Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

57. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY AND ISSUES PAPER

NSSM 110—Indian Ocean Follow-On Study

Introduction

NSSM 110² directed an Ad Hoc Group chaired by State to prepare a follow-on study filling in the broad political context necessary for judgment on possible U.S. responses (including the naval options presented in the NSSM 104 Study)³ to increased Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean. The NSSM 110 Study⁴ assesses Soviet objectives and the political implications of Soviet naval activity, Chinese involvement, and U.S. interests and the threats to them. On the basis of this material, the Study offers two basic options: (1) a decision to explore the feasibility of a U.S. arms limitation initiative for the region, or (2) a decision to move ahead now with some form of naval response to Soviet activities.

This paper sets forth the Study’s principal findings; our views are indicated within brackets.

The Criteria For Choice of a U.S. Indian Ocean Posture

[The basic problem with this Study, as with its predecessor, is the difficulty of identifying useful criteria for choosing between different naval options, or between naval and other means to enhance our interests. Both Studies argue for a low to moderate level of Soviet threat and U.S. interest, stressing that since the region is not of central strategic concern to either power, the key variable is local stability. The littoral’s fragmented character and the lack of unifying strategic issues complicate our decision. The key criteria are discussed below.]

1. Soviet Objectives in the Indian Ocean

[The key issue here is: Should we view increased Soviet naval activities in the region as an integral part of a global naval challenge?]

The Study notes a variety of motives for Soviet naval actions:

• —The desire to enhance their space, oceanographic, intelligence, and ASW capabilities (the latter probably directed against possible U.S. deployment of SSBN’s to the area).
• —The U.K.’s continuing disengagement from the region with the prospect of uncertainty and possible instability providing opportunities for political gains at low risk.
• —The desire to underline Soviet achievement of parity with the U.S. beyond the strategic nuclear sphere, thereby offsetting previous U.S. supremacy in worldwide conventional capability and bolstering Soviet diplomatic efforts in littoral states.

[—Another factor, not discussed in the Study, is that Soviet Indian Ocean policy may reflect internal debate (including inter-Service rivalry) within the Soviet decision-making group.]

On balance, the Study argues that the Indian Ocean will rank ahead of Africa and Latin America, but well behind the countries on their periphery and the Middle East in the Soviet order of priorities over the next five years. Soviet policy will be one of “cautious opportunism,” but the “political use of naval forces” will increase. The Study doubts that the Soviets are seriously concerned that the Indian Ocean might become the theatre of U.S.-Soviet or Sino-Soviet hostilities.

The analysis explicitly recognizes the parallel with Soviet naval policy in the Mediterranean. However, it notes that the USSR may confront local resistance in attempting to translate naval presence into the degree of influence it has achieved with the radical Arabs.

In sum, the Study reflects consensus that Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean “represents a departure from the traditional missions of the Soviet navy” and that this effort to project influence “is having an impact in countries where it was unimportant a few years ago.” Despite uncertainties in evaluating Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean, there is consensus that some form of Western (including U.S.) naval presence or, alternatively, some type of arms limitation arrangement, is required.

2. Chinese Involvement

The Study takes the position that PRC interests in the Indian Ocean littoral have no common denominator, apart from a general desire to counter U.S. and Soviet influence. Chinese concern over Soviet naval deployments reflects sensitivity to Soviet influence along its southern border rather than a sense of direct military threat.

Should the Chinese decide to undertake missile testing in the Indian Ocean, they would almost certainly seek support and monitoring facilities, perhaps in such littoral states as Tanzania and Pakistan.

[In the long run, the Chinese may perceive a need for a presence of their own as a badge of great power status, particularly if the U.S. and the USSR have a permanent presence in the area.]

