Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

214. Minutes of a Combined Washington Special Actions Group and Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 9, 1970, 11:40 a.m.–12:35 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Middle East and Hijacking

PARTICIPATION

• State
• CIA
• U. Alexis Johnson Richard Helms
• Rodger P. Davies
• NSC Staff
• Joseph J. Sisco
• Col. Kennedy
• Defense Hal Saunders
• David Packard Jeanne W. Davis
• Robert J. Pranger
• JCS
• Adm. Thomas Moorer
• Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

1. It is not feasible to attempt to rescue the passengers in the hijacked aircraft through the use of US military force, except as a move of desperation if we became convinced planes and passengers were to be blown up;

2. We have a plan for a military evacuation of American civilians from Jordan, and would prefer to use a US brigade from Europe, rather than forces from the US;

3. This military evacuation plan is essentially the same as that required to secure the airfield where the hijacked planes have landed, if it should be decided to attempt this move;

4. Mr. Saunders will prepare a status report on the hijacking situation and on Rochat’s efforts to negotiate an extension of the deadline and extricate the passengers;²

5. While we would prefer to use US troops for a military evacuation if Jordanian troops were not adequate, Israeli troops would be preferable to US troops for an operation in support of King Hussein against the Fedayeen and possibly the Iraqis;

6. The JCS will investigate ways in which we might put the US brigade in Germany on semi-alert for a military evacuation operation with the minimum possibility of its leaking;

7. The JCS will prepare by tomorrow:

… an analysis of what we would need to mount and sustain an operation to prop up King Hussein against the Fedayeen and possibly the Iraqis;

… an estimate of the kind of arms package we would have to provide Israel if it should undertake the operation to prop up King Hussein;

…a package of what Lebanon would need to defend itself against a Fedayeen attack.

8. We should improve our public affairs coordination, with State taking the lead.

Mr. Packard: The Israelis have requested delivery of our equipment by ship by September 22. We could get it there by air in five days, but they have asked for it by ship, in case we should be accused of being unresponsive on quick deliveries.

Mr. Johnson: I just talked with UK Ambassador Freeman who said the British had lost contact with their Embassy in Amman.

Mr. Helms: There is heavy firing in the city.

Mr. Packard: Do we have other communications?

Mr. Johnson: Our communications are no problem. I told Freeman of our conversation with Rochat who said he expected the BOAC plane to land at the desert airfield at any minute.

Dr. Kissinger: How many passengers are on board?

Mr. Saunders: One report says 63.

Mr. Johnson: [21/2 lines not declassified] The plane has 104 passengers and 10 crew abroad. A phone call from our Embassy in Amman indicated they had talked with Zaid Rifai who said the Jordanian Army has not moved into Amman. The battalion that was already there is doing the fighting. A radio broadcast was interrupted with an announcement that the King had met with the Prime Minister and Chief of Staff and that the King was instructing General Haditha, in view of the regrettable developments in Irbid, to take steps to guarantee peace.

Mr. Blee: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Johnson: The statement said the General has been instructed to look into the Irbid situation and take whatever steps were required to ensure peace. This announcement came at 10:25 this morning, our time.

Dr. Kissinger: If the King is apologizing for shelling Irbid, doesn’t this mean that he has lost control?

Mr. Davies: I interpret this announcement to mean that Hussein has asked the Army to take over the country. This is what we had hoped he would do.

Dr. Kissinger: He’s isn’t telling the General to prevent a repetition?

Mr. Davies: I think he is entrusting the Army with the task of restoring order—I hope so, at least.

Admiral Moorer: Isn’t this the first time he has done this? Hasn’t he been holding the Army off?

Dr. Kissinger: What does he mean by “taking the necessary steps to prevent a recurrence”?

Mr. Davies: He has to assure the Palestinians that they won’t be attacked in their camps by the Jordanian Army.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree that is one interpretation. The Army would take over Amman and the Palestinians should stay in their camps. We had a September 8 report saying that Hussein had lost control and that the First Brigade had defied the King and moved into Amman.³

Mr. Helms: That is the brigade doing the shelling now.

Admiral Moorer: (producing map) They are shelling this road.

Mr. Johnson: Where is the British Embassy? Where are the hotels?

Mr. Davies and Admiral Moorer: The hotels are far out the road. The British Embassy is out of the sight line from the shelling.

Dr. Kissinger: Has the deadline been extended?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, but the exact length of time has not been determined. Rochat is negotiating how much additional time has been granted.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Hal Saunders) Will you do a wrap-up of this?

