54. National Security Study Memorandum 1101
TO
- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
- Follow-on Study of Strategy Toward the Indian Ocean
As a follow-on to the study developed in response to NSSM 104,2 the President has directed that a further study be prepared outlining alternative U.S. strategies through 1975 for dealing with the increase in Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean area. Whereas the NSSM 104 study concentrated on Soviet naval threats and friendly naval force and basing alternatives, this study is to provide the broader framework necessary for judging a naval response in the context of other possible strategies.
This study should provide answers to the following questions:
- 1.
- What is the political significance in the Indian Ocean context
of the Soviet naval presence? In each case, attention should be
given to the effect of the passage of time.
- —What states in the area are more susceptible and less susceptible to this sort of Soviet influence?
- —In what specific ways in these states could the Soviet Union be expected to enhance its influence by increasing its naval activity?
- —In what parts of the area could local tensions develop to the point of (1) tempting Soviet exploitation and (2) producing local invitation for Soviet involvement?
- —In what specific ways in these states could an increase in Soviet naval presence be expected to work to Soviet disadvantage?
- —In these states, how does Soviet naval activity compare in effectiveness with military aid, economic assistance, political support and local Communist parties as devices for increasing Soviet influence?
- —Does Soviet political influence increase commensurately with increases in Soviet naval activity?
- 2.
- What is the military and political significance of the Soviet
naval deployments in the Indian Ocean viewed in the context of
global Soviet naval strategy and overseas deployments elsewhere?
- —What are the principal views of the relationship between Soviet naval and political strategy?
- —Against the background of the global context, what seem to be Soviet objectives in the Indian Ocean?
- —In what Indian Ocean states is the Soviet interest greatest and least?
- 3.
- What is the political significance of Chinese Communist activities, e.g. ICBM testing and political relations with littoral states?
- 4.
- What are the U.S. options in setting a strategy toward this
area? The NSSM 104 study
outlined options for a naval response. The purpose of this study
would be to develop a political framework for the naval
response.
- —In which states are U.S. and allied interests greatest and least?
- —What activities other than naval are potentially useful devices in countering Soviet influence? How do these differ in various littoral states or regions?
- —In what ways can Soviet activities be made more costly politically for the Soviets?
- —What U.S. responses are most likely to encourage or discourage response by allied governments?
- —What U.S.-allied responses are more and less likely to elicit hostile and friendly responses from the indigenous nations?
- —What is the appropriate political posture for the U.S. to take with the states in the area in connection with each strategy option?
- 5.
- If there were to be a U.S. and allied naval response to the Soviet buildup, which is the more appropriate timing for the U.S. and allied response? Is it better to move quickly to try to pre-empt further Soviet buildup or to keep pace with the Soviet buildup?
This study should be prepared by an NSC Ad Hoc Group to be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State. It should be submitted by January 22, 1971.3
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–178, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 110. Secret. A copy was sent to Moorer. Submitted to Kissinger under a December 18 covering memorandum from Kennedy, Saunders, Smith, and Sonnenfeldt. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 46.↩
- The paper was submitted to Kissinger on February 8. See Document 57 and footnote 4 thereto.↩