Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

288. Telegram 4089 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹ ²

Tehran, July 8, 1972, 1215Z

Subject:

• Secretary Connally Travel: Memorandum of Conversation From Secretary Connally’s Meeting With President Bhutto at the Presidential Palace in Rawalpindi on July 6, 1972: Part V of VII: Aid, the Summit Meetings and Implications.

1. Pakistan, Bhutto continued, had many problems. It could live and was grateful for the help of the U.S. It must, however, have more help. He would not ask for help now until after the November elections. (I remained silent.) He said if he could maintain order, if he could continue to make economic gains, he could rebuild the nation. Pakistan has the strength and spirit and could become the West Germany of South Asia. That was what it intended to be. He said Pakistan might have made many mistakes. He had made many mistakes. His views had changed on many issues but a man’s views reflect the times in which he is living when he has those views. Changed conditions and changed positions frequently compel an alteration of attitudes.

2. Bhutto said he kew the President’s visit to Peking was fruitful, because he had been informed by us. In fact, he knew in advance President Nixon would have a productive visit with Chou En Lai. He had told President Kennedy a month before he died that, if he could escape his fears of the Chinese, he felt a dialogue with them could be quite productive. He said the Chinese were always extremely intelligent and gracious in their talks and in their behavior. Most important, they always lived up to their commitments, oral and written. If they did not wish to make a commitment, they would adroitly avoid the subject, but once having given their word they would unquestionably adhere to precisely what they committed themselves to do. “I wish I could say as much for the Russians,” he added.

3. Bhutto recalled he had written to the President prior to his trip to Moscow. I said I knew the President very much appreciated his letter, and then referred to the letter. I explained the Moscow visit had been two years in the making. We entered into a number of agreements which we hoped would provide the basis for greater peace and tranquillity and hoped the Russians would in good faith carry out these agreements to the letter and spirit as we intended to do. He said he was convinced if the President had not gone to Peking the progress in Moscow would not have been so great. It was essential for the U.S. to continue to maintain its presence in Southeast asia and South Asia and in the Indian Ocean. “I don’t mean in a strong military sense or of flexing your muscles, but you must nevertheless maintain a very strong presence, politically, militarily and economically in this area because you are the only nation that can provide the balance between the forces that are now working.” He said the separation and attempted destruction of Pakistan destroyed a balance of power which was critical to South Asia and this could have serious repercussions, even in the Middle East. Pakistan’s only hope for continued stability, until there was more rebuilding during this decade, was the continued interest, presence and influence of the U.S. He said there were many problems: Russians were moving in in great numbers in India and Bangladesh. Pakistan had problems of exports—of developing its resources. It wanted to build a port somewhere in Baluchistan. He said Pakistan very much needed U.S. help to do it. The Russians desperately wanted access to a warm water port. If this port facility was built with American help, it would be a great setback to the Russians.

4. Bhutto expressed deep gratitude for what the President told the Shah of Iran. He did not in any way want to do anything that would embarrass the President prior to the election in November by asking for aid for their needs, even military needs. But, after November they would like the opportunity to make representations about what their needs were going to be.

Connally

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 267. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.
2. Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Pakistani President Bhutto discussed President Nixon’s trips to China and the Soviet Union. Bhutto pointed to the growing Soviet presence in South Asia and stressed the importance of an offsetting U.S. presence in the area.