Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

293. Telegram 9257 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹ ²

New Delhi, July 24, 1972, 1815Z

Subject:

• Farewell Call on Prime Minister: Indo-American Relations.

Ref:

• New Delhi 9254

1. Summary: I met with Prime Minister Gandhi July 24 for half-hour farewell call which turned out to be a profoundly disturbing reminder that at the apex of Indian policy there is a nexus of emotional and distorted attitudes concerning the US which cannot help but burden the prospects for improved Indo-American relations. Among the catalogue of categorical allegations made by the Prime Minister were: (a) qte everything the US does is against India unqte; (b) the US is trying to drive a wedge between India and Bangladeshi; (c) qte the US is working against us in India, too unqte; (d) we have qte proof unqte that the US is cooperating with communist extremists against us; (e) qte I don’t doubt that you probably think so, but you wouldn’t know the facts unqte; (f) qte a lot of American professors have been engaging in improper activities injurious to india unqte; (g) qte it is immaterial to us whether you want to do business with us or not unqte; (h) qte you are against India in the monetary field unqte; (i) qte it doesn’t matter in the least to us what the US does about debt relief or aid. India will survive and progress with or without help from the US unqte. Incredible! My successor has an even tougher task ahead than I anticipated. End summary.

2. Shortly after arrival at the Prime Minister’s outer office, Siddhartha Ray, former Union Minister of Education, now West Bengal Chief Minister, emerged from the Prime Minister’s office with what I perceived as a scowl on his face, but when he observed me, brightened up, greeted me most cordially and said he had missed seeing me for a long time. I expressed my congratulations over improvements in Calcutta since he had taken over as Chief Minister. Shortly thereafter Mrs. Gandhi rang, and I was ushered in. Since it was a farewell courtesy call, I was without a note-taker, but she had her amanuensis on hand, who scribbled furiously during our entire interview.

3. As I entered I observed that she looked tired, unhappy, or preoccupied, but she greeted me with a smile which was reciprocated (the last on either side during the entire interview). Her opening gambit was, qte so, you’re going off to campaign for the President I understand? Qte yes, and you as a genuine campaigner would know my feelings of anticipation unqte. I said that I wanted to pay my respects and to thank her for her many personal courtesies and kindnesses to which she responded that she and her Minister held me underline personally end underline in high regard. Her emphasis caused me to express the wish that this regard could be reflected in her and their feelings for my country, because that was vastly more important to me than their feelings about me, much as I appreciated them. She said it was impossible to forget the anti-Indian stance constantly taken by the US. I said I regretted deeply that Indo-American relations were very bad compared to what they had been during my first year and a half here and to what they should be. I said our differences in perception of, and response to, the South Asian crisis are of course well-known and have had unfortunate psychological and other effects on both sides which will take time, understanding and effort to overcome.

4. I told the Prime Minister that it seemed to me there were no direct conflicts of interest between the US and India, e.g., territorial, commercial, military or even ideological. I pointed out that in the US a majority of the people felt that a competitive free enterprise system was economically the best for us. In India the majority of the people felt that the Indian form of socialism is best. We certainly recognize that each sovereign nation must determine for itself what economic system it will follow and that conditions are different in various countries. In any event, we had good relations with other countries whose economy followed a socialistic pattern of one kind or another, and that should be no bar to our good relations with India. She replied, qte if you can have good relations with China you ought to be able to have good relations with India unqte.

5. Mrs. Gandhi then volunteered the astonishing observation that qte everything the US does is against India unqte. Endeavoring to submerge my indignation at her bald statement, I said I would certainly appreciate it if she would cite chapter and verse to substantiate such a sweeping allegation, adding that it seemed to me that the US action over the years in extending aid to India amounting $10 billion of which 20 percent was in outright grants and the rest in loans on very favorable terms, did not impress me as qte anti-Indian unqte. This was the largest amount of aid we had given to any country and more aid than had been extended to India by all other countries combined. Likewise, US participation in helping India bear the huge burden of caring for refugees pouring into India during the South Asian crisis, with the US contributing the largest amount, except for India, given by any country, could scarcely be called qte anti-Indian unqte. Moreover, our present aid to Bangladesh to help that country get on its feet economically seemed to me to coincide with India’s interest in seeking to assure an economically viable neighbor and one in which extremist elements hostile to India could not flourish, was not qte anti-Indian unqte. I assured her that it was certainly not the policy of my government to be qte anti-Indian unqte, and I regretted deeply that she had any such feeling, her rejoinder was, qte well, that’s the way I feel and I have reasons for my feeling unqte.

6. I told Mrs. Gandhi that I felt that her harsh feelings about the US stemmed from distorted information brought to her by those who preferred to see even further deterioration in Indo-US relations and therefore had a sinister motive. In this connection, I said I had read in certain segments of the Indian press fantastic stories that extensive US aid to Bangladesh was being given in order to alienate Bangladesh from India, and that US agents were active there to drive a wedge between India and Bangladesh. She said “those aren’t fantastic stories at all, they are the truth and what is more, that is just what the leaders in Bangladesh think unqte. My answer to her was, qte Madam Prime Minister, you astound me. What possible motive could the US have for engaging in any such operation? We have no objectives commercial, military, territorial or otherwise in Bangladesh, nor in India for that matter. We seek no gain of any kind except to see stability established, which seems to us desirable for all South Asia, just as stability in India and Pakistan is desirable not only for South Asia but for the entire world, including the US unqte.