3. U.S. Interests and the Threat to Them

The NSSM 110 analysis follows closely the predecessor Study, arguing that our interests—oil flows and investment, intelligence and communications assets, political influence, security commitments, and access and transit—are of moderate importance and face a moderate level of threat. The likelihood of a direct Soviet physical threat to U.S. interests is heavily discounted, though indirect Soviet political leverage flowing from naval and other programs could support local pressures against U.S. interests. On balance, the Study takes the view that the primary threat to our interests will come from the states of the area, and that the root of the problem is the low level of economic development and political stability in much of the region.

[The judgment that our interests in the region face a relatively low level of threat rests on the premise that we share more common interests and commitments with the littoral states than do China and the USSR. The corollary is that “our best hedge against an excess of Soviet influence in the area is the good sense and rather abrasive nationalism” of the littoral states.]

[It can, of course, be argued that the Soviet-radical Arab pattern of alignment could be duplicated elsewhere along the littoral as the fruit of local tensions in such areas as the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, or Southern Africa. This possibility buttresses the view that we should not adopt a unilateral self-denying ordinance. On the other hand, highly visible deployments of U.S. power along the littoral would not necessarily enhance local stability, and could actually spawn future alignments between the USSR and local nationalism. Hence, we need to steer a middle course which gives the Soviets neither a completely free ride nor the high moral ground of siding with littoral state sensitivities to gunboat diplomacy.]

4. The British Factor

[The key issue is: What is the nature of the linkage between U.S. and U.K. policy in the region? The NSSM 110 Study does not address this question, apart from noting that even implied support for the U.K. decision to supply arms to South Africa “will be costly to us in terms of our relations with the Afro-Asian world.” This is a comparatively minor aspect of the problem: there is no question of our publicly opposing the arms deal, nor are we likely to endorse it. The Study recognizes this since none of the options calls for any change in our stance vis-à-vis South Africa or the U.K. arms sales.]

[Far more important is the fact that our Indian Ocean reviews were generated, in substantial measure, by the talks between Heath and the President last October.⁵ Both NSSM’s assumed a linkage of some sort between what we do and what the British do. In general, the naval options offered by the NSSM 104 Study posited increasing levels of U.S.–U.K. cooperation and of U.K. naval effort as the U.S. increased its naval deployments and activities.]

[This may not be an especially useful way to approach the problem. The British have not suggested that their continued presence in the area is contingent upon any particular level of U.S. effort, nor that they would increase their presence if we increased ours. Their stance is based on two assumptions:

• —That a continued U.K. presence, even if only symbolic or intermittent, could enhance local stability and British interests in such areas as Singapore–Malaysia and the Persian Gulf.
• —That Britain’s (and Europe’s) substantial interests should not go unrepresented in a region of growing interest to the Soviets.

[In addition, East of Suez deployments coincide with factors of sentiment and continuity almost irresistible to a Tory Government, despite the constant reorientation toward Europe.]

[On the other hand, the British are most unlikely to increase their Indian Ocean presence, regardless of our posture. They are currently in the process of reducing considerably the nearly 40,000 men and 16 combatant ships they support East of Suez. Rather, it is a matter of holding on at reduced levels instead of withdrawing virtually everything as envisaged by Labor.]

[What the British appear to seek is a general U.S. endorsement for their view of the strategic problem and for the relevance of U.K. efforts there. Such an endorsement, even if confined to low-key recognition of increased Soviet activities and to modest collaborative projects as in BIOT, would lend credibility to a U.K. posture rooted historically in the colonial era. Given the broad congruence of U.S. and U.K. interests in the region— apart from the South African arms deal—there are advantages in not adopting a disinterested posture which might tend to accelerate an eventual total U.K. withdrawal.]

5. The Political Impact of a Naval Presence

NSSM 110 asked for analysis of the political implications of Soviet naval activity in the area, and of the relevance of a U.S. naval response. The Study argues that “the Soviet naval threat in the Indian Ocean can only be dealt with on a global basis” in the context of worldwide Soviet naval policy, but it also identifies certain political ramifications of the naval effort in littoral states:

• —promotion of an image as a world maritime power with expanding strategic interests and capabilities;
• —establishment of naval aid and training relationships;
• —symbolic sympathy and support for littoral regimes and movements;
• —conditioning of littoral states to Soviet probing and presence in the region.

