U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan, 1972
288. Telegram 4089 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Pakistani President Bhutto discussed President Nixon’s trips to China and the Soviet Union. Bhutto pointed to the growing Soviet presence in South Asia and stressed the importance of an offsetting U.S. presence in the area.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 267. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.
289. Telegram 4090 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Former Treasury Secretary Connally concluded the conversation by offering suggestions on how to promote foreign investment in Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 268. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.
290. Telegram 4091 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Former Treasury Secretary Connally concluded from his conversation with Pakistani President Bhutto that while Bhutto was “enormously upset” with India, he was intelligent and pragmatic enough to move beyond the crisis and rebuild his country without letting bitterness blind him.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/Connally. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as CONTO 269. The time given for the transmission of the telegram is apparently wrong. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.
291. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger summarized reports from India that indicated Indian concerns about the outcome of the Moscow summit and provided evidence of a generally positive Indian reaction to former Treasury Secretary Connally’s visit to India.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Jul 1972-Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy.
292. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported to President Nixon on his trip.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 3, Memoranda for the President, Beginning July 9, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President’s Office in the Western White House.
293. Telegram 9257 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
Ambassador Keating reported a disturbing farewell conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and drew the conclusion that “at the apex of Indian policy there is a nexus of emotional and distorted attitudes concerning the US which cannot help but burden the prospects for improved Indo-American relations.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Exdis. Keating subsequently discussed this conversation with Singh. Singh put the best possible light on the exchange between Gandhi and Keating and concluded that it marked the beginning of a dialogue between India and the United States. (Telegram 9256 from New Delhi, July 25; ibid.)
294. Telegram 9254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
Ambassador Keating reported on his farewell calls on Indian President Giri, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, and Indian Foreign Minister Singh. Keating was given what he described as “the Indian treatment”: “I was first warmed and relaxed by the affable Giri, then rudely pummeled and goaded by the madam, and finally brain-washed by the great rationalizer Swaran Singh.”
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Confidential; Exdis. Keating left his post on July 26. The post remained vacant until Daniel Patrick Moynihan was appointed on February 8, 1973.
295. Telegram 9293 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
The Embassy concluded that India had no current plans to develop nuclear weapons.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71-July 72. Secret; Exdis.
296. Memorandum for the Record
Acting Secretary of State Irwin, Assistant Secretary Sisco, and other interested Department of State officials discussed how best to dissuade India from developing nuclear weapons.
Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 387, Working File’Indian Nuclear Intentions. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted in NEA/INC on August 2 by Dennis Kux. The 42-page draft response to NSSM 156, prepared in NEA/INC on August 4, is ibid. For NSSM 156, see Document 275.
297. Memorandum of Conversation
Acting Secretary of State Irwin and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed the possibility of developing a dialogue to improve relations between the United States and India. Jha sought to explain the negative comments made by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi during Ambassador Keating’s farewell call and argued that if a constructive dialogue were not initiated soon, increasing anti-American sentiment in India might make it difficult to do so.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on August 7 by Kux and cleared in draft by Irwin.
298. Special National Intelligence Estimate 31–72
SNIE 31–72 analyzed Indian nuclear developments and their likely implications.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Treasury, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.
299. Memorandum of Conversation
During his initial call on Secretary of Defense Laird, Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Mohammed Khan brought up the issue of military supplies for Pakistan and the “one-time exception” sale offer of October 1970. Laird indicated that the U.S. was prepared to consider Pakistan’s request but not until later in the year.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 75–0125, Pakistan 1972. Confidential. Drafted on September 5 by Lieutenant Colonel Gross and approved by Nutter. The conversation was held in Secretary Laird’s office.
300. Response to National Security Study Memorandum 156
In response to NSSM 156, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia assessed India’s nuclear capabilities and intentions and U.S. options for influencing India on the issue.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 77–0094, India, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The paper was circulated on September 26 to the CIA, the JCS, and the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury by Jeanne Davis, Staff Secretary of the NSC, under cover of a memorandum indicating that the paper would be considered by the Senior Review Group at a time to be determined. Copies were also sent to the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (Ibid) The paper was prepared by an ad hoc group representing State, Defense, CIA, AEC, and ACDA, headed by Sisco, as chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The annexes cited in the paper were attached but are not published. The footnotes in the paper occur in the source text. For NSSM 156, see Document 275.
301. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Nixon approved Kissinger’s recommendation that he defer a decision on a Pakistani request for the release of a limited amount of military equipment owned by Pakistan but still in the U.S. as a result of the embargo on military shipments to India and Pakistan.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, July 1972–Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A notation at the end of the memorandum indicates that Caspar Weinberger and William Timmons, the President’s Assistant for Congressional Relations, endorsed Kissinger’s recommendation. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation.
302. Telegram 7547 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Pakistani President Bhutto explained to Chargé Sober why Pakistan had not recognized Bangladesh by August as had been anticipated in the Simla agreement.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, London, New Delhi, USUN, Karachi, and Lahore.
303. Memorandum of Conversation
The President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha agreed that it was time to begin taking measures to normalize relations between the U.S. and India but recognized that not much of consequence could be done until after the presidential election in November.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, 21 May 1971–21 Dec 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. I. G. Patel was the Special Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Finance.
