Office of the Historian

32. Telegram 23 From the Embassy in Senegal to the Department of State1 2

Dakar, January 3, 1976, 1539Z

Subject:

  • Probable OAU CM Summit Scenario

For Secretary from Asst Secretary Schaufele

1.
The attitude which Onu has displayed in his talk with Embassy is perfect demonstration of what has nearly always in the past led the African moderates to allow themselves to be steamrollered by a militant minority.
2.
One of the things I am pushing strongly on this trip is exactly that point. In the past the minority has been able to turn itself into a majority by bullying, intimidating, calling names and simply by hanging in there until the end. On this issue, perhaps the most important the OAU has faced since the Congo crisis of 1964–65, it is the moderates which must stand fast.
3.
According to GOIC FonMin Usher there is a provision for the adoption of OAU resolutions by a two-thirds majority, but in a question of this importance there will be a great pressure to achieve unanimity or a consensus. The militant minority has generally been successful by invoking the threat to African unity. This is a threat that cuts both ways and can be used by those which have not recognized the MPLA, whether they [Page 2] constitute a majority or not. Their adversaries in this matter, both African and non-African, are trying to create exactly the psychological climate to which Onu may have fallen prey.
4.
It is also characteristic of this attitude to describe any US initiative as being counterproductive because, as in this case, the countries which I visit will be vulnerable to charges that they have succumbed to US pressure. The same thing, if done by others, seldom seems to draw a similar reaction. The fact remains that although US honestly supports an African solution to an African problem in Angola, the issue has been internationalized not only because of Soviet intervention but also because the Africans themselves were unable or unwilling to bring concerted pressure on Soviets and Cubans at a time when the latters’ stake in this enterprise was small enough to permit a graceful withdrawal and even win some credit in Africa.
5.
I see no reason that countries which I visited should be defensive on this score. They are aware of all the kinds of pressure which have been brought to bear by Soviets, Algerians and others, not only on them but on other African countries.
6.
For Embassy Addis contacts with moderate African representatives to OAU meeting I suggest following talking points:
A.
Given the composition of the pro-MPLA group it can be expected that it will adopt a seemingly uncompromising attitude, utilizing the full bag of psychological tricks, including variation of Onu statement such as “the OAU is going to recognize the MPLA and you wouldn’t want to be left behind.”
B.
Undoubtedly appeal will be made that greater goal of OAU unity should not be endangered by resisting this “swing to the MPLA.” Fact is that if OAU lets itself be steamrollered the future viability of OAU as forum for solutions to African problems will be seriously weakened for some time to come.
C.
Pro-MPLA groups have already undermined OAU unity by departing from OAU call for non-recognition of any group. Therefore it is this group which has taken the first step toward destroying OAU unity.
D.

As moderate states have learned, at least in a few cases, if they pull together, coordinate their efforts and clearly demonstrate that they are willing to go right down to the wire they will find that others will back off. Chiefs of State I have talked to agree and Senghor threatens, if necessary, to recognize FNLA/UNITA government.

E.
In sum everything should be done to assure that such delegates not become infected by “inevitability” argument which, in past has enabled militant minority to go home with the marbles.
Aggrey
  1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 5, Senegal, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE—Exdis. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Niact Immediate to Addis Ababa.↩
  2. Assistant Secretary Schaufele, traveling in Senegal, responded to Telegram 31 from Addis Ababa (Document 31), by explaining how African moderates had allowed themselves to be steamrolled by a militant minority.↩