While the impact of this effort varies considerably in different littoral states and could “arouse latent fears of a new Soviet imperialism,” it is ultimately aimed at establishing a position to deter or neutralize Western activities and influence.

The Study judges, however, that other Soviet actions—arms supply, training, economic aid, political moves—have a greater impact on littoral states than Soviet naval activity which is essentially supplemental. Moreover, it argues that U.S. naval presence is a relatively minor tool in enhancing U.S. influence in the region.

But the Study nonetheless concludes that given the Soviet naval initiative, there is a political, though not a military, requirement for some Western presence.

The argument that naval presence translates into political influence is elusive. It seems to boil down to a judgment that gunboat diplomacy is not outmoded in Afro-Asia, even where actual on-scene capabilities and the willingness to use them are minimal. Perhaps the case was best summarized in Ambassador Strausz-Hupé’s recent observation that Western interests will not be best served “if littoral states believe they can count on our absence.”

The Options

The Study explicitly states that, given the moderate level of U.S. interest and Soviet threat, there is little requirement for a significant increase in U.S. presence and programs in the area. Consequently, “there is little absolute difference” between the options it offers. Rather, the issue boils down to a tactical judgment on how best to achieve our objectives of:

• —avoiding U.S.–Soviet military rivalry in the area;
• —inhibiting the growth of Communist influence;
• —keeping open the option to exert military influence if needed; and,
• —maintaining access and good relations in this core region of developing Afro-Asia.

[As indicated above, an additional objective of U.S. policy should be to respond to our British friends in such a way as to enhance the credibility of their role, thereby maximizing its size and duration, while profiting from British assets and experience through periodic consultations and intelligence exchanges. Hence, the options should also be costed in terms of their impact, if any, on British policy.]

The Study presents a choice between a strategy emphasizing limitation of super-power competition and a strategy including an element of naval response to Soviet activities. Hence, the primary issue is whether or not to explore further the arms control option—inside the government, with our allies, and with important regional powers.

1. The Arms Control Option

This option is not spelled out in detail, and would require considerably more interagency study before any decisions were made. The issue here, therefore, is whether this extra effort is worthwhile. It could range from a general unilateral statement of understanding for the concerns of littoral states that the Indian Ocean not become an arena of U.S.-Soviet rivalry to quite detailed scenarios for negotiating limitations on great power military presence in the area.

The Study tentatively judges the former approach more attractive, at least as a first step—we would simply be aligning our posture with that of important regional states and expressing our preparedness to limit our forces if the USSR did likewise. This would place the ball in the Soviet court, demonstrate our good intentions, and leave open our ultimate stance until the Soviets responded. [However, this approach could be dangerous: we would refrain from vague but virtuous initiatives until we know our position on specific potential Soviet counter proposals.]

The Study recognizes the many issues that formulation of a detailed arms control proposal would pose for us: (1) the problem of denuclearization and the possibility that we might want to deploy SSBN’s in the area—this apparently poses no immediate strategic problem, but we might want to keep the option open; (2) the importance of Diego Garcia and what, if anything, we would accept as a quid pro quo for giving it up; (3) the feasibility of securing Chinese adherence, the impact of probable Chinese non-participation, and the need for an escape mechanism if they refuse to participate; and (4) our continuing interest in freedom of naval access and transit worldwide.

However, the argument is that the potential attractiveness of an arms control approach warrants a full in-house study of possible proposals. Such a study now provides us the best opportunity we are likely to have to confirm or refute the apparent attractiveness of the arms control option. If we subsequently decided to go ahead with a proposal, it could lessen U.S. strategic involvement and U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the region, it would align our policy with important regional states (i.e., India), and it could heighten regional resistance to Soviet activity. If the Soviets responded negatively, it would place the onus for subsequent naval rivalry on them. In addition, such an approach would be a unique and striking application of the Nixon Doctrine to the Afro-Asian world. [Finally, an agreement limiting U.S. and Soviet deployments would permit us to pursue our interests through political means, backing up the residual role of Britain and the potentially growing roles of Australia, Japan, and friendly littoral states.]

