31. Telegram 31 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Angola: Probable OAU CM Summit Scenario
Ref:
- Addis 13212 Para Six
Dakar for Asst Secretary Shaufele
1. OAU A/SecGen Peter Onu and Egyptian Amb Bassiouny agree—and we think they represent wide consensus—that upcoming OAU CM Summit meetings on Angola likely to be confronted with near-majority or even majority of member-govts who have/will recognize MPLA regime. Following are views, from them and others, on Angola and OAU.
2. Most likely scenario for meetings will be recognition of MPLA as hopefully “major” but perhaps sole faction in Govt of Angola. such recognition would be combined with OAU pressures on MPLA to accept “clearn personalities” linked to FNLA and UNITA within MPLA regime (cf reftel).
3. USG public statements condemning South African as well as USSR and Cuban intervention in Angola have not rpt not made appreciable difference in previous view of many Africans that USG and SAG are in de facto collusion, if only because both support opponents of MPLA regime.
4. Onu told us Jan 2 that statement attributed to A/Secy Schaufele in Cameroon condemning MPLA recognition was “unfortunate”, in light of circumstances described above. Onu added that in his view Schaufele’s mission to selected African countries would prove counterproductive; govts of these countries would be handicapped at OAU CM Summit by suspicions of other participants that positions taken by these govts “influenced” by the U.S.
5. African perception of Cubans in Angola is strongly conditioned by previous Cuban behavior (in Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere), where Cubans departed promptly when no longer needed. Many Africans feel that future Soviet presence, while not as easy to dislodge as Cubans, can also be managed because “Africans have long experience in doing so.”
6. Alternative outcome of OAU Summit only conceivable if dominant South African facet of problem is dramatically transformed. For example, withdrawal of South African forces from Angola would deeply undercut rationale put forward by MPLA for its reliance on Soviet/Cuban military presence and support.
7. Comment: All this has the ring of truth to us. On point (para 2) above, it is easy to see that OAU, prizing unity (or minimizing disunity) above all, would seek least divisive course. Conviction has been growing that majority of OAU will inevitably recognize MPLA, and therefore there is strong temptation to ride with the inevitable, mollifying the anti-MPLA minority with promises of some form of coalition govt. Additional factor we are hearing about is that OAU desperately needs some organizational foothold in Angola through which to work, and continued non-recognition of all factions would deprive OAU of ability to influence events. Given nature of dilemmas facing OAU member states, Embassy believes that this logic, whatever its shortcomings, is all to persuasive to Africans. We will seek more OAU views and report.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy Files, 1976. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated Immediate to Dakar.↩
- Ambassador Hummel reported on Acting OAU Secretary General Peter Onu’s view that despite U.S. statements against outside intervention in Angola, Africans still believed the U.S. and South Africa were in de facto collusion. Onu concluded that Assistant Secretary of State William E. Schaufele Jr.’s mission to Africa was therefore counterproductive.↩