Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–6, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976

33. Intelligence Appraisal DIAIAPPR 4–76 Prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency¹ ²

Washington, January 9, 1976

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (U)

Summary

(S/NOFORN) During 1975, there has been a shift toward greater Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. The USSR has developed naval and air facilities in Somalia and has continued deployments of naval reconnaissance aircraft to Guinea. A substantial shipment of arms and military equipment to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola has also demonstrated an increasing Soviet resolve and willingness to support their clients and to pursue objectives in the area. Overall, Moscow has demonstrated an alertness to the opportunities for extended influence and currently providing military aid in some form to 17 Black African countries. This effort, which is being continued at a relatively low cost to the USSR, has met some success.

(S/NOFORN) Past Soviet efforts have often been marked by insensitivity and ineptitude, but their recent activity reflects greater professionalism, a sense of urgency, and an increased military presence. Although the shor-term outlook appears favorable to the USSR, newly independent African states are wary of foreign domination, and Moscow will very likely suffer some setbacks as it seeks greater influence in the highly nationalistic environment of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Discussion

(C) Current Soviet military involvement in Africa is the outgrowth of Moscow’s long-range policy of using military assistance to gain military, political, and economic objectives in the region. These include access to strategic military facilities, an increase in Soviet political influence to the detriment of China and the West, and access to raw materials, Furthermore, these goals are being met with some success at a relatively low cost in terms of Soviet money, materiel, and manpower.

(S/NOFORN) At the present time, the Soviets are providing military assistance in some form to 17 sub-Saharan countries (figure 1). More than $340 million worth of military hardware has been delivered to these countries since January 1974 (figure 2). In addition, more than 2,000 Soviet military advisors are located in Black African countries (figure 3). Cuba, the USSR’s ally and surrogate, also has 7,900 advisors and troops in Black Africa, mainly in the Angolan area.

(S/NOFORN) Sino-Soviet competition also provides additional rationale for the growing Soviet presence in sub-Saharan Africa. The People’s Republic of China is currently providing military equipment and training assistance to 14 nations (figure 1). Nearly 1,000 Chinese military advisors are in sub-Saharan countries, and $28 million in military hardware has been delivered there since January 1974.

(S/NOFORN) A comparison of Soviet and Chinese military aid programs for 1974—the most recent year with complete data—shows the USSR to be clearly the leader in military assistance, but the Chinese lead the Soviets in economic aid. In comparison to total Soviet aid to less developed nations, last year’s assistance to sub-Saharan Africa was at small cost to Moscow. Military deliveries there were less than five percent of Moscow’s total military assistance to all less developed nations in 1974. However, the Soviet effort in Angola will substantially increase Moscow’s military assistance to Black Africa; Peking’s aid to Angola has been minimal.

(S/NOFORN) Soviet economic and military involvement in sub-Saharan Africa focuses on three countries -Guinea, Somalia, and Angola. Guinea is the recipient of Moscow’s largest economic aid program in the region, a $92 million bauxite project. An estimated 110 Soviet military advisors are currently in this West African country, and $48 million in arms have been delivered since 1960.

(S/NOFORN) The USSR has been accorded certain military privileges in Guinea in return for its assistance. Since the summer of 1973 the Soviets have made repeated deployments of TU-95/BEAR D naval reconnaissance aircraft, consisting of two aircraft each, to the Conakry airfield. This has provided tenuous naval presence near the port or Conakry.

(S/NOFORN) In East Africa, Somalia is the main center of Soviet activity. This country, which has received $165 million in military equipment since 1961, is Moscow’s single largest military investment in sub-Saharan Africa. Soviet military advisors have increased from 300 in 1972 to the current number of 1,000 in 1974. The USSR is continuing the development of facilities in the Berbera area for both Somali and Soviet use, and Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft operating from Somali airfields, including the one under construction at Berbera, give Moscow the potential to cover the entire Indian Ocean area. Substantial Soviet military assistance to Uganda and recent initiatives in Tanzania have also enhanced Moscow’s presence in East Africa.

(S/NOFORN) In Southern Africa, the USSR is actively supporting Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) forces in the Angolan civil war. As a part of this effort, some 44 Soviet flights involving both civil and military aircraft have taken place since 1 November. Additionally, at least nine Soviet ships have delivered substantial quantities of arms and equipment to Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo, as well as Luanda since Angola drifted into independence on 11 November.

(S/NOFORN) Soviet political and military support for the MPLA’s bid for power and the introduction of an estimated 7,500 Cuban personnel is unprecedented in modern African history. Moscow apparently considers the benefits to be well worth the danger inherent in its open involvement. Soviet presence and influence in Angola would not only permit the USSR to threaten vital lines of communication and gain access to a wealth of natural resources but would also establish a base for Soviet subversion, which would present a clear danger to the remaining white minority regimes in southern Africa. Use of Angolan facilities would enhance Moscow’s strategic position and project a Soviet presence into the South Atlantic.

(C) Soviet involvement in sub-Saharan Africa has not been a complete success. Soviet activities have frequently been marked by insensitive treatment of Africans both on the continent and in the USSR, a preoccupation with Chinese penetration, small and inefficient aid programs, and inept clandestine ventures. The Soviets have often projected a negative image that continues to cause several major African leaders to distrust their motives. Moscow is somewhat aware of these failings, and its recent activities have reflected greater professionalism, a sense of urgency, and a growing military presence. In the words of President Nyerere of Tanzania, “the second scramble for Africa is-under way.”

Outlook

(C) While the Soviets appear to have gained some short-term advantages, African states have traditionally turned against foreign powers seeking influence no matter how attractive their aid programs. In the highly nationalistic environment of sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviets will very likely continue to suffer some setbacks. Angola is undoubtedly a test case that could determine future Soviet policy in Africa and to other areas of the Third World. (XGDS-2 Declassify upon notification of originator)

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 330–79–0049, Box 64, Africa 1976. Secret; Noforn.
2. The Appraisal described growing Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa during 1975, but predicted that Moscow would suffer setbacks among newly independent nations wary of foreign domination.