7. The Prime Minister replied, qte the US is working against us in India, too unqte. I said I had also read stories in the India press to the effect that we were cooperating with the CPM to undermine her and her party. I asked what could the US possibly have in common with the left extremists who make up the CPM? She replied, qte well, we have proof of that too unqte. I said I would be most appreciative if she would furnish any proof to that effect and I and my government would immediately look into it and put a stop to it if there was any such thing going on which I could not believe was the fact. Then she resorted to generalities in characteristic fashion as she had in a similar conversation with Secretary Rogers in New York in October 1970 (State 175720) saying, qte well, it may not be proof that would stand up in court, but we have ways of knowing what is going on. You cannot prove that is not so unqte. To which I replied, qte it is practically impossible to prove such a negative proposition in court, it is the established practice that those who make some allegations submit some proof in the first instance beyond mere suspicion unqte. To which she replied, qte this is not suspicion; we know what is going on unqte. I said, qte apparently your mind is closed on this subject. I am very sorry you feel the way you do. Just let me say that I and my government recognize you and your party as the undisputed leaders of India. Your opposition on the right has been virtually wiped out, and the US has nothing in common with your opposition on the left. I am afraid you are being tragically misled by talebearers with ulterior designs. All I can say is that I can assure you that the allegations you have made are false unqte. To which she replied, qte I don’t doubt that you probably think so, but you don’t know the facts unqte. My answer, qte I believe I know what my mission and government are doing and have been doing in India unqte.

8. Despite an inclination to walk out, I thought it best to pursue two other subjects. I expressed deep regret over what I perceived to be signs that India wished to reduce or restrict people-to-people contacts with the US and reduce scholarly exchange which had been the product of many years of working together in the intellectual communities of both nations. I pointed out that US professors and scholars, many of them longtime friends of India, now found their visas held up. I inquired if this was a matter of official policy, bureaucratic caution or simply anti-American feeling. She answered, qte a lot of these professors have been engaging in improper activities here injurious to India unqte. There then ensued the same go-around on my part to try to get her to be specific. I pressed her for details as to what she meant, but nothing was forthcoming except the repeated remark, qte I know the facts—we have our sources unqte.

9. I told Mrs. Gandhi that many businessmen in the US and American business in India are concerned that there is some official Indian bias against American investment and US imports. I referred to her remark to Secretary Connally made in my presence that there was no official Indian policy against foreign investment in India. I said I hoped American business could be assured of non-discriminatory treatment. She answered, qte it is immaterial to us whether you want to do business with us or not unqte. I pointed out that the US had set up in the aid mission a special section known as the USAID export promotion program and that its sole function was to help India to increase exports, and that Indian commercial exports to the US are currently at a record high figure. I also called her attention to the fact that just last week the US Export-Import Bank had authorized a $2.7 million grant to Hindustan Aluminum Corporation, which I realized was a private sector company but with only a 26 percent US interest and largely owned and controlled by India interests. I said it seemed to me that these facts and many others could be cited which demonstrated that the US had an interest in the prosperity and wellbeing of India.

10. Mrs. Gandhi said, qte you are against India in the monetary field unqte. I asked what she meant. She said, qte oh, there was some meeting lately where you were the only country against us unqte. Comment: She only had a vague idea of what she was talking about end comment. I inquired whether she was referring to the consortium meeting in Paris on the subject of debt relief and she said, qte yes, that’s it. All countries except the US went along with us. We had people there—I got it straight from them and from other countries that were there unqte. Thereupon, I explained how the US had indicated its willingness to go along just as it had in the past with the same formula for debt relief, with hard lenders like Japan and France taking a larger percetage of the debt extension than soft lenders such as the US. I said it was apparently not possible to arrange with the other countries for an extension beyond $100 million, but that I felt certain the US interest was in the formula which seemed fair rather than in the total amount of debt relief. I said I suspected if India were in position of the US as a soft lender, it would feel the same way. Her answer, qte oh, well, I know what happened—we had our people there, and other countries tell me the same thing which our people told me unqte. Obviously my analysis got nowhere either because she did not understand it or did not want to understand it, or both.

11. Comment: The interview reminded me very much of the talk Secretary Rogers had with the Prime Minister in New York in 1970, although she has become much more acerbic with time. Clearly she has a very big chip on her shoulder. she said, qte it doesn’t matter in the least to us what the US does about debt relief or aid. India will survive and progress with or without help from the US unqte. Throughout, her manner was arrogantly confident, ready to believe the worst about the US, closed to any explanation and thoroughly obnoxious. For example, after initial pleasantries when I started to talk seriously, she commenced the annoying practice of repeatedly putting her glasses on and off, scribbling notes, pressing buttons and talking to the flunkies summoned, and making telephone calls, in Hindi. With each interruption, I paused in conversation, then I continued, repeatedly. I have seen her go through this routine before with others, either to indicate lack of interest in the conversation or to display how busy she is or to set her guest on edge. In the Western world, we would call it rudeness. With considerable difficulty I believe I kept my rise in temper concealed.

12. The Prime Minister said she wished me well personally, again with a strong accent on the last word, we shook hands, and I departed.

Keating

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA-US. Secret; Exdis. Keating subsequently discussed this conversation with Singh. Singh put the best possible light on the exchange between Gandhi and Keating and concluded that it marked the beginning of a dialogue between India and the United States. (Telegram 9256 from New Delhi, July 25; ibid.)
2. Ambassador Keating reported a disturbing farewell conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and drew the conclusion that “at the apex of Indian policy there is a nexus of emotional and distorted attitudes concerning the US which cannot help but burden the prospects for improved Indo-American relations.”