Mr. Helms: (passing a paper to Saunders)⁴ This may help.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s wait until Joe Sisco arrives to discuss the diplomatic side. In the meantime, I believe we should review our military contingency planning for Jordan. I understood our discussion yesterday as rejecting any attempt to extricate the passengers from the planes for the time being.⁵ Is that correct?

Mr. Packard: (to Admiral Moorer) Has anyone come up with any idea as to what we might do for the passengers without running the risk that the guerrillas would blow up the planes?

Admiral Moorer: No. We couldn’t save these passengers in that circumstance, but we could do something to save others in the future. This is another Pueblo.

Dr. Kissinger: It was agreed that we would use force only as a move of desperation if we become convinced that the planes are about to be blown up with the passengers abroad. If a judgement is made that this is likely, how much would it take to secure that airfield?

Admiral Moorer: The Jordanian Army is already surrounding the airfield. That is not the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: But the Jordanian Army might not move at our direction. Are there any US forces we could use? How many would it take?

Admiral Moorer: We could do it with one brigade,⁶ flying out of Europe. The speed with which they could move would be affected by the time they received an alert. I believe we should alert them now and publicize the fact that we are doing it.

Mr. Johnson: No—I feel very strongly we should not alert now. We can’t put them on alert without a leak, and the minute it becomes public it could stop the efforts of Rochat and the ICRC. It could make the situation worse.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree on the desirability of an alert, but not on publicity. How much time would an alert save?

Admiral Moorer: About 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there nothing we can do in between without a leak?

Mr. Packard: There isn’t anything we can do in the US without its leaking. It might be possible to do something with troops in Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we mount some sort of NATO exercise to cover an alert?

(Mr. Sisco arrived)

Mr. Packard: The last time we already had forces on an exercise in Versailles and it was easier.

Dr. Kissinger: How fast could US troops get there from Europe?

Admiral Moorer: From 40 to 48 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose the Fedayeen say they will blow up the planes unless Israel agrees in principle to designate some prisoners for release. Suppose, contrary to our expectation, Israel is determined not to yield. What do we do?

Mr. Johnson: It is not feasible to think in terms of using American forces. The Jordanians are there. And the Israelis are closer, could move faster, and are better than our troops at this sort of thing.

Dr. Kissinger: The President would be very reluctant to use Israeli forces.

Admiral Moorer: The cease-fire would go out the window if Israeli forces were used.

Mr. Johnson: Not necessarily, if they were used only in a limited operation to rescue the passengers.

Mr. Sisco: Jordanian forces would be preferable, with US forces second and Israeli forces third. Reports from Amman in the last hour and a half indicate the situation is serious. We have been looking at our plans for evacuating our people from Amman. Alongside the contingency raised by Dr. Kissinger, we have to look at the possibility that there may be a need for US forces to go in to evacuate Americans. The two things are linked.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us put aside for now a rescue operation for the passengers. I see that as a last resort and can’t now see a situation in which we would be that desperate. Let’s look at the other contingency— use of US forces to evacuate American civilians from Amman—to see if there might be some fallout which would be applicable to the airfield situation. I see three possible situations: (1) if the planes were blown up, we might have to do something for domestic reasons.

Mr. Johnson: We have already pre-positioned the C–130s with medical supplies. If the planes are blown, we assume the Jordanian Army would secure the airfield. We would then go in with our medical supplies. Last night I sent a message to Amman suggesting that the King make it clear that, if the planes were blown, the guerrillas would all be killed. Our Embassy has replied saying the Jordanian Army would need no encouragement to do just that.⁷

Mr. Sisco: If the planes are blown up, the Jordan Army will take action. They are reluctant to make any such announcement now, however. From the point of view of the Jordan Government, the situation in Amman is the more serious one. Such an announcement might be the flashpoint which Hussein has been trying to avoid. We have just sent a telegram to our Embassies, pointing out that with each successive tiny crisis, the King’s position becomes a little weaker.⁸ We have asked their judgement as to whether we should encourage the King to come to a showdown with the Fedayeen at this point. If he delays longer, he will be weaker. At least now he still has the Army.

Dr. Kissinger: In the present situation in Jordan, the peace initiative doesn’t have a prayer. We can’t ask the Israelis to negotiate a border arrangement with a government that isn’t in control of its country.

Mr. Packard: If the planes are blown, we can then alert US forces.

Mr. Johnson: I agree—there is no problem of alerting after the planes are blown.