The major counter-argument is that such a proposal could hand the Soviets and their friends a propaganda field-day if our proposal was so hedged with qualifiers as to appear self-serving. They, for example, could focus on denuclearization or our Diego Garcia facility. Furthermore, an Indian Ocean agreement could generate pressures for similar agreements elsewhere. We have an interest, as the world’s largest naval power, in maintaining the traditional freedom of the seas. An agreement could restrict our role in an unstable zone, thereby encouraging insurgents and discouraging allied and friendly states. [This option could also create an undesirable impression of “bargaining from weakness” in a region of modest but growing Soviet activity.]

[The unknown factor is whether it is possible to design an arms limitation proposal which cannot be turned against us. A related question is whether we should view a proposal as a tactical gambit to place the Soviets in a poor light, or as a serious effort to exclude U.S.-Soviet naval rivalry from the region.]

[The question of timing and tactics was recently highlighted by an approach from Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary Rogers (a cable⁶ on this approach is in your book). Referring to discussion at the recent Georgetown Indian Ocean Conference,⁷ Dobrynin asked “informally” whether we would be interested in a declaration that this area be kept free of major power competition, including “military bases and fleet concentration.” He sought our views—Secretary Rogers was noncommittal— on the grounds that he would be seeing Gromyko during the Soviet party congress starting March 30. Should the Soviets go public with the arms limitation idea, surfaced by several participants at the Georgetown Conference, we would not only lose the initiative but would face the need to respond. This may constitute a compelling reason to order an in-house study now.]

[There is also a bureaucratic problem. The Ad Hoc Group’s efforts surfaced sharp disagreement between representatives of State (pro) and OSD/JCS (con) over whether such an option should even be presented to the SRG, much less explored in depth. If we do want to examine further the possibilities of the arms limitation route, we will need to give study guidelines designed to elicit the full range of agency views. Such a study should evaluate alternative proposals in terms of their impact on (1) U.S. global and regional interests, and (2) allied and friendly policy, particularly those of the U.K. and Japan (the NSSM 110 Study assumes that U.K. forces would not be restricted); and it should assess the salability of various proposals and tactical approaches.]

2. Naval Options

If it is decided not to explore the arms limitation route, we need to consider possible naval responses. The Study concludes that any of Options A through C in the NSSM 104 Study would be appropriate, ranging from continuation of present policy to modest increases in U.S. visibility through qualitative upgrading of MIDEASTFOR, permanent deployment of 2 destroyers in the eastern Indian Ocean, and increased joint U.S.–U.K.–Australian operations. Option D—a higher option calling for homeporting 4 destroyers at Singapore, extensive joint cruises and air surveillance, and improved support facilities—is judged inappropriate in view of the findings of the NSSM for the period up to 1975.

The advantages of one of the relatively low-visibility naval options over the arms limitation approach would be:

• —It would underline our willingness to help our friends resist Soviet encroachments or Soviet-sponsored internal pressures, and demonstrate to all concerned that they cannot count on our absence.
• —It would give us some capability to meet local contingencies (evacuation of nationals, show of force, etc.).
• —It would indicate to the Soviets that they face another arena of politico-military competition if they continue to up the ante.

On the other hand, such a course could complicate our relations with some littoral countries which would accuse us of bringing the cold war to the Indian Ocean, and it could require higher levels of economic and military assistance to regional states. Moreover, any increase in U.S. naval activity could lead to spiralling naval competition in an area of limited U.S. interest. [Finally, we would need to weigh likely Congressional and public reaction to any new military undertakings overseas, regardless of the rationale.]

