible to have an orderly and honorable retreat from some of his emotional positions. He said: “He is an emotional man. You as a politician will understand that the last thing a political leader wants to do is to foreclose all options under the circumstances.

8. I then said one of Mujib’s principal problems was going to be not only the trial but the return of the Bengalis in Pakistan. From my conversations this appeared to be a matter of utmost if not paramount importance. He said he well understood this was a major issue but this would have to be determined along with the solution of many problems. He didn’t know how we could begin to solve any of them if Mujibur wouldn’t meet with him prior to recognition. The idea that he can wake up one morning and say, “I can recognize Bangladesh” is wholly unrealistic and without the bounds of reason. He said, with respect to the Bengalis in Pakistan, that the military seriously questioned the patriotism and loyalty of most of the Bengalis serving in the armed forces, so they removed them from their positions. Bhutto said he regretted the decision and told the military leaders he would do it only under the condition that they were treated decently—“as well as our own troops.” Therefore they even moved them into the same quarters and fed them the same food that the Pakistani troops who had been in the trenches were being fed. Their pay and allowances were continued in full. They then found some Bengali civil servants and civilian employees were sorting through files and duplicating files. They were taking them out of offices and taking them to the Russians. They were also storing their gold and wealth with the Russians. So again, they were reluctantly removed from their positions but continued to receive their full pay and allowances. This had been done in the cause of humanity at a cost which Pakistan could ill afford.

9. Bhutto went on to say: “I am going to change this though. I am going to begin to tighten the screws because that is all Mujibur understands—he is at times irrational.” Bhutto explained he had offered Mujib 100 thousand tons of rice to help feed his impoverished and starving people and Pakistan could ill afford to do that, as poor as it was, but Mujib had arrogantly declined the offer. At this point I spoke up and told Bhutto that he should know that there were stories being circulated in both countries in which I recently visited that Pakistan was starving the prisoners in the cantonments and torturing them and that, in some cases, women were incarcerated in camps and being raped and mistreated. He reacted very strongly to this and again repeated that everyone had been treated most civilly and honorably and at great cost to Pakistan. He again repeated he was not going to be cruel to the Bengali soldiers or civilians but was going to begin to tighten down and reduce their salaries to perhaps one-half. This was the only thing Mujib understood-force and pressure—the only thing to which Mujib would react.

Connally

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 265. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.
2. Pakistani President Bhutto outlined the trying circumstances in Pakistan he had to deal with since becoming president. He discussed the difficulties of reaching an understanding with Awami League President Rahman that would enable him to recognize Bangladesh.