Dr. Kissinger: I personally don’t think it is likely that they will blow the planes. To recap, the three situations are:

1) if the planes are blown up and we have to do something for domestic reasons;

2) if the situation in Jordan breaks down and we have to mount a military evacuation of American citizens;

3) possible US assistance to Hussein in a showdown with the Fedayeen, either provoked by the Fedayeen or provoked by the King with our encouragement.

Could a military evacuation plan for Amman be adapted to the airfield situation?

Admiral Moorer: Let me review our plan for evacuation of Americans from Amman. There are two possible situations: (1) where friendly forces would be in control of the airfield; and (2) where we would have to seize the airfield. We are planning on a brigade force either all landed by aircraft if the airfield is secure, or with the 1st battalion dropped by parachute to secure the airfield and the rest landed by aircraft.

Dr. Kissinger: How long would it take them to get there after the executed order?

Admiral Moorer: 40 to 48 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: From the US?

Admiral Moorer: From Europe. The flight time from Europe is 7-1/2 hours in a C–130 and 4-1/2 hours in a C–141, so the troops would arrive rested. Flying time from the US would be 18-1/2 and 14-1/2 hours, respectively. This is from a non-alert status. If the forces used were from the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, they would have to be staged either through Greece or Incirlik.

Mr. Sisco: Or through the British base on Cyprus. I don’t think we could get approval for staging either through Greece or Turkey.

Mr. Johnson: And, of course, no staging would be required for forces from Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Why not Greece? Because of our military assistance embroglio?

Mr. Sisco: Greece might possibly agree for a limited evacuation operation.

Dr. Kissinger: If Greece would not agree, why would Cyprus?

Mr. Sisco: Makarios has been pretty good about these things. Also, he sees the base as a British sovereign base, and if the British agreed he would go along.

Dr. Kissinger: Once the forces begin to move through the staging areas, it will be known.

Admiral Moorer: Once they start to load the planes, it will become known.

Mr. Johnson: All the evidence argues for use of forces from Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have the airlift capability?

Admiral Moorer: Planes are no problem; they can get there faster than the troops can be ready. If we should be required to put forces into Jordan for any reason, the first step would be to get American civilians out. So, any operation would begin in the same way. We do have a well-thought-out plan and have made some preliminary moves, but we have not alerted anyone yet.

Mr. Johnson: Assuming a brigade operation, how would you follow it up in support of Hussein?

Admiral Moorer: By using the 82nd Airborne. We would then have four brigades: one brigade from Europe and a division from the US. We should look carefully at the second phase, however—examine our staying power, which is limited.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you look at our staying power and tell us about it?

Admiral Moorer: We may be faced with the possibility of Syria and Iraq mounting an attack on Lebanon and Jordan.

Mr. Sisco: On the political side, in the context of a limited American operation, limited to the evacuation of Americans, it would be entirely feasible militarily and, with no question of staying power, could be justified as a short-lived action appropriate to the circumstances. If, however, we should move into Option 3 or slip from Option 2 into Option 3, where we would be using US forces to prop up Hussein, the very fact that we had had to do this, could only mean a temporary prop for the King. We would have to stay for some time, and, even then, the moment we got out, the King would be in a much weaker position politically. We must lay out the political considerations along with the military.

Admiral Moorer: I am not recommending such action. I agree it would be a very tenuous situation with no end in sight.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Sisco) Are you saying it shouldn’t be done?

Mr. Sisco: Only that it could be considered only as a temporary prop for the King.

Admiral Moorer: Is there a paper which lays out options?

(The State Department paper was passed around the table)⁹

Mr. Packard: I think it most important that we get some public affairs coordination.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely. (to Mr. Johnson) Will you take the lead on this?

Mr. Sisco: Ron Ziegler and Bob McCloskey had a long talk this morning before Ron went on at 11:20. Dan Henkin and McCloskey are also in touch. There was a slight hiatus because the decision on the C–130s with the medical teams was made yesterday when I was out of the room and I was not aware of it. Also, we were not aware of the fleet movements.

Mr. Packard: The State people are not getting the information they need.

Mr. Johnson: I forgot to tell Joe about the C–130s—I didn’t realize he wasn’t in the room. In this matter, Abshire (State’s Congressional liaison) was told last night by the Defense Congressional man that Secretary Laird wanted to say something to the Congressional leadership about the C–130s. I cautioned against this.

Dr. Kissinger: The President yesterday ordered that the carrier be moved into approximately the same position as in the June Jordan crisis.¹⁰

Mr. Johnson: We didn’t know that.

Dr. Kissinger: That is my fault.

Mr. Johnson: I will ask Bob McCloskey to take the lead.

Admiral Moorer: I want to make it clear that we do have an evacuation plan, and a good one, for evacuating American citizens from Amman.