Apart from the judgment that Option D (of the NSSM 104 Study) is too “high” to be consistent with our interests and the threat to them, the Study does not evaluate the naval options offered by the earlier Study. The NSSM 104 Study assessed Options A through D in terms of:

• —the consistency of each with friendly plans for the area, especially those of the U.K.;
• —the relative presence of U.S. and friendly forces compared with Soviet forces, and possible Soviet reactions;
• —possible reactions from neutral countries;
• —costs and naval force availability.

[In addition, the options should probably be assessed in terms of the local political impact of particular naval deployments, e.g., in the Persian Gulf.]

[A capsule evaluation of each Option is outlined below. For a fuller discussion, turn to the Analytical Summary of the NSSM 104 Study which is in your book.]

Option A. Maintain Current Presence

We would maintain our present activities and assets in the Indian Ocean area, while urging the U.K. to retain a presence at Singapore to strengthen the Five-Power arrangement, and to participate in the use of Diego Garcia.

This Option would not provoke adverse reaction from littoral states or from the USSR, and it requires no increase in U.S. involvement or costs. On the negative side, the absence of any concrete U.S. steps in response to Soviet activities may deny the U.K. the justification it seeks for its residual role in the area, which could cause allied presence to fall below the current Soviet presence. Moreover, even if the U.K. retained its presence, allied presence would fall below the anticipated Soviet presence over the period 1972–75.

Option B. Emphasize Allied Cooperation at Slightly Increased U.S. Force Levels

We would qualitatively upgrade MIDEASTFOR by replacing World War II vintage destroyers with modern ships, and we would conduct combined allied cruises, port visits, training exercises, and maritime surveillance efforts with U.K., Australian, and other friendly forces. We would make increased use of Singapore for logistic support and consider upgrading Diego Garcia’s POL storage capacity.

This Option would not open us to the charge of initiating big power competition and would keep our presence at parity with our allies, while enabling allied presence to roughly match the Soviets in port visits. Costs and force diversions would be minor, and it would not justify Soviet escalation. Disadvantages are that we would still fall below the Soviets in terms of ships and ship days, and that the U.K. may be seeking more substantial evidence of our concern.

Option C. Moderate Increase in U.S. Presence and Operations with Allies

In addition to the above, we would establish a permanent presence in the eastern Indian Ocean by operating two destroyers at Singapore, and we would increase the level of U.S.–U.K.–Australian group operations, conduct cruises of U.S. naval task units, and increase fleet visits.

This Option would enable U.S. and allied presence to remain on a par with the Soviets if they expand as anticipated, and it would provide tangible evidence of our concern, thereby encouraging the U.K. and Australia to maximize their efforts. On the negative side we would be stepping out in front of our allies and we could expect Soviet counter-escalation and strong neutralist reaction. In addition, this Option would divert destroyer and other forces from our fleet capability in the Western Pacific.

Option D. Begin Major U.S. Task Force Deployments, Upgrade Substantially Area Basing, and Increase Cooperation with Allies

In addition to the above, we would homeport four destroyers at Singapore, increase the duration and size of joint cruises, increase air surveillance operations utilizing both U-Tapao and Diego Garcia, upgrade Diego Garcia facilities, and consider construction of an aifield elsewhere in BIOT.

The pros and cons are essentially the same as for Option C except that it could cause more serious reactions from non-aligned littoral states and would entail somewhat higher costs.

Another naval option surfaced by the Study, but not by its predecessor NSSM 104, is the possibility of an intermittent naval presence through a systematic program of visits by more impressive units than those in the 3-ship MIDEASTFOR. This option has some inherent merits not available in options calling for a given level of permanent U.S. presence:

(1) It frees us from the stigma attached to foreign military bases in the nationalist environment of most littoral states. However, Diego Garcia could offer some of this advantage since the political vulnerability of our base would be minimal.

(2) It would probably be cheaper than permanent basing arrangements.

(3) It would upgrade the size and quality of our ships in the area.