304. Telegram 3739 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State
In a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister Singh at the UN, Secretary Rogers took sharp exception to allegations reportedly made by Prime Minister Gandhi that the CIA was interfering in India’s internal affairs.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Also designated as Secto 70. Repeated to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Dacca. The allegations made by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to which Rogers referred were reported on October 3 in telegram 1577 from Calcutta. In a speech before Congress Party workers, Gandhi stated that she had information that the CIA had become active in India and she asked party workers to be vigilant and counteract its activities. (Ibid., POL INDIA–US)
305. Telegram 8436 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Chargé Sober recommended approval of a Pakistani request for 400,000 tons of wheat under PL—480 to offset the effects of a drought. Sober noted Pakistani President Bhutto’s urgent interest in the request.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Pakistan made the case for additional PL–480 supplies in an aide-mémoire submitted to the U.S. Embassy on October 3. According to the aide-mémoire, the wheat harvest in Pakistan had suffered from drought and unless the requested supplies were provided by the United States, the Government would be confronted with sharp rises in politically sensitive wheat prices. (Telegram 8317 from Islamabad, October 6; ibid.)
306. Telegram 8648 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State
Chargé Sober reported that Pakistani President Bhutto urgently repeated his request for 400,000 tons of PL–480 wheat.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Sent with instructions to pass to Agriculture, AID, the Treasury, and the White House.
307. Memorandum of Conversation
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig met with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Iftikhar Ali to discuss Pakistan’s intentions with regard to Bangladesh and the state of Pakistan’s relations with India. National Security Council staff member Harold Saunders, who attended the meeting, explained the basis for the pending U.S. response to Pakistan’s request for wheat.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. The memorandum bears Saunders’ typed signature. The meeting was held in Haig’s office in the White House.
308. Memorandum From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, and Nepal (Schneider) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)
At Sisco’s request, Schneider listed U.S. programs in India that had been curtailed by the Indian Government since December 1971.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/INC by Donald W. Born. Sent through Armin H. Meyer, who was assigned to NEA as a special consultant after returning to the Department following 3 years as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. He had previously been Ambassador to Lebanon and Iran.
309. Telegram 13259 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State
The Embassy reported on continuing allegations of CIA activities in India.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Sent as a joint Embassy/USIS message. Repeated to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, Moscow, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.
310. Telegram 201141 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India
The U.S. agreed to participate with the other members of the India Consortium in restructuring India’s foreign debt.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 9 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted on November 3 by Schneider; cleared in the Office of International Finance and Development of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs by John Gervers, and in the Office of Planning and Development of AID’s Bureau for Asia by Alfred D. White; and approved by Meyer.
311. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
In apparent response to what he found to be a disappointing decision by the U.S. on his request for PL–480 wheat, Pakistani President Bhutto decided to recognize the Governments of North Korea and North Vietnam, and was considering recognition of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia. He also withdrew Pakistan from SEATO.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action. Hoskinson initialed for Saunders. Telegram 9038 from Islamabad, November 8, reported that Pakistan had recognized North Korea and North Vietnam and was considering recognition of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia. (Ibid.) Kissinger checked the approval line. A handwritten notation in the margin next to the approval line, in Richard Kennedy’s hand, reads: “Kennedy to call in Amb Khan per telcon with HAK 11/9/72.”
312. Memorandum of Conversation
NSC staff members Kennedy and Saunders called in Pakistani Ambassador Khan to discuss Pakistan’s decision to recognize North Vietnam and North Korea. Kennedy said the decision came at a sensitive time in U.S. negotiations with North Vietnam and might create problems with the Congress in seeking support for renewed arms supplies for Pakistan. He asked that U.S. interests be taken into account in the decision to recognize the Sihanouk Government.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.
313. Telegram 207769 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India
Deputy Secretary Irwin and Indian Foreign Secretary-designate Kewal Singh discussed prospects for improved relations between the U.S. and India.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Kux on November 13, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, USUN, Bonn, Kathmandu, and Colombo.
314. Letter From Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Nixon
Gandhi responded in kind to a letter from Nixon expressing his desire for improved relations.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Gandhi sent Nixon a message of congratulations following his reelection. Nixon responded on November 19 with a letter to Gandhi in which he looked toward improved relations between the U.S. and India: “I hope our two countries can develop a sounder relationship based on understanding and respect for mutual interests.” (Ibid., Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, India (1972)) Gandhi’s letter of November 28 was delivered to the White House by the Indian Embassy on December 5. The text was transmitted to New Delhi on December 6 in telegram 220565. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US)
315. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders assessed the state of relations between the U.S. and Pakistan.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger highlighted the first of the paragraphs dealing with arms supply and underlined the first three sentences of the paragraph.
316. Memorandum of Conversation
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Khan reviewed a number of issues bearing on relations between the United States and Pakistan.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, 13 Sept 1971–7 Mar 1973. Confidential. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House. Tabs A–C were attached but not published.
317. Telegram 217378 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan
Guidance from the Department of State to the Embassies in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh stipulated that negotiations relating to a peace settlement in South Asia should be left to the countries directly involved, without U.S. mediation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Schneider and Meyer, and in IO/UNP by John Kimball; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to New Delhi and Dacca. Repeated to London, Kabul, Tehran, Ankara, Colombo, and USUN.