Mr. Johnson: I understand it takes 40–48 hours to bring troops in from Europe from a non-alert status, and 6–8 hours from an alert status.

(Mr. Packard left the meeting)

Admiral Moorer: The time of the alert has some bearing on this— whether it is 2:00 a.m. or 2:00 p.m.

General Zais: The first company could be there in 20 hours, with the rest of the brigade following.

Dr. Kissinger: Could one company survive?

General Zais: We would make this judgement at the time. Someone has to go in first.

Dr. Kissinger: The most realistic contingency would be military evacuation of American civilians. But this would be essentially the same as taking Dawson field. Would not the plan be interchangeable?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: So that if we get in a fix, we have a plan. If we are questioned, we could say we had a plan. If we are talking about a military evacuation it is generally agreed we should use the brigade in Germany. If we use troops out of the US we would have to stage across the Atlantic, and the warning time would be greater. Is there any exercise we could send the European brigade on, without any apparent connection with the Middle East, so that they could be on alert? Could General Goodpaster do anything? Could we look at the possibility of ginning up some exercise to keep the brigade on alert?

Admiral Moorer: I will look into it.

General Zais: One problem is that the European brigade is a dual-purpose brigade, with both an air-borne and a ground capability. The minute you start packing parachutes and readying planes you have given a signal.

Dr. Kissinger: I was thinking of things like cancelling leaves and getting troops together.

Admiral Moorer: You are talking in terms of a semi-alert.

Mr. Sisco: You could always send a General out there and call for a special inspection.

Mr. Johnson: Our first hope, of course, is that Rochat can pull a rabbit out of the hat as he did before.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Even if we put the unit on alert, 24 hours would be too long.

Mr. Johnson: Rochat might be helpful even in the event of a civilian evacuation of Amman. He has good contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: I see the weight of Sisco’s political argument. Even if we should win a civil war in Jordan, there would be nothing left behind to sustain it. However, if the President should order such a move, are we in a position to do it?

Admiral Moorer: In terms of bolstering the King, we could do it from airheads.

Dr. Kissinger: If we do not get the Fedayeen in Jordan under control, the peace initiative will go by the board. Israel has to have a government to deal with that can fulfill its obligations. The President’s instincts are to crush the Fedayeen now. Although he may reconsider, we must make sure such a move doesn’t fail because we didn’t have a good plan. Could we sustain an action to prop up Hussein? How long would we have to stay?

Admiral Moorer: We have a plan to mount such an operation. The question would be if it should spread. Given our Vietnam requirements, we might be in some difficultly with ammunition and other things. We always have to consider the next possible step.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we count on the Iraqis and Syrians becoming involved?

Admiral Moorer: It would be prudent to do so.

Dr. Kissinger: Then what?

Admiral Moorer: We would put the four brigades into Jordan to handle the situation.

Mr. Helms: Would that mean we had no strategic reserve left in the US? That scares the hell out of me.

Admiral Moorer: That’s right. That would be everything we’ve got.

General Zais: There is no other existing unit in the US. We would have to reforge a unit to go to Europe to replace the brigade. Also, the 82nd is not in great shape. It is C–2, meaning it is at about 85 percent personnel strength.

Admiral Moorer: We would send it anyway.

Dr. Kissinger: How would the battle develop?

Mr. Sisco: We would land at the airport, and move out, I assume assisting the Jordanian Army, to clean out the city. We assume the Jordanian Army could establish and sustain certain positions. The Iraqis are outside the city. If both Iraq and Syria should move, I can’t believe Israel would stand idly by. This would mean, basically, a US-Israeli operation to sustain Hussein against the Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians. The whole Arab world would have to come out in support of Iraq and Syria.

Dr. Kissinger: Suppose the King moves against the Fedayeen without US support. Would the Iraqis intervene?

Mr. Sisco: If they did, the Israelis would intervene, at Jordanian request, with ground forces.

Dr. Kissinger: That would finish the King.

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but better Israeli forces than US forces. The Israelis and Jordanians have already talked about this.

Admiral Moorer: We could always give Jordan air support from our carriers.

Dr. Kissinger: As a preliminary judgement, then, we can undertake a military evacuation, and would prefer to use US forces for this purpose if Jordanian forces are not adequate. For a defense of the King against the Fedayeen and Iraq, however, we would prefer to use Israeli forces. Is that a fair statement?

All agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: I assume if Israel moved in support of Hussein, it would be with our approval.

Mr. Sisco: At least our tacit approval. We could never convince anyone that it was done without our approval.