(4) Timely visits/exercises could make a greater impact than a permanent presence.

On the negative side, the irregularity of our presence would downgrade our assured capability (currently minimal outside the Persian Gulf); it could be seen as a sign of disinterest and might be equated with withdrawal; it would give us support problems and put our presence on the same footing as the Soviets’.

[Advocates of an intermittent presence would note that we get limited mileage from MIDEASTFOR’s World War II vintage units, essentially a Persian Gulf force. No presence may be preferable to one so easily outclassed by modern Soviet ships, particularly if our interests do not seem to demand a permanent presence. In addition, a permanent force such as MIDEASTFOR could become a questionable asset in an area of potential instability.]

[Others would counter that even MIDEASTFOR pays dividends along the African and Arabian littoral as a familiar symbol of our interest and a form of contact with local peoples. On-scene (or over-the-horizon) naval capabilities are seen to provide inherent leverage, if only for preemptive purposes, in local affairs. Proponents of this view would argue that our naval presence should be designed in terms of concrete circumstances in key parts of the littoral—e.g., Bahrein or Singapore—not by an illusory need to match the Soviets ship-day for ship-day in the Ocean as a whole.]

[Since the Study does not make a case for the urgency of deciding on a naval option, there may be merit in deferring a long-range decision until we’ve explored the arms limitation idea, especially in light of the Soviet approach. As a practical matter, if we are going to have a study of the arms control possibilities, we do not want to move in the interim to measures which clearly suggest a permanent, higher level of U.S. concern and activity. Construction of new facilities (apart from Diego Garcia as planned) and negotiations for new base rights fall into this category.]

[By the same token, however, an interim decision for a relatively low level naval option—e.g., Option A or B or a program of cruises and visits—may be a useful holding device while an arms control study is underway.]

3. Non-Naval Elements of a U.S. Response

The NSSM requested a political framework for a naval response and asked what non-naval activities are potentially useful in countering Soviet influence. The Study notes that each Option would be accompanied by continued economic aid, but it rules out an approach based either solely on aid or solely on a strengthened military presence.

[In theory, it would be desirable to design alternative policy packages including naval, political, and economic aid elements, since naval policy itself is only a small part of both the Soviet and U.S. postures in the area. In practice, a package approach for the whole region is possible only at the highest level of abstraction. For example, if we go the arms control route (after studying it), we would support the views expressed by the non-aligned states at Lusaka and emphasize our desire to avoid superpower competition in the area. An appropriate political rationale for a modest naval option would stress our concern at Soviet activities and our inability to unilaterally refrain from naval activity.]

[The basic problem with designing policy packages for the Indian Ocean is that we tend, like other powers, to focus on its subregions rather than the area as a whole. Aid levels and bilateral political relations are set in conjunction with our priorities in East Africa, South Asia, or the Persian Gulf rather than in terms of Ocean-wide criteria. Naval policy is probably the only area where it makes conceptual sense to think in Indian Ocean terms, and it may not be helpful to attempt to squeeze all our programs and postures into what is essentially a naval strategic frame of reference.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret. All brackets are in the original. On April 21, Smith complained to Kissinger that the views of his staff were left out of this final summary, which failed to advance knowledge on Indian Ocean problems. Moreover, it set up a series of false dichotomies the result of which created a naval response without any real political or economic component and without any assessment of the competitive forces at work within the region itself. Smith concluded, “there is no analysis of the details of the threat, the local situation, and the impact of free world programs on which to base any firm conclusions on Soviet interests, our’s, or the U.K.’s or anyone else’s and how they impact on the littoral countries.” (Ibid., Box H–054, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting, Indian Ocean (NSSM 110) 4/24/71)
2. Document 54.
3. See Document 46.
4. Attached but not printed is the February 1 study entitled, “Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean 1971–1975: Response to NSSM 110.” It was submitted to members of the Senior Review Group on February 8. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110)
5. See Document 41.
6. Document 55.
7. See footnote 3, Document 55.