Dr. Kissinger: But if the Soviets or Egyptians prepare a move, we should be a position to keep the Soviets out.

Mr. Sisco: And we should be prepared to supply Israel with considerable additional wherewithal, since Israel would be expending materiel very rapidly.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) Could you get us an estimate on that overnight?

Mr. Helms: The JCS will have an awful time backstopping an operation which eliminates our strategic reserve. Anything involving four brigades would be out politically.

Dr. Kissinger: That is why Israeli forces are preferable. The missing ingredient would be enough US show of force to keep the Soviets and Egyptians out.

Mr. Helms: How big would that have to be?

Dr. Kissinger: That is the question I’m asking Admiral Moorer.

Mr. Sisco: I don’t think the Egyptians would intervene. We would have to provide the ring so far as the Russians were concerned, however. Also, Israel would need more to sustain itself against the Iraqis in a Jordan situation.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we have a package that could serve this purpose? Could we pick one of the existing alternative packages?

Mr. Sisco: We could adapt one to suit the purpose—probably by including more planes and bombs.

Dr. Kissinger: We need an analysis of what it would take to hold the ring against Russia if Israel moves in support of Hussein at the King’s request (which we would approve) against the Fedayeen alone, or against the Fedayeen and the Iraqis.

Mr. Sisco: On the Egyptian side, the Egyptians would probably move some of the SAMs closer to the Canal. Also, Russian pilots would likely become more involved. The Israeli tactic would probably be to keep the Canal area as quiet as possible. Nasser would have to step up his campaign against Israel in some way—probably by small, showy raids.

Mr. Helms: He might undertake a bombardment of the Bar Lev line.

Dr. Kissinger: We need to know: 1) what it would take to hold the ring against the Russians; and 2) what a new package to Israel would look like in terms of this objective. Can we have this by tomorrow?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Helms) Do you feel the Jordanian Army can handle the Fedayeen by itself?

Mr. Helms: Yes, if they will do it. They don’t need help to handle the Fedayeen.

Mr. Sisco: In these circumstances, the Fedayeen in Lebanon would feel they had to act. Without outside intervention, however, the Lebanese Army could do reasonably well against the Fedayeen. Lebanon would want additional military equipment, however—at least armored personnel carriers.

Dr. Kissinger: Then let’s get a package together for that too. We may be forced when this crisis is over, to address the question of crushing the Fedayeen.

Mr. Sisco: I agree the outcome might have that effect. However, a political settlement is still the best tool in terms of the Fedayeen. A substantial portion of the Palestinians still prefer a political to a military solution. It might alter our attitude, however, as to the realistic elements of a settlement. For years we have told the Israelis that the Allon plan is a non-starter.¹¹ We might look at it again in the light of changed circumstances.

Mr. Davies: After this crisis is over, and assuming Hussein is still in power, we might look [less than 1 line not declassified] to help get rid of the Fedayeen.

Dr. Kissinger: We need a plan to do it, or might decide to jiggle our notion of peace terms, depending on events. (To Mr. Johnson) Are we clear that we won’t agree to treat dual US-Israel nationals on the planes as anything but US nationals?

Mr. Johnson: Absolutely—this is fundamental. Any other notion is out.

Dr. Kissinger: This group should meet again tomorrow.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Nodis. This meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Kissinger is not listed as a participant but he chaired the meeting.
2. Saunders’s report was finalized as a memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, September 9, 3:30 p.m. The memorandum notes that the PFLP provided an extension on its ultimatum, although it gave no time limit for the ultimatum. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings)
3. CIA Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB–315/04645–70, September 8, 1806Z. (Ibid., Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)
4. Not further identified.
5. Presumably the morning meeting in Secretary Rogers’s office; see footnote 3, Document 209.
6. A handwritten notation replaced “battalion” with “brigade.”
7. Telegram 4495 from Amman, September 9, 1305Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12) For text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–1972, Document 53.
8. Not further identified.
9. Department of State paper entitled “Contingencies for Hijacking Crisis.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, WSAG & SRG Meetings, Middle East and Hijacking 9/9/70)
10. Throughout the first half of 1970, sporadic fighting broke out between King Hussein’s forces and the fedayeen. In June 1970, 2 weeks of intense fighting erupted, which led U.S. policymakers to consider sending U.S. forces into Jordan. Documentation on this is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.
11. Conceived in July 1967 by Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, the Allon Plan called for Israel to maintain a row of fortified settlements along the Jordan River to provide Israel a security buffer from future Arab attacks but leaving the rest of the West Bank